笔记 - Iran: A Modern History

Abbas Amanat, Iran: A Modern History (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2017)

Introduction

Persian tripartite model of authority: clerical establishment+state power+prophetic paradigm

象棋作为伊朗政治的隐喻: Few shahs over the long course of Iranian history managed to maintain the formidable “balance” of both the polity and society at large without being isolated to the point of checkmate. The mobility and versatility of the minister or queen (including his or her revivification to the stage from the position of a negotiating pawn) as opposed to the shah’s isolated vulnerability is a telling commentary on the hazards of ministerial office as head of the divan.

中央和边缘的关系：The delicate arrangement between the center and the periphery was at the core of the idea of the King of Kings (shahan-shah), a key notion in Persian political culture. The interplay between Iranshahr and its periphery generated a central theme in pre-twentieth-century Iran and was a decisive force in shaping political authority even in the Islamic classical period, when the land of Iran became fragmented or was annexed to a larger Islamic empire. 十世纪以来几乎所有的伊朗王朝都来自游牧边缘，或者被其支持。

Major tribes on the northern Iranian periphery, at least from the mid-Safavid period, were Turkish speaking (such as the Shahseven of Azarbaijan) or Kurdish. Before the conscription army of the twentieth century, the tribes were the backbone of Iran’s fighting force, and the presence of tribal regiments of different ethnicities in the dynastic armies of the Safavid and post-Safavid periods was the norm. 主要是骑兵

波斯城市的格局：Citadel+Bazaar+Maydan(公共广场)

The large-scale merchants (tojjar) dominated the trade and finances of the bazaar, as well as its political orientation and loyalty. They were an indigenous equivalent of a bourgeoisie with a strong capitalist ethos, but in contrast to their European counterparts, they were often introverted in their private lives and pious in negotiating an Islamic mercantile ethics. Yet in times of crisis they did not hesitate to incite the bazaar to protest, often against government intervention in the market. 在现代也是重要的经济、政治力量，关闭bazaar常被用来做政治武器

The Shahnameh, and the cultural milieu associated with it, had a lasting effect on Persian awareness even before Shi‘ism became Iran’s state creed in the sixteenth century.

One should note that the Persianate cultural domain was about the only one in the entire Islamic world that over a long period of time preserved and advanced a vibrant and comprehensive musical tradition with an extensive body of lyrical, romance, and epic verse and literature entirely of non-Islamic origin and inspiration

Despite political defeat and the relatively swift conversion to Islam, it can be argued that Iran never was fully won over by the predominant culture of normative Islam. It converted to Islam at its own pace and on its own terms, and with paradigms and practices it improvised along the way.

As early as the sixth century CE, Sasanian Iran came up with a dictum that symbolized and sanctified the need for a bond between the state and the religious establishment, above all to combat heresies, which were often labeled “bad religion.” 和现代的政教分离不同, 波斯政治理论家认为“好政府”和“好宗教”是一对兄弟，相辅相成，谁也离不开谁。实际情况：state-religion relationship was guarded at best and antagonistic at worst. In some respects the tension reverberated between them all up to the Islamic Revolution in the late twentieth century.

The practice of “temporary marriage” (popularly known as siqeh), as sanctioned by Shi‘i law, gave women some agency through their choice of partner, as well as duration and terms of the marriage.

白奴隶、黑奴隶：从高加索地区掳来的白奴隶服务后宫生孩子，从波斯湾进口的东非黑奴隶做显贵家奴，二十世纪初据估计2%的人口是奴隶后代。波斯湾沿岸有传统上从事渔业的黑人。对男女奴隶的刻板印象：Male slaves were often stereotyped as shrewd and witty, and females as trusted practitioners of white magic. 有描述奴隶使唤主人的喜剧传统“black acting” (siyah-bazi)。

1 SHI‘ISM AND THE SAFAVID REVOLUTION (1501–1588)

十六世纪初，Safavid王朝的崛起，和立什叶伊斯兰为国教，是地区历史的转折点。

Since its inception, Shi‘ism has been imbued with a cult of suffering and martyrdom. It also has prompted numerous messianic movements with crucial roles in the shaping of Islamic history.

Safavid王朝崛起时的世界形势：

十五世纪后半叶， Ottoman，Safavid，Mughal，中亚的Uzbek confederacy都是Persianate帝国。

什叶崛起类似于宗教改革，逊尼反应类似于反宗教改革，逊尼什叶对立可与同时期的新教天主教对立对比. Herat，Samarkan，Tabriz的文艺大发展和欧洲文艺复兴同期。

Both empires, Safavid and Ottoman, remained essentially introverted and unable to seriously engage with new trends that rapidly were changing Europe of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

Safavi王朝崛起时伊朗形势：十三世纪蒙古入侵以来三百年的混乱；十五世纪后半叶Timurid帝国衰落；政治分裂，城邦混战

Safavid House的背景：祖上是库尔德贵族，和Ahl-e Haqq有渊源，十二世纪时，Ismail I的六世祖Safi alDin Ardabili 迁到阿塞拜疆东北，是当地的Safavi Sufi Order（still Sunni）的创办者和领袖。到十五世纪时，Safavid Sufis发生明显转变：adopted a form of Shi‘ism with messianic proclivities and increasingly became a crusading force with overt political ambitions.

Ottoman帝国和埃及Burji Mamluks王朝之间的政治真空为西伊朗地区势力的崛起（如Turkmen王朝Aq Qoyonlu）留出空间。后来Safavid政治文化受到Aq Qoyonlu不少影响。为了控制Safavi Order，Aq Qoyonlu统治者和Safavi Order领导者家族通婚。Ismail I的祖先于是可以trace到拜占庭皇室（Aq Qoyunlu统治者和黑海地区Trebizond希腊王国的统治者家族，十三世纪时为躲避十字军从君士坦丁堡跑出来的拜占庭王室的后裔，通婚）。

Safavi Order的厉害之处：combined mystical and military appeal to the Turkmen warriors (不少是Ottoman扩张带来的失地牧民) of the region. Organized into a Turkmen confederacy, possibly as early as the 1480s, the Qezilbash (Turkish for “the red heads”), as their enemies first called them是Safavid王朝早期征战的主力。

Qezilbash的信仰是非正统的（注：好像和Alevism属于同类）Anatolia东部/伊朗西北部信仰。What was remarkable about these nonorthodox trends in the borderlands was a dormant form of messianism, one untouched by the strictures of urban Islam. As it turned out, the heretical “extremism” of the Safavi order, as its opponents saw it, would successfully channel an amorphous nomadic mass of followers into a powerful military force.

In the early sixteenth century, there were seven major “tribes” of the Qezilbash, all of whom shared 游牧/半游牧生活方式, 土耳其语, a “messianic”信仰, 对Ottoman的仇恨.

Isma‘il epitomized the revolutionary process that propelled him into the dual position of a Persian shah and a Sufi master.Even though he was still in his teens, to his senior followers, Isma‘il appeared to be a sacred leader who had come to avenge the martyrdom of his forefathers and deliver worldly blessings of land, flocks, and slaves to the Qezilbash.

To a mix of Turkmen messianism and ancestral claims, Isma‘il added a third element of Twelver Shi‘ism. Isma‘il himself was not particularly keen on practicing the Twelver (or Ja‘fari) law, but it was this brand of Shi‘ism that he came to promote with zeal throughout his reign.

Ismail I的目标：建立什叶国家+什叶社会。武力推广+系统灌输。从黎巴嫩请什叶学者（没有本地人际网络，不构成政治威胁）。

Ismail I时期的分工与制衡：军事靠Turkmen，官僚治国靠Persian。Qezilbash和本地Persian之间存在tension。Isma‘il试图维持Qezilbash和Persian对手间的脆弱平衡。

东征Herat和Marv（今土库曼斯坦Merv），确立帝国东界。打败当地的Uzbek统治者Shayban Khan后，把头骨做成酒杯，把砍下来的右臂送给Babur（Mughal王朝的创立者），把头皮送给Ottoman的Sultan Bayazid II，剩下的身体让Qezilbash吃了？

Safavid王朝的崛起启发了Ottoman境内Turkmen起义，如Shah-Qoli Baba的起义。Bayazid II选择和Safavid讲和。Bayazid II的儿子Salim I则敌意强烈，发起anti-Safavid宣传，向Safavid宣战（”The eternal reward for killing one Shi‘i, a fatwa by the mufti of Istanbul declared, was equal to killing seventy Christian infidels.”）。

Salim I和Ismail I的信件来往十分搞笑。Ismail I试图解除敌意但是没用。1514年，Salim I带十六万大军攻打Safavid。Ismail I仅带了两万人（当时东线正在和Uzbek作战，抽不出更多兵力；Ismail I低估了Salim I的敌意，也一直试图回避正面交战；对Qezilbash的战斗力过于自信，轻敌）在Chaldiran（不打不行了，快打到首都Tabriz啦）迎战。

The fatalist strain running through Isma‘il’s political life appeared strange even to his own Qezilbash lieutenants. Whether to overcome combat fright or out of sheer self-confidence, he and his Qezilbash chiefs spent the night before the battle drinking until dawn. 开战当天早上Ismail I还在打鸟！

Safavid不重视火器（原因之一，认为使用火器不够骑士精神，Qezilbash自认为神佑天兵，也看不上火器），而Ottoman军队火力强大。Chaldiran之战后Safavid才开始重视火器，过了一百年才在这方面赶上Ottoman。最后Safavid惨败，Ismail I本人差点被活捉，老婆Tajlu Khanum被活捉了（但后来又自己从Ottoman人手里逃出来了），爱妃Behruzeh Khanum被捉到伊斯坦布尔作为战利品赏赐给军事人员了。不久Tabriz陷落，Safavid眼看要完，但是出于对Janissary造反的恐惧，Ottoman军队没在Tabriz久留就离开了。Ottoman军队从Tabriz带到伊斯坦布尔的战利品里包括一批画家，书法家，插画师，这些人后来对Ottoman艺术影响不小。

Salim I曾计划和乌兹别克人瓜分伊朗，畅想伊斯法罕会师，但是从未实现。腹背受敌 remained in place throughout the Safavid and post-Safavid periods.

Chaldiran之战的失败给Safavid革命热情浇了一大盆冷水，也让Ismail I作为sacred leader的个人威信大打折扣。喝酒喝得更猛了，人也更忧郁了，不再亲征。开始从魅力领袖到传统Persian kingship的持续几代的转型。

至少四个世纪, 伊朗被Ottoman切断了（经黑海的）和地中海世界的直接政治、商业联系。

Chaldiran之战后，although Alawite communities in Anatolia periodically revolted against the Ottomans during the Jelali revolts of the mid to late sixteenth century, 输出什叶革命不再可能。

但是Ottoman从未成功征服Safavid，原因一是后勤限制，原因二是Ottoman精锐部队Janissaries还有Ikinji轻骑兵是Bektashi Order的，同情什叶派。

关于Ismail I本人：诗人（笔名Khatai，可能是“契丹”？）, 打猎成瘾, 男女通吃情人无数, 重度抑郁，死时年仅三十七岁。 A curious mix of unbridled prowess, violent tantrum, princely affection, and a streak of genius, Isma‘il seemed an unlikely candidate to build an empire. Yet he proved an ideal leader for a messianic enterprise that brought together, a cacophony of erratic Turkmen chiefs, shrewd Persian administrators, and Arab jurists. He harnessed the warlike energies of his Turkmen devotees and diverted them remarkably into a state structure with a lasting future. In this respect, his initiative to adopt Twelver Shi‘ism as a state creed with legal and institutional capabilities was a conscious policy upon which he intended to build a state and a community of believers.

Isma‘il’s vision of the state was neither purely messianic nor juristic; it was primarily based on the Persian model of kingship. Ismail I本人痴迷波斯文化，尤其喜欢Shahnameh，给三个儿子都用Shahnameh里的人物起名（给剩下的一个儿子起名Alqas，意思是复仇，结果这个儿子后来投奔Ottoman了…）。Safavid史官把Safavid vs Uzbek比喻为Shahnameh里的Iran vs Turan。Ismail I的死敌Salim I也特别喜欢Shahnameh。The kingship paradigm to which they all subscribed, from the Ottoman Empire to South Asia and Central Asia, offered a common Persianate political culture despite widening of sectarian divide. （Ismail I晚期喜欢上画画，据说曾给Shah Tahmasp著名的插图版Shahnameh画画。1568年，Tahmasp把手稿献给苏莱曼的儿子Salim II作为登基礼物，收藏在Topkapi宫的皇家图书馆。二十世纪成为流失文物，大都会博物馆靠拍卖发了一笔财👎）

Tahmasp’s era is remembered as an age of clerical consolidation, when Shi‘i jurists, Arab emigrants, and indigenous Iranians gained prominence in government and in society at large.

Denouncing the Sunni “other” helped reinforcing doctrinal conformity as much as it encouraged a state-sponsored spirit of intolerance. Yet unlike宗教裁判所, Safavid Iran never institutionalized systematic intrusion in the life of individuals.

为了回应Sunni邻居的异端指控，取得更大的legitimacy，Safavids开始声称拥有神圣血统。从Tahmasp开始，自称血统可以追溯到‘Ali ibn Musa al-Rida, the Eighth Shi‘i Imam, whose shrine in Mashhad was the most venerated site in Safavid Iran.

苏莱曼在位时三次出征Safavid，主要为了领土和抢掠。Qezilbash部落的不忠，以及部分地区的人对Safavid王朝强行推广什叶的不满，为Ottoman入侵创造条件。

Ottoman和Safavid长期争夺高加索。基督徒/异教徒奴隶是一大诱惑。Safavid后宫里充满了高加索女子（Ottoman一样）。男奴隶组成军队，类似Ottoman的Janissaries系统。

1548年，Tahmasp把首都从Tabriz迁到Qazvin，the decision to move to the Persian-speaking interior and away from the original Qezilbash base in Azarbaijan was a turning point in the further “Persianization” of the Safavid Empire。

1555年和Ottoman签订Amasya和平协议，划定两国边界，直到二十世纪都定义着伊朗的西界。

为了平衡Uzbek和Ottoman，和Mughal关系友好。印度Mughal帝国皇帝Homayun曾长期在Tahmasp宫廷避难，回德里的时候带走大量画师，工匠，学者，对Mughal文化影响巨大。Mughal帝国宗教政策比较宽容，后来又有大量波斯知识分子出走Mughal。

Tahmasp晚期出现继位危机，Safavid差点解体，变成Qezilbash军阀割据混战的局面。

As the early career of the young ‘Abbas I, the ultimate successor to the throne, demonstrates, the Safavid princes were no more than puppets whose only other refuge from their manipulative Qezilbash guardians was their mothers and other female members of the royal household.

Safavid后宫女性崛起和Mughal后宫女性崛起，以及Ottoman帝国著名的“sultanate of the women”基本同期。The coincidence of women’s influence was probably because all three empires experienced a similar, if not identical, pattern of political transition.

Ismail II继位：同父异母的妹妹Pari-khan Khanum功不可没。Pari-khan的妈是Circassian奴隶，她取得了其它Circassian奴隶来源的军政人士的支持，和部分Qezilbash部落结盟，把对手搞了下去。

Ismail II被Tahmasp关在阿塞拜疆的某个要塞里二十年，性格乖张，喜食鸦片。一上台就处死大量其它皇家人员和Qezilbash反对者。一反anti-Sunni宗教政策，不进行强制转化和迫害。Ismail II在位两年就蹊跷死亡。死亡时刚和男情人共度春宵。虽然可能死于鸦片过量，但也不排除谋杀。如果Ismail II活得更久些，可能会把Safavid王朝变得更加包容并和Sunni邻国改善关系？

Ismail II死后是宫斗和内战时间。最后Qezilbash首领推举Tahmasp的长子Sultan Mohammad继位。Mohammad无实权，权力实际被Qezilbash寡头控制。老婆Khayr al-Nesa（Mahd ‘Olya）则掌握宫中权力。Ismail II的妹妹Pari-khan Khanum失势，后来被谋杀，宫中Circassian派系陨落。Mahd ‘Olya搞不定Qezilbash，最后被一群Qezilbash首领入宫杀掉，编织的罪名是和在Qazvin避难的克里米亚王子通奸。

1578-1590年间Safavid王朝十分虚弱。Ottoman趁虚而入。Murad III四次入侵。1584年入侵的借口是“解放被Safavid压迫的高加索基督徒”“为Ismail II报仇”。1585年，Tabriz陷落，并把什叶男女掳为奴隶。东线Uzbek也趁虚而入，什叶男女被卖到中亚奴隶市场。The fatwas of the Sunni muftis in Istanbul and Bukhara legitimized enslaving the Safavid subjects on the grounds of their heretic Shi‘i beliefs.

In the midst of civil strife and foreign invasion, the governor of Herat, a Qezilbash chief by the name of ‘Ali Qoli Khan Shamlu, declared the ten-year old ‘Abbas Mirza, the prince in his custody, the nominal Safavid shah of Khorasan in 1581. 1587年在Qazvin继位，即Shah ‘Abbas.

The early Safavid experience demonstrated that southern Mesopotamia, eastern Anatolia, and southern parts of Central Asia could no longer be easily incorporated into Iran proper despite common Persianate cultural, religious, and ethnic ties. Isma‘il’s world-conquering project was bound to stop at the threshold of Iran’s natural frontiers.

2 THE AGE OF ‘ABBAS I AND THE SHAPING OF THE SAFAVID EMPIRE (1588–1666)

Few rulers in Iranian history are as idealized in public memory as ‘Abbas I, and few epochs as cherished as his reign (1588–1629). He was seen as an empire builder who rose to the challenges of his time.

Abbas非常独立，出于自身经历（父亲在位时无实权，母亲和兄弟在与Qezilbash的权斗中被杀，在Qezilbash控制下长大），憎恨Qezilbash霸权。继位后以谋反、制造内斗等罪名处决了一大批Qezilbash chiefs。

处决Qezilbash相对顺利的原因： erosion of Qezilbash fighting power and the breakdown of clan loyalties

Abbas I通过推行shahisevan（love for the shah）加强Qezilbash士兵直接对其本人的忠诚。‘Abbas exploited this sense of solidarity not only to undermine the Qezilbash elite but also to uphold it as a principle, a political motto, and even an institution upon which he could rebuild the Safavid army and administration. 减少对Qezilbash的依赖，使用其它ethnicity的军队，更加倚重奴隶。The Qezilbash was effectively stripped of its status as a cohesive tribal elite in control of a semiautonomous military force.

将大量tribe迁到东北边境抵御Uzbek。埋下部落冲突的种子

The key to ‘Abbas’s shahisevan solidarity and the cornerstone of his centralizing policy was the effective use of firearms. Cannon helped consolidate power in ‘Abbas’s hands, established a rapport with Europe, and augmented Safavid Iran’s image of itself as a victorious power. Equipped with artillery and reinforced by musketeer corps, for a limited time in the first half of the seventeenth century the Safavid army reached an effective optimal balance between the traditional methods of warfare and the new military technology and tactics.

What also gave ‘Abbas’s career a flavor of the common trends in the empires of the early modern times were a clearer sense of military strategy and political priorities. 如先和Ottoman讲和，平定内乱和东部边界后再打Ottoman，收复失地。

1598年，Abbas I重新夺回呼罗珊。之后迁都Isfahan。迁都的sense：位于Safavid中心；离波斯湾更近；在连结伊朗和阿富汗印度的陆路商道的中心；靠近 Zayandehrud河，水资源丰富；人才多

Abbas I’s economic interventionist policies and deliberate mix of business and government heralded a political economy in tune with the European state mercantilism of his age.

The cornerstone of his economic reform policy was to shift the landholding pattern from hereditary fiefdoms to state-controlled renewable land tenures (tuyul) assigned as estates to the members of the Persian and gholam elite.

Silk was the most plausible, perhaps the only, cash commodity at ‘Abbas’s disposal in order to compensate for the paucity of other nonagrarian source of wealth.

Ottoman和Safavid争夺高加索的丝绸生产中心。1605年，Abbas I下令把亚美尼亚的丝绸生产中心的Julfa的居民全部转移，部分转移到首都Isfahan，划出New Julfa区，令其从事丝绸贸易（亚美尼亚人商业网络广泛；亚美尼亚商人可以相对安全地穿越Safavid-Ottoman边境）。之后夷平Julfa，让Ottoman死心。The nurturing of an Armenian mercantile network was ‘Abbas’s answer to the Ottoman blockade of what would potentially be his most profitable commodity.

为了进一步发展丝绸生产，把亚美尼亚和格鲁吉亚的丝农迁到里海沿岸的Gilan（Safavid的丝绸生产中心）。

买来或者捉来的亚美尼亚人和格鲁吉亚人改宗后在政府里做高官，典型如Allah-Verdi Khan。Abbas I时代，基督徒发挥着和人口占比不成比例的重要作用。亚美尼亚人（They were viewed as a window to the outside world and a key medium for enticing and sustaining Europe’s diplomatic and commercial interests toward Iran.）成最大赢家，比犹太人和其它minority受益都多。New Julfa大发达，各种修漂亮教堂如Vank教堂。

Abbas I对西方很感兴趣，对欧洲政治最新情况很熟悉。

十六世纪初葡萄牙人就试图控制波斯湾Hormuz海峡，巴林1521年落入葡萄牙人之手。葡萄牙人长期控制波斯丝绸的南线海路出口，和威尼斯人在地中海东部的丝绸贸易形成竞争。

Despite a cultural divide and geographical distance, by the late sixteenth century Iran’s geopolitical destiny was curiously tied up with Europe’s. 试图和反Ottoman的其它欧洲势力，如西班牙哈布斯堡王朝，还有俄国人，结盟，但是Ottoman封锁给外交来往造成不少障碍。（后来和Ottoman讲和，不再需要搞反Ottoman联盟）

一批各怀鬼胎的欧洲外交官以及冒险家访问Safavid谈商业军事合作。Safavid派出的使团各种不靠谱，有把货物卖掉自己吞钱的，还有改宗天主教的如“Don Juan of Persia”。派到英国的使团虽然合作没谈成（受到英国的ottoman支持者的反对），但是使者（打扮成Qezilbash的英国人）的服饰在Stuart朝廷掀起了一股波斯时尚旋风。

‘Abbas’s diplomacy worked to the extent that it not only opened Iran to European commerce and curiosity but also forged stronger bonds with Mughal India and eventually with the Shaybanid Uzbeks of Central Asia.

和东印度公司建立贸易关系。鼓励英国人和葡萄牙人竞争。和英国人合作从葡萄牙人手中夺回Holmuz海峡。后来又在英国人和荷属东印度公司之间搞平衡。

葡萄牙人虽然从伊比利亚赶走了犹太人，但在和Safavid丝绸贸易时却依赖犹太人（有的就是被赶走的）。葡萄牙人势力衰落，犹太人也不好过。十七世纪早期Safavid反犹政策可能是受了欧洲人影响。

Having been a land power, the Safavids, similar to the Mughals of Hindustan, had difficulty adopting the sea culture of their southern and northern peripheries. 葡萄牙人走后荷兰人垄断了海路丝绸出口。本地的丝绸商人（如Isfahan的亚美尼亚人）利益受损。

Trade through Bandar Abbas and other southern ports was essential for incorporating the Persian Gulf littoral into the Safavid Empire, in much the same way that exporting silk produced in Gilan province through the northern route integrated the Caspian provinces into Safavid Iran.

Europeans traced the material evidence of Persia’s ancient past and its place in the biblical and Greco-Roman experience. Some of the earliest Orientalist representations of the East were shaped by images of the Safavid court, culture, and society.

在Safavid伊朗生活并出版游记的欧洲人：Pietro Della Valle Adam Olearius John Chardin

Montesquieu’s Lettres persanes relied in part on both Olearius and Chardin and the format of their journals to portray an imaginary Persian observer of French society.

Precious little was ever written about Europe by Safavid authors beyond passing geographical references, mostly based on classical Islamic texts rather than on fresh learning and observation. Early modern European thinkers and their scientific discoveries remained unknown to the Safavids even as late as early nineteenth century.

该时期波斯语的对中国的描述（如Khataynameh）很少。 The Chinese-style figures that Persian artists portrayed in their paintings were about the only memory still alive of 波斯与中国的长期文化交流。

Although a small Armenian printing house with Armenian typeface did exist in New Julfa at the time, the idea of printing seems not to have impressed Iranians for a long time.

宗教控制加强，打压异端，sufis日子不好过，连Safavi Order都名存实亡。边境关闭，邻国敌意，让喜欢长距离游走的dervishes旅行困难。伊斯兰千年之际出现 Noqtavi 运动. The Noqtavis’ conscious attempt to break away from the dominant religion of the time was a rare phenomenon in Islamic history. Sense of historical progression stood in contrast to the veneration of the past in normative Islam. In its origins, Noqtavism was the most cerebral and systematic manifestation of the greater qalandari movement of the late Islamic Middle Ages. The alternative convents of the Noqtavis in the Safavid period, so far as the sources inform us, were more about music, wine, appreciation of nature, good food, and intellectual discourse than formalities of the shari‘a. We may assume that it was the growing popularity of the Noqtavis, and their anti-jurist and even anti-state ideas, which turned the shah against them. The Noqtavis were persecuted under Tahmasp, but it was ‘Abbas’s millennial anxieties that persuaded him to eradicate the agnostic heretics. Noqtavis称伊斯兰教千年（Hijra calendar）时要完，Abbas I千年刚过就下手打击，指责其通敌Mughal。不过Mughal印度宫廷确实后来受到从伊朗出走的Noqtavis的影响，皇帝Akbar推崇的Divine Creed (din-e elahi)就有Noqtavism成分。

The more the Ottoman and Uzbek states turned to Sunni orthodoxy, the more the Safavids became dogmatic Shi‘is, and so closing the geopolitical horizons of Iranian territory and society.

Safavid哲学：The shift in the Safavid state’s ideology allowed conservative jurists to articulate an ethos of pious legalism through law, ritual, and sacred myth. The Safavid age also nurtured a new generation of thinkers akin to mystical and philosophical thought, even at times engaging in proto-modern themes that otherwise were entertained only by antinomian trends outside the confines of normative Islam.

受官方资助庇护，生产“安全”（相对于Noqtavism）的思想：School of Isfahan，代表人物Shaykh Baha’i，Sadr al-Din Shirazi (Mulla Sadra)

By the late seventeenth century the promising intellectual momentum seems to have come to its end. Most evident in this respect was the late Safavid scholars’ engagement with the study of hadith (traditions) and akhabr (reports) related from the Prophet and the Shi‘i Imams, a pedantic preoccupation that clearly contrasted with the speculative thinking of earlier generations.

Mulla Mohammad Baqer Majlesi 影响力大的正统人物，钳制思想，迫害宗教少数

The anti-intellectualism of the Safavid ulama, had hardly changed even after two centuries of Persianization: obsession with the hadith, legal conservatism, ritualization of Shi‘ism, rejecting diversity, and popularizing of a tearful myth of suffering of the Imams. Their hostility toward Persian literary and artistic pursuits, and condescending attitude even toward their lay constituency, was typical of their sociocultural orientation. The Iranian public reserved great ambivalence for the ulama, a sort of love-hate relationship, revering them for their hard-tounderstand learning and for their sanctified posture, and despising them for their haughtiness, hypocrisy, and greed—all of which is highlighted vividly in Persian literature.

国家大力支持ulama：The ulama served the state as moral police, defining learning, disciplining leisure, promoting uniformity, and sharpening the divide between the “saved” Shi‘i and the “damned” Other

Until the time of Majlesi, weapons of social control, even when fortified with the sanctity of the hadith, were not fully in place. Leisure and artistic inspirations remained strong.

The jurists’ attack on philosophy and on organized and theoretical Sufism proved more effective. Philosophy, the most vulnerable of all, was banished to small and inconsequential circles at the margins of the madrasa. 窒息气氛下知识分子出走印度：多数消极避世。

The Safavid imperial model and its theory of legitimacy proved to endure long after the Safavids’ demise. Most of these features were shared with contemporary Mughal India, Qing China, the Ottoman Empire, and Habsburg Spain.

问题：Neither Shah ‘Abbas nor his successors were able to overcome the institutional limitations in the Safavid system. Weakening of the Qezilbash and its replacement with a gholam class did not end tribal conflicts, which soon flared up spectacularly. The silk monopoly proved viable, but efforts to create an indigenous trading network competitive with the European trading companies was transient. The Safavids never developed a maritime empire and showed no interest in creating a naval power. Their overland territorial expansion paid off in the southern Caucasus and Persian Gulf, and less so in Iraq, but revenue from these sources was not a long-term remedy for the state’s shortfall. Centralization of the agrarian regime raised revenue but over the long term actually weakened Safavid defenses.

3 THE DEMISE OF THE SAFAVID ORDER AND THE UNHAPPY INTERREGNUMS (1666–1797)

1722年，阿富汗Sunni chief Mahmud Hotaki打进Isfahan，迫Safavid国王Shah Soltan Hosain退位，成为Mahmud Shah，Safavid灭亡。

The dramatic collapse of the Safavids and their surrender to a small tribal army raises questions about the economic and administrative problems of the empire, as well as political legitimacy, Shi‘i identity, changes long occurring at the Iranian periphery, and shifting regional patterns across the Eurasian world.

问题：高官位置不稳，没有足够权力制衡王室，内斗严重；王子在后宫长大，即位前没有公共经验，缺乏政治教育，又因为继位斗争担心自己的安全，很多沉迷酒精和性，精神状况堪忧，治国能力不行。

梅毒肆虐：从欧洲经Ottoman传入。Among the members of the royal house, behavior such as abrupt killings, mutilation, self-inflicted wounds, and utter feebleness might be taken as either withdrawal symptoms or as signs of mental degeneration associated with contracted or congenital syphilis.

十七世纪经济稳定，文艺发展，民间业余诗歌创作发达。咖啡屋，酒馆，妓院数量增加。Admiring the beauty of youth, often male, became acceptable through the lyrics and paintings of the period.

咖啡屋是自由交流表达的场所：棋牌，念诗（史诗和什叶主题故事如Hamzanama），音乐舞蹈。 One cannot fail to note the budding Safavid public space comparable not only to similar Ottoman and Egyptian establishments, but also to French salons and English coffeehouses of the period.

Safavid晚期饮酒盛行，鸦片流行，男女卖淫tolerated（taxed and regulated by the state）。烟草开始流行。

边患不断：高加索（半游牧部落、哥萨克，干扰里海陆路贸易），西部（库尔德人），南部（Oman海盗干扰波斯湾贸易，Khuzestan 起义不断），东南（Baluch部落干扰和印度贸易 ）。

阿富汗坎大哈Ghalzai Afghan部落造反：长期和Mughal争夺此地（军事、经济价值），当地人不喜欢波斯人，对Safavid的anti-Sunni政策不满。1701年坎大哈mayor Mir Vays Hotaki在Mughal朝廷和麦加支持下造反。二十年后其子在Afghan、Baluch部落支持下打进Safavid腹地，围城Isfahan。

Shah Soltan Hosain无力应对阿富汗危机。刚刚因为“亲Sunni”指控处决了grand vizier Fath Ali Khan Daghestani和他的亲信，军政不稳。The downfall of the shrewd Lezgian minister, who earlier had established his power base in Georgia, was one example of how the spread of Shi‘ism in the Safavid realms gradually eroded tribal support for the empire on the Sunni periphery. Safavid军队被数量少得多的阿富汗部落军打败。Mahmud入城后，开始对前朝官员、市民还比较大度，后来发现人们对Safavid忠诚度颇高，开始大开杀戒。

Isfahan陷落后Ottoman以“帮Safavid Shah复位”名义入侵。1726年Ashraf Hotaki下令处决末代Safavid Shah Soltan Hosain。

赶走阿富汗人后仍然混乱了几十年。复辟Safavid失败，强人Nader Shah Afshar崛起 etc。

此段时期部落造反不断的可能原因之一是气候变化。十七世纪末到十八世纪小冰期: 此时期西亚的游牧部落造反爆发也影响到了Ottoman和Mughal。On the Iranian plateau, the shaping of new Afghan warring confederacies, both the Ghalzai takeover of Kandahar and the occupation of Herat by the rival Abdali tribes, may be attributed to the same climatic changes. The simultaneous rise of the Baluch tribes in the Makran, the Kurdish tribes in northwestern Iran, and the Cossacks and Lezgians in the Transcaucasus, all soon followed by unrest among the Afsharids and other tribes of Khorasan, the Kurdish tribes of the northern and eastern Iranian periphery, and the confederacy of frontier Turkmens in the northeast, may also be contributed to the same phenomenon.

气候变化也影响到Safavid腹地：Repeated crop failures and recurring droughts coincided with the shrinking of the agricultural hinterlands, decline of trade in Persian Gulf and Mediterranean ports, and the depopulation of the cities. 1666年宫廷占星家曾建议Shah暂时退位以避免大灾。

Safavid军队解散，武器流落民间，助力部落造反。十八世纪部落占领不断，摧毁居民区，bazaar经济瘫痪，旅行和贸易受到严重干扰。丝绸贸易崩溃。Not until the beginning of the nineteenth century did trade in the Persian Gulf recover, and even then it did not reach the heights of the Safavid period.

The tax burden and inflationary pressures, even before the fall of the Safavids, became intolerable enough under Solayman and Soltan Hosain that the peasants and nomads had to be forcefully kept on the land and prevented from fleeing. This policy of near serfdom, previously alien to the Islamic world, may help explain the explosion of restlessness among the nomadic and seminomadic tribes once the central state had largely collapsed.

人口和Ottoman，Mughal比相对较少，收入不足。

全球通胀危机的影响：A shortage of currency, hoarding by state authorities and the privileged classes, drainage of currency, and overall weakening of the agrarian base intensified the empire’s fiscal crisis. the siphoning off of Persian silver by the Dutch and English trading companies to Europe and by Indian traders (banyans) to the subcontinent had a long-term negative impact. between 1642 and 1660, the Dutch East India Company smuggled the equivalent of more than nine million guilders from Iran, a gigantic drainage of spices profoundly contributive to the Safavid insolvency. The cycle of trade from Europe through the Ottoman Empire, Iran, and to Mughal India generated three to four fold profit for European trading companies at the expense of impoverishing the empires of the east.

俄国人和Ottoman趁虚而入：俄国人进犯南高加索和里海沿岸地区。Ottoman和俄国人争高加索。Ottoman一开始支持阿富汗造反，后来当阿富汗人要收回被Ottoman夺走的Safavid失地时，又转而支持Safavid复辟。

By 1727 Safavid Iran had nearly ceased to exist as an empire. The Afghans, their rule harsh and alien to the Shi‘i Iranians, held only a semblance of control over what was left of Iran. Within a few short years not only the most prosperous northern and western provinces were snatched away; cities and countryside throughout the empire were depleted, nomadic forces on the periphery were in rebellion, and confidence in the culture and social order was at its lowest ebb. Isfahan的Safavid state archives 被毁。

试图复辟的Tahmasp II寻求Qajar部落的支持。

Nader-Qoli崛起。结束post-Safavid时期的外国占领但也彻底葬送Safavid的军事奇才Nader Shah Afshar (r. 1736–1747)后世历史评价争议大。His countrymen viewed him first as a restorer of the empire and a savior but later a tyrant and a maniac. For his contemporary Europeans he was a thundering conqueror whose Indian campaign paved the way for British colonial domination. To the incoming Qajar dynasty, he was a despicable usurper, yet in the Pahlavi era he was glorified as a hero and a forerunner of national unity, a prototype of a sort for Reza Shah, who admired him for his discipline and resolve. Today he is still part of Iran’s nationalist narrative, appealing to pan-Iranian sentiments of some and anticlerical aspirations of others. Beyond the constructs of the later centuries, however, Nader looms large as a unique phenomenon, in some ways reasserting tribal identity of the Iranian periphery and in other ways as a prototype anticipating the nationalist trends of later centuries.

Nader-Qoli：出生在北呼罗珊的Turkmen，被Abbas I迁到呼罗珊抵御Uzbek入侵的Qezilbash后裔。早年是Malek Mahmud Sistani(a self-styled claimant to the legendary Kayanid dynasty of the Shahnameh)地界的军阀，和Malek Mahmud争夺Mashhad失败后，转而服务Tahsmasp II，号称Tahmasp-Qoli (slave of Tahmasp)。击败阿富汗人收回Isfahan，被视为“解放者”。

Nader-Qoli组织军队，招募部落很有一套。Perhaps for the first time in Iranian history—and possibly in the history of empires in the region—his crude method of drafting able-bodied men from remote villages and towns, often without serious resistance, set the precedent for a new conscription army. Nader’s drive for a disciplined military force increasingly entailed an element of protonational integration: a sense of unanimity and emphasized pronounced elements of shared identity, such as standardized insignia in campaigns, the use of Shahnameh legendary motifs, and later the creation of a new royal crown for himself instead of the Safavid Qezilbash cap. Nader himself became a champion of national assertiveness, distinct from the late Safavids’ public image of debauchery on the one hand and excessive religiosity on the other.

Nader收回丢给Ottoman和俄国人的失地，打败高加索叛军，重夺Herat，平定呼罗珊，控制波斯湾。It seemed as though Safavid rule, nominal though it was, had finally restored stability and calm to the empire.

In the winter of 1736, he summoned to the plain of Moghan on the bank of the Aras River in northern Azarbaijan a great assembly of khans and notables to consider the future of the Iranian state. Perhaps inspired by the Mongolian tribal gatherings of the Ilkhanid era, the Moghan assembly was the first time that the notion of representation was introduced to the Iranian milieu. Moreover, Nader justified deposing the Safavid monarchy, and his own “reluctance” to carry the burden of kingship, on the grounds of restoring Iranian sovereignty when the Safavids were no longer fit to rule the country.

Nader主张放弃什叶国教，主张相对包容的Ja‘fari creed. Devoid of anti-Sunni exclusivity, messianic longing, and juristic tradition, Nader’s Ja‘fari brand seemed to be a diluted form of the Safavids’ state-dominated creed. Nader认识到exclusionist form of Shi‘ism的害处. He hoped that declaring the Ja‘fari creed would persuade the Ottomans to comply with the terms of his peace proposal, which called for the establishment in Mecca for the Shi‘i pilgrims of a fifth platform around the Ka’ba (lit. rokn, “pillar”), adjacent to that of the Hanafis, which was to be taken as recognition of Shi‘ism as a legitimate Islamic creed.

Nader意识到淡化Sunni-Shi‘i differences有利于他征服Sunni土地。 Nader的军队不少都是Sunni。Here, perhaps for the first time in a political context, the notion of a pan-Islamic solidarity (ettehad-e Islam) found expression in Nader’s conciliatory proposal, which, though it never materialized, denoted a shift away from the creed-based Ottoman and Safavid Muslim empires. As it turned out, Nader’s proposal was unacceptable to both sides

Nader决定征印度，取得资源，然后对付Ottoman。从印度满载而归。威胁到Ottoman但没拿回伊拉克。边乱又起。统治残暴，不断征战，对城市破坏大，Nader的辉煌不可持续，十分短暂：With Iran’s resources stretched to their limits, he left behind a ruined agrarian economy, little trade and manufacture, and decimated administrative infrastructure. It was as if Nader and his army represented a nomadic revenge of the periphery against Iran’s urban centers.

His progressive insanity, which erupted in bursts of violence, fueled the fire of ethno-religious tension among his officers and troops. 计划eliminate the growing opposition among his Persian officers and troops，还没实现，1747年就在平定库尔德叛乱中被刺身亡。The mostly Shi‘i Iranian faction among his troops, who had now regrouped under the title of Qezilbash, had felt threatened by Nader’s ominous drift toward his Afghan and Uzbek mercenaries.

Nader’s failure to put an end to post-Safavid tribal turmoil cost Iran dearly. Though he aimed to create a stable imperial model distinct from the Safavids, he essentially remained a tribal chief in control of a formidable war machine devoted to conquest.

His policy of deemphasizing Shi‘ism and disengaging from its clerical core never led to a tolerant alternative. It became apparent that the people of Iran, at least of the Persian-speaking urban centers, no longer would abandon Shi‘ism. It is therefore not surprising that shortly after his accession, the Persian urban public of the interiors viewed him as a usurper of the Safavid throne. 不过反Nader复Safavid的叛乱多失败告终。

Nader死后再次局势混乱，陷入内战。By 1757 the rise of Karim Khan Zand in the south was the only positive outcome. Karim’s personality combined political sagacity and soldierly valor with beneficence, acumen, and conviviality—a rare combination especially when compared to his cohorts. His rule of more than two decades marks one of the most tranquil in Iran’s early modern history, a remarkable example of how the ruler’s personal qualities, rather than the institutional framework within which he operated, determined political stability, the well-being of subjects, and cultural florescence. He was realistic enough to acknowledge the place of Shi‘i faith and wise enough to respect devotion to the Safavid memory.

Consolidation of the Zands soon gravitated the political center, at least temporarily, toward the south. Shiraz大发展。建筑风格独特。娱乐业发达。社会风气相对开放。

海军薄弱，控制波斯湾一直不成功（和欧洲人，Ottoman竞争）。发展里海贸易，Qajar成最大赢家。

Karim Khan 1779年去世，内战再次开始。The tribal truce that was the outcome of Karim Khan’s political acumen withered rapidly after his passing. Not for another two decades, until the last year of Aqa Mohammad Khan Qajar(r. 1789–1797), the prevailing leader of the Qajars of Astarabad, did a solution to the question of political authority emerge.

Karim Khan视Qajar为最大威胁。It is noteworthy that the Qajar contender relied on the Turkmen tribes of the northeast frontier, as had the early Safavids on the Qezilbash Turkmens of Azarbaijan three centuries earlier

Aqa Mohammad Khan Qajar: Qajar王子，父亲叛乱被杀，儿时被人（an Afsharid pretender to Nader’s throne）阉割，早年作为人质生活在Shiraz，在Karim Khan临死之际逃出回到北方。

Aqa Mohammad Khan can be credited for his great success in reunifying Iran, an enterprise in which Nader Shah and Karim Khan both failed. 有Nader的军事精明，和Karim Khan的政治才干。

Contrary to Nader’s enmity toward the Safavid divan, he partially rehabilitated the existing Zand bureaucrats, who themselves often had their roots in divan families of the late Safavid era. He also learned from Nader’s error not to alienate the Shi‘i clerical establishment. One of the most important political figures of modern Iranian history, he founded a dynasty that survived for more than a century despite many odds.

1786，Aqa Mohammad Khan定都德黑兰：as Isfahan was a millennial city for ‘Abbas I, so was Tehran a centennial capital for the Qajars. It was a gateway to the Iranian interior and provided easy access to Astarabad and other Qajar strongholds in the north. Moreover, being devoid of a sizable urban population, Tehran was free from Isfahan’s pro-Safavid and Shiraz’s pro-Zand sentiments. 北部Alborz山脉提供天然屏障，猎物丰富。

After more than a decade of conflict and economic disruption, some had come to accept the reality of the Zands’ eclipse. Fars长官Haji Ibrahim Shirazi趁Zand王子Lotf-‘Ali Khan出征，将Shiraz献给Aqa Mohammad Khan。Lotf-‘Ali Khan后来被抓到后被挖眼，轮奸，处决，成为民歌里的悲剧人物。

收复领土：征服高加索时为了惩罚寻求俄国人保护的格鲁吉亚Kartli-Kakheti王国，洗劫Tiflis。失去当地基督徒支持，是伊朗永久失去高加索的开端。

1796年，Aqa Mohammad Khan登基。1797年，再次出征高加索时被刺杀身亡。Surely no one shed tears over the dead Qajar khan; but even beyond the grave, his vision for an enduring dynasty seemed to have held more firmly than Nader’s or Karim Khan’s. Aqa Mohammad Khan活着的时候杀掉了多数王位争夺者，侄子继位相对顺利，没有出现大乱。

十八世纪大量波斯知识分子出走印度，在喜欢波斯文化的印度人（Mughal朝廷，以及后来的princely states）那里得到庇护。代表人物Shaykh Mohammad ‘Ali Hazin。

Through disaster and defeat, one can detect flickers of a new national awareness, one no longer tied to Safavid sovereignty but to the sorrowful memory of a glorious past, one that repeatedly would be invoked in the later Iranian experience. 同样表现在Mirza Mohammad Kalantar（Zand时期的Shiraz市长，十八世纪伊朗和Ottoman崛起的urban notable阶层的典型）的回忆录里。 Here we can detect the seeds of an indigenous communal awareness made sharper by the loss of influence and wealth in the south to a new dynastic power from the north.

The Qajar rulers relied not only on the claim of legitimate heredity that went back to their membership in the Qezilbash of the Safavid era; they claimed for themselves the memory of the legendary kings and dynasties of the Persian past, kings who defended the land of Iran against its Rum and Turan neighbors. Likewise, the Qajar cultural and artistic expressions remained indebted to the southern spirit of leisure, music, and the good life, a continuity of the late Safavid and Zand eras.

4 THE MAKING OF THE QAJAR ERA (1797– 1852)

19世纪上半叶，局势渐稳，政府控制恢复，农业和贸易有所起色。但是人口增长缓慢：by the end of Fath ‘Ali Shah’s reign (1798–1834), Iran’s population still barely exceeded four million.

19世纪初地缘政治形势改变：the east-west two-frontier Iran of the Safavid and post-Safavid eras was substantially changed to a new north-south two-frontier reality. Qajar Iran’s self-image as an empire at the center of its own universe also changed into one of a vulnerable nation in the throes of Christian powers. 然而，Qajar Iran没有沦为殖民地，并且开始有选择地接受欧洲的物质和精神文明。The mixed experience of contention and adoption helped shape Iran’s perceptions of modernity throughout the Qajar period.

The early Qajar period also witnessed the emergence of a potent Shi‘i clerical establishment. The Qajar state’s desire to preserve the status quo helped sustain the Shi‘i jurists as a formidable force. Yet the symbiosis of the state and the ulama establishment acted as a barrier against innovative thinking and wider cultural adaptation.

二十世纪的historiography受到欧洲人影响，贬低Qajar，视其为an age of defeat and decadence。忽视了Qajar时代的成就：维持了国家主权；文艺（绘画，书法，音乐，书籍装帧，建筑，诗歌，手工艺）、思想发展（revival of the Aristotelian philosophy of the School of Isfahan; revival of the Shi‘i Sufi orders; rise of new socioreligious movements that espoused indigenous reforms embedded in Perso-Shi‘i environment，如Babi movement）。

Qajar早期，扑灭叛乱：pro-Zand的，拒绝Qajar统治的，争夺政权的（如库尔德首领Sadeq Khan Shaqaqi）。巩固政权：清洗不忠者，杀了grand vizier，在政府高层搞不同地区的派系平衡（Fars派，Mazandaran派，Farahan派）。

The Qajar khans and divan went hand in hand with a new spirit of grandiosity in Fath ‘Ali Shah’s court. 加强political legitimacy：drew attention to the memory of the ancient Iranian past, as narrated in the Shahnameh and visible in the rock reliefs and ancient ruins of the Achaemenid and Sasanian periods.These perceptions of Iranian kingship were revived and maintained alongside Timurid ties to a tribal past. These perceived sources of authority went hand in hand with a Qajar claim to temporal leadership of the Shi‘i community and defense of Shi‘i Islam, a Safavid legacy.

大修浮雕（如Fath ‘Ali Shah猎狮图），有的就修在萨珊浮雕旁边，meant to remind viewers of the return of ancient royal splendor.

Efforts to demonstrate historical continuity are also evident in the literature of the period, notably in the revival of the classical Khorasan school of epic poetry. 创作模仿Shahnameh的歌颂Fath ‘Ali Shah的epic。

Fath ‘Ali Shah疯狂生孩子，五十年里生了一百多个子女：和Qajar khans抗衡，各种政治婚姻leverage。

王子在中央政府控制下管理各地：Senior princes mostly served as provincial governors in Tabriz, Shiraz, Kermanshah, Isfahan, and Mashhad or as high officials in the expanding Qajar court and military.

王子‘Abbas Mirza负责管理Tabriz。Tabriz复兴：成为和欧洲商贸中心，对外交流，接受现代化影响的窗口。其它皇子也分配到各地。皇子之间存在竞争。Yet the balancing act in the Qajar princely system proved successful insofar as it recognized the reality of Iran’s regional diversity and helped the country’s economic recovery.

On the one hand, the presence of European powers helped stabilize the Iranian frontiers and consolidate the Qajar state. 另一方面，欧洲列强的战略、领土、商业野心，turned Iran into an arena of intense—and at times highly disruptive—rivalries. Russia and Britain’s mutual fears and suspicion of each other in effect sealed the fate of Iran’s geopolitics for the entire Qajar period：成为英俄间缓冲

1800年东印度公司使团在John Malcolm带领下来访，试图联合Qajar对付威胁到旁遮普的喀布尔统治者Zaman Shah。Malcolm, who played a pivotal role in the conquest of Mysore, and later as the private secretary of Marquess Wellesley, the chief architect of British colonial hegemony, viewed Iran as an important party to the security of Hindustan, a policy that remained in effect for the entire Qajar period.

The Zands—and later the Qajars—viewed British colonial successes with a mix of awe and anxiety.

Qajar官员和英国使团争宫廷礼仪细节。Malcolm赠送宝石。不过Qajar Shah不把宝石当礼物，而是当tribute。

Qajars认为俄国人是野蛮侵略者，认为英国人精明有纪律有远见。

Malcolm写作History of Persia: From the Most Early Period to the Present Time，典型的English Orientalist写作。十九世纪欧洲人描述伊朗的（充满优越感的）地理书，历史书，游记增加。

伊朗人对外国的了解仍然有限，不少来自和印度的英国殖民者的接触。早期介绍外国的著作Tuhfat al-‘Alam，赞扬了西方科技进步，评点时事后，描述了印度被殖民的过程，提出要警惕殖民者。

Qajar和亲近英国主要是为了抵抗俄国威胁。

1801年Tsar Alexander I吞并格鲁吉亚。Alexander and his like-minded advocates of Russian expansion relied on sympathizers in the Georgian royal family and in the Armenian Church who viewed Russian annexation of the eastern Caucasus as the only way to lift the yoke of Persian rule. 高加索人有亲俄的，有亲波斯的。By 1803, Russia claimed sovereignty not only over Georgia but also over all other Iranian possessions east of the river Kora, provinces coveted for their silk production.

Qajar-Russia战争，Qajar先赢后输，在英国调停下，1813年签订Treaty of Golestan：granted Russia nearly all of the eastern Caucasus north of the river Aras, and Russia annexed the whole of Georgia and southern Caucasian provinces of Baku, Shirvan, Qarabagh, Darband (Derbent), and Ganja. The treaty also gave exclusive rights to Russia to maintain a naval force in the Caspian Sea. It took another round of war before the Russo-Persian border was permanently settled along the Aras.

Qajar卷入欧洲政治，在英法之间周旋。1805年法国使节来访提出和拿破仑结盟。1807年Franco-Persian Treaty of Finckenstein，承诺法国打败俄国后把格鲁吉亚还给伊朗，为伊朗军队提供法国训练。要求伊朗把英国人赶走并向英国宣战，鼓动Herat和Kandahar人攻击英国殖民地。法国人不靠谱，变得快，很快又和俄国人签约… 英国人各种开空头支票，找理由拒绝兑现承诺。

With France defeated and Napoleon in exile, the shah and the Qajar elite came to the conclusion that if Iran were to survive Russia’s onslaught, it had to rely on British support and bravely accommodate that power’s whims and wishes.

军队现代化：‘Abbas Mirza的阿塞拜疆西式新军

败给俄国人是几百年来头一次输给基督徒。

The Usuli Shi‘i mojtaheds’ answer to the crisis of the post-Safavid era was to come up with a new legal approach to shari‘a that stressed the methodology of jurisprudence (or roots of jurisprudence, usul al-fiqh) as the key to a broader legal application of the principle of ejtehad.

To attract more followers and create a larger constituency, so to speak, a mojtahed had to listen to his followers, comply to a certain extent with their wishes, and even sometimes succumb to demagogy and crowd pleasing.

早期Qajar统治者寻求mojtaheds的支持以增强统治合法性。支持伊拉克的什叶ulama。

For most of the nineteenth century, the mojtaheds remained partners in power with the Qajar state. 不太过问政治。The Usuli ulama, despite their legal activism, never really abandoned the Shi‘i idea of avoiding the temporal government, a relic of piety-minded tendencies in early Islam.

伊拉克Najaf学者Shaykh Mohammad Hasan Najafi的代表作Jawahir al-Kalam fi Sharh Sharayi‘ al-Islam大部分都是关于purification rites和devotional acts的，perhaps a relic of the deep memory of the Zoroastrian rituals of the pre-Islamic past.

What was most remarkable about Najafi’s comprehensive treatment was the preoccupation with individual behavior and the means of controlling and policing it. This ritualistic aspect, more than civil or public conduct, interested the Shi‘i jurists. A vast number of intricate cases discussed in Jawahir, as in all compendiums on fiqh, were purely academic and had little, if any, practical implications. More than anything, they represented their authors’ legalistic obsessions and the scholastic acrobatics of the madrasa environment in which they were produced.

从伊拉克学成回国的mojtahed代表人物Sayyed Mohammad Baqer Shafti，穷人出身，在Isfahan发迹，经商借贷，非常富有。

Contrary to popular images of the ulama as champions of the weak, most mojtaheds were supplicating subjects of the shah and admirers of Qajar rule.

State支持的目的：wash away the significant public evidence of greed and lust with a good dose of religiosity; the shah had to keep the ulama content to acquire their approval, especially in dealing with the Europeans.

Some urban mojtaheds controlled the luti brigands and, if necessary, incited a mob. It was not uncommon for the influential mojtaheds to settle differences between the provincial governors or officials and other urban elite by inciting riots.

英国人试图传教：传教士Henry Martyn和伊朗教士进行神学辩论，传播波斯语圣经。

During the first round of wars with Russia, the ulama backed the state as the defender of Islam waging jihad against infidel intruders. 1819年Jihadiyah (On jihad)出版，called for jihad on the grounds that defense of Muslim lands against outside aggression was an inalienable “individual duty” of all qualified believers. On the one hand, it allowed mass mobilization to wage a successful war, while on the other hand, it took the initiative out of the hands of the state in favor of the ulama.

Mohammad Baqer Shafti发布fatwa要求杀掉所有infidel战俘（除了老，幼，妇女）。实际： 俄国俘虏得到善待, many preferring life in Muslim Iran over the arduous and inhumane lifetime of military service in the tsar’s army. 说明jurists的影响的局限性，人们并不总是听他们的话。

1826-1827，再度和俄国为高加索开战。认为不可能打赢的反战者是少数派。ulama上层号召jihad，亲自请求开战解救高加索的什叶muslim。开战后很快落下风，士气低迷，失去Iravan and Nakhijevan，‘Abbas Mirza丢弃Tabriz而逃。俄军控制整个高加索，差点进军德黑兰。

签订Torkamanchay条约：Torkamanchay has often been deemed the most disastrous treaty in modern Iranian history, even though territorial Iran came out of the ordeal relatively intact. The final loss of seventeen khanates of the Caucasus, consisting of the eastern part of today’s Republic of Georgia, as well as the Republics of Armenia and Azerbaijan, amounted to more than 10 percent of Iran’s territory at the time and more than 10 percent of its population of about five million. 失去高加索经济损失巨大（农业，丝绸，商贸，制造），也打击了Qajar的声誉与威信，Fath ‘Ali Shah统治后期叛乱不断。巨额赔款让Qajar濒临破产。俄国人带走大量财宝，包括Safavi祖宗shrine的。

政府和ulama都大丢脸：The hollow exhortation to wage jihad stood in sharp contrast to the realities of defeat. The transfer of the Shi‘i population of the Caucasus, the so-called emigrants mostly to Iranian Azarbaijan, was a stigma and humiliation visible to ordinary Iranians. 俄国政府要求进行人口交换：高加索的什叶muslim搬到伊朗阿塞拜疆，伊朗阿塞拜疆的基督徒到高加索。

条约里‘Abbas Mirza(因为战败，继承人地位岌岌可危)要求俄国人支持他继位。The end result was that the Tabriz administration accepted the harsh terms of the treaty to buttress ‘Abbas Mirza’s shaky stance. As far as the Russians were concerned, this was nothing short of ‘Abbas’s admission of his virtual vassalage status.

条约确定了伊朗的西北边界（持续至今）。俄国在里海享有exclusive航行权，断了伊朗对里海的控制。俄国取得领事裁判权，由俄国人负责解决俄国人和伊朗人的冲突，被各国纷纷效仿。操作中为欧洲人服务的伊朗本地人也享有这些privilege，后来屡屡对Qajar权威造成挑战。

1828年后，Qajar被视为弱国，地位下降。1829年发生Griboedov事件：俄国使节Griboedov带走显贵后宫的格鲁吉亚女人，引起强烈不满。宗教人士号召首都人解救被带走的女人，示威者和俄国guards发生冲突死亡三人，愤怒民众杀掉了Griboedov和另外七十名embassy成员。Though it did not substantially change the European power’s future attitude toward Iranians, it did draw a line as to how far Europeans could meddle with Iran’s mores and religious sanctions. 事件后续：没闹大，道歉解决

为了赔款赋税加重，各地造反。阿塞拜疆新军进行镇压。打击东部边境Turkmen的大规模绑架。呼罗珊的部落也不听中央，直到1850年后才完全控制。

1833，‘Abbas Mirza死亡。More than any member of the Qajar royal family, he embodied a new national awareness and understanding of modernity. 兴洋务，邀请欧洲人帮助改革，日后被Amir Kabir继续发扬。

1834，Fath ‘Ali Shah死亡。He was able to transform largely Turkic and tribal rule into a centralized and stable monarchy based on the old imperial model. He offered Iran a period of relative calm and prosperity, secured a symbiosis of state and ulama, laid down rudiments of the Qajar divan, and fostered a period of cultural and artistic revival that has remained the hallmark of the Qajar era.

Mohammad Shah即位。premier Abol-Qasem Qa’em-Maqam专权被杀。新premier是sufi mystic Haji Mirza Aqasi : removed most of his competitors from among the Qajar aristocracy of the Fath ‘Ali Shah era; he tried with some success to place a degree of state control over the powerful mojtahed establishment, reminiscent of the Safavid practice.

1840s各地urban upsiring不断：One frequent cause of these uprisings was clashes between the local population and the government troops stationed in the cities whose members were of different ethnic and geographical backgrounds. 军纪差，军队扰民

瘟疫（伤寒鼠疫天花）流行，估算至少一百万人死于瘟疫。

1860年代后，里海沿岸产丝绸地区流行从北美传入的phylloxera害虫，摧毁波斯丝绸生产。1870年代后鸦片烟草种植发展。

土地聚于私人之手，税重，农民生活困难。Aqasi将土地收归政府所有，发展灌溉。

The most visible change during the middle decades of the century was growth in the trade sector, most significantly foreign trade. 波斯湾贸易，Yazd-Kandahar商路，Trabzon-Tabriz 商路，里海商贸，呼罗珊商贸，均有起色。

进口欧洲织物摧毁本地纺织业。条约里的最惠国待遇给进口商品很低关税，比本地商品税还低，造成本地破产。贸易逆差巨大，货币贬值加剧。

贫富差距增加，腐败严重。

The state’s endemic flaws and the country’s economic plight barely concerned the ulama establishment. Mojtaheds were increasingly seen as part of the power structure.

ulama受到的挑战：Ne‘matollahi sufi order. To the mojtaheds, the unconventional beliefs and lifestyle of the Sufis and their dervishes were worrying signs of moral corruption and ploys to deceive their followers. Several leaders of the early Ne‘matollahi revival fell victim to the mojtaheds’ anti-Sufi campaign. Even though the mojtaheds’ campaign under Fath ‘Ali Shah succeeded in containing the growth of Sufi orders, it could not stop them altogether, and least of all within the elite circles. Mohammad Shah统治期间sufi待遇较好（自己和premier都是sufi）

ulama的内部挑战：Shaykhi theological school offered a third alternative to the shari‘a of the mojtaheds’ and the mysticism of the Sufis. By the 1840s the Shaykhi school, under Rashti’s leadership, had grown into a network distinct from that of the Usulis and in competition with it. 在Hidden Imam归来问题上和传统解释有很大区别。The millennial markers in the Shi‘i calendar no doubt added to the Shaykhis’ messianic preoccupation and its appeal.（1844年是Occultation千年）

Shaykhi school的影响下，出现Babi movement：In 1844, a young merchant from Shiraz called Sayyed ‘Ali Mohammad (1819–1850) proclaimed to a small group of young Shaykhi mullahs who had come from Karbala to pay their allegiance to him that he was the “gate” (bāb) to the Truth. 称Mahdi马上要再临，正在亲自等待Mahdi, 后来称自己就是Mahdi，是initiator of a new prophetic cycle. Bab被视为异端，很快被软禁。受到Isfahan长官庇护，不过长官不久死了（谋杀？），关到阿塞拜疆要塞，写下Bayan。Between 1848 and 1851 the Babis were forced to take up arms against the government. 很快被镇压。世纪末，运动的主要派别形成Baha’i faith。

Messianic Shi‘ism, long had adopted the idea of prophetic cycles, a notion shared with ancient Zoroastrian belief in Renewal (farashkart) at the end of consecutive millennial cycles. The idea of the advent of the Mahdi at the End of Time, especially in Shi‘ism, remained the major conduit for survival of the idea of cyclical revelation.

The Babi endeavor, it can be argued, was striving to build in its own esoteric language an indigenous concept of modernity that relied on historical progression rather than the sanctity of the past. Likewise, it called implicitly for human agency rather than prophetic finality. The Babi message should be seen as the fulfillment of more than a millennium of Shi‘i apocalyptic yearnings to break with shari‘a, and more specifically with the shari‘a that had been set in place with the rise of the Safavid Empire.

The nascent Babi faith carried with it the kernel of a new national identity：用波斯语写作，以Nowruz作为一年开始，各种波斯神秘观念。Bab对欧洲人态度模糊，一方面赞扬之，一方面the Bab believed that as long as Europeans denied the veracity of the prophet of Islam, they could not be saved on the Day of Judgment.

不仅称自己是Mahdi降临，还称自己是Imam Hosain（the paradigm of Shi‘i martyrdom）再世。1847年在Tabriz受审，公开称自己就是Mahdi。

Babi领导者中的重要人物是一位女性：Fatemeh Zarrin-Taj Baraghani（Tahereh）。来自Qazvin的富裕Usuli mojtaheds家庭，She accepted the Bab’s claim in absentia and the Bab in return included her among his “Letters of the Living”，打破性别藩篱。 1848年Badasht会议，Tahereh emerged as the leader of the radical faction, which was seeking not only a break with Islam but also open defiance of the Shi‘i ulama. 在Badasht故意不戴头巾，probably the first instance in the history of Islamic Iran.

1848年起事：从阿塞拜疆把Bab救出，躲到shrine of Tabarsi打游击。很快失败，大部分被处决。剩下的Tabarsi community过起了朴素的共产公社生活。

In all instances, the Babi message motivated dissent and gave the people a sense of agency and hope for their eventual triumph. 新premier Mirza Taqi Khan Amir Kabir投入大量人力物力财力扑灭Babi起义。1850年Bab在Tabriz被枪决。两年后刺杀Naser al-Din Shah行动失败，引起大规模处决。

运动早期：gained popularity despite widespread persecution of its followers. The movement’s political defeat signified a chance to articulate a new, though sketchy, version of religious reform inspired by the inner dynamics of Shi‘i Islam.

The Babi movement anticipated the alliance of small-time merchants, artisans, low-ranking clergy, and other voiceless and marginalized groups a half a century later during the Constitutional Revolution. 推行西化改革的Amir Kabir镇压Babi运动，体现了两种现代化vision（内生的，进口的）的冲突。

During the leadership of Baha’ullah (1817–1892), the Babi movement adopted an ecumenical message of universal reconciliation and socio-moral modernity. unlike nearly all Islamic modernist trends of the time, tried to fuse the Perso-Islamic Sufi heritage of Iran with European modern humanist and universalist endeavors.

5 NASER AL-DIN SHAH AND MAINTAINING A FRAGILE BALANCE (1848–1896)

Naseri era：an era of gradual state consolidation, appeasement of the religious establishment, adjustment to European diplomatic and economic realities, and limited success with domestic reforms. sporadic urban riots and popular protests;further material and cultural influences from abroad;stronger sense of national resolve began to emerge. 天灾不断

No modern industry of any substance emerged. The modern educated sector constituted a small and largely ineffective part of the elite, and the political structure of the Qajar state remained more or less intact.

铁路没发展起来，坏处不说了，好处： left Iran far less open to European capital and colonial projects.

Amir Kabir：来自平民家庭，从Tabriz步入政坛，曾参与Treaty of Erzurum的制定。后来在阿塞拜疆新军工作。改革受Peter the Great和Ottoman Mahmud II的启发。

1848年出任，集军政大权于一身，镇压呼罗珊Davalu Qajar叛乱和Babi运动。建立西式教育机构Dar al-Fonun，培养军事与工程人才。得到英国人支持。Yet he was careful to reserve Iran’s authority over a range of issues, including trade regulations, protégé status for Iranian subjects, sovereignty over the Persian Gulf coasts, and the behavior of foreign diplomats at the Persian court.

印刷出版业发展，发行官报Vaqaye’-e Ettefaqiyeh，报道政府动态和国际新闻。民间出版宗教作品，诗歌，故事集，翻译小说。

改善财政，减少支出（降低官员和贵族工资），加强征税；司法改革，建立Government Bureau of Justice。

宗教法庭和政府法庭两套系统情况没改观： The mutual reluctance of the ulama and the government to create a uniform code, such as the Ottoman civil code known as Majilla Ahkam ‘Adliya, compiled during the Tanzimat era, served as a major obstacle to judicial reform.

得罪人（贵族，太后）多，改革依靠Shah的支持，后来Shah也不开心了（不让玩）

二十世纪的民族主义叙事倾向于拔高Amir Kabir：Amir Kabir can be seen as an anti-imperialist with a protonationalist vision. 敢对外国要求说不。和前任比没有鸡毛蒜皮小事引起的外交危机。

初期和英国人走太近，得罪法俄。1851年底，被Shah解除职务，后来被杀，和Abol-Qasem Qa’em-Maqam命运相同。

Amir Kabir：能干但autocratic的十九世纪改革型政治家。His vision of reform was top down, functional, and clearly designed to create a disciplined and orderly regime. He was inspired by the European ideas of material progress, by industrialization under the shield of a militarized state. Naturally such a vision could not tolerate an indigenous movement of religious reform such as that of the Babis, which was rooted in messianic aspirations and seeking finality to the unresolved Shi‘i problem of authority.

改革的障碍：缺钱缺人；只有state支持缺乏其它支持；反腐得罪贵族；官僚力量比贵族权力弱太多；公家土地私用老问题。

新premier Mirza Aqa Khan Nuri：a return to the traditional governance of the Fath ‘Ali Shah era. 对贵族和elite官僚有利。

1853，Nuri和英国人就Herat达成协议：allowed Iran to interfere in Herat if Britain, or its adventurous Afghan ally, Dost Mohammad Khan, infringed on that province’s neutrality.

Suspicious of Iran’s secret deal with Russia(合作夺取Herat), London sent a new envoy, Charles Murray, to Tehran to underscore its annoyance with the Iranian government’s desire to reassert control over Herat. 结果Murray和Shah的sister-in-law搞婚外情闹出大丑闻，两国断交。断交后出兵，1856年控制Herat。引起英国从波斯湾进军，Qajar大败，只好从Herat撤兵。英军惩罚性轰炸波斯湾港口。

At the end of the 1857 Paris peace treaty, mediated by the French emperor Napoleon III, Iran was obligated to renounce any territorial claims over Herat or any other part of Afghanistan. 失去高加索是伊朗-俄国关系转折点，失去Herat是伊朗-英国关系的转折点。The Herat affair made clear to the Qajar state the grave consequences of militarily engaging a European colonial power. The shah and his government realized that negotiation, brinksmanship, and the politics of balancing the two empires on Iran’s opposite borders were the only realistic alternative.

四年后，失去Marv及周边。

1860年代起，饥荒瘟疫不断。叛乱四起，刺杀不断。政府使用酷刑。少数精英积攒大量财富，包括Nuri，修建豪华私宅。1858年，Nuri被解职流放，神秘死亡。

Shah开始直接掌权：resulted in a haphazard system of petty bickering between the conservative and reformist factions of the government. It also ransomed off the government to the whims of a capricious but shrewd ruler. 组织consultative council, 一开始有所行动就害怕失去权力把council废了，反反复复。

受Napoleon III法国影响，Shah进行改革。改革派Mirza Malkom Khan：在法国接受教育的改宗的亚美尼亚人，参与过关于Herat命运的巴黎和谈。sought a model of state reform compliant with the Qajar establishment’s conservative view of government. His “orderly absolute monarchy” called for a constitutional government based on enforcement of the law (qanun) and a legislative council (majles) whose members were to be appointed by the shah. 警惕帝国主义扩张威胁，搞改革派秘密结社Faramush-khaneh（很快被Shah收拾）。

Shah对改革失去兴趣，任命保守军官，指控改革派搞颠覆，收拾之，政治改革熄火。

货币财政改革没有成效。By the very end of the Naseri period, the Qajar statesmen still could not clearly or permanently differentiate the government treasury from the shah’s own private purse.

搞卖官创收，横征暴敛严重。

没钱，出口没竞争力，靠卖鸦片（和英国竞争着给中国卖）和烟草勉强维持外贸平衡，1870年后波斯地毯出口才给力。然而波斯地毯出口主要控制在英国人意大利人ottoman希腊人亚美尼亚人手里。

工业化搞不起来：没钱。没基础设施。倾向于投资贸易而不是投资制造业。利率过高。列强不支持技术输出或者保护伊朗本土制造业，只把伊朗做出口市场，伊朗只能靠卖原材料缩小贸易逆差。

食物短缺，又有人囤积居奇，常引起暴动，对政府不满增加。

1870年Mirza Hosain Khan Moshir al-Dowleh被任命为grand vizier. His rise to power signaled the shah’s periodic return to the idea of reform. Brought new hopes for the stranded program of institutional reforms but also posed the danger of monopolizing power. 此人精明而腐败（是同性恋）。试图在英国支持下（对外将Qajar定位于正在现代化的缓冲国）重启改革。

司法改革：试图建立centralized judiciary，被ulama和地方同时反对。

军事改革：征兵方法过时，学习欧洲组织和战术不彻底，对实际军力认识有偏差，军队改组过于频繁，训练不足，后勤管理过时，官员挪用军事资金，卖官，Shah支持不consistent，请来训练的外国人良莠不齐。军队勉强维持和平与边疆安全。

1879年建立哥萨克骑兵团。At best, one can attribute it to Naser al-Din’s policy of keeping the tsar on his side by offering him an affordable token of friendship. At worst, it was an impulsive blunder that for decades to come would help protect the throne while exposing Iranian subjects to the overbearing conduct of the Cossack commanders and their troops.

修铁路计划被列强反对。（担心strategic repercussions）

1871年Shah到伊拉克朝圣，the first time in recent history that any Iranian ruler had left his domain in peacetime，受到Ottoman方友好接待，提升在本国虔诚人士心中形象。

1873，1878，1889访问欧洲： That a Persian ruler could travel abroad despite a religious ban on entering lands of nonbelievers, was a novelty even in the late nineteenth century. consolidating Iran’s image abroad as a sovereign state and reasserting its independence during the age of colonial expansion. 出版日记。提升国内外形象。

The shah and his retinue had turned into a spectacle to be gazed at, teased and even condescendingly looked upon. The shah was yet another showcase for displaying imperial power.

欧洲见闻：appreciate the advantages of a strong state over the revolutionary alternative that was then in progress. Beyond Russia, the shah could see the advancements and military glory of autocratic Prussia becoming the German Empire, as opposed to defeated and revolutionary-stricken France.

对英国民主印象一般，认为伊朗和欧洲政治文化差异太大，欧洲那套行不通。 Europe, unlike Iran, so the shah believed, did not have restive tribes on its periphery, nor did it have an intransigent clergy wielding its power over the state with the weapon of shari‘a. 不想马上工业化：An imported modernity seemed to the shah, and to likeminded Iranian elites, untenable.

带着后宫最爱到俄国时，沙皇夫妇要求她不戴面纱出席活动，只好送回去了（不开心，回去搞coup收拾Moshir al-Dowleh）。

和Baron Julius de Reuter谈生意：修波斯湾到里海的铁路，给Reuter开的条件极丰厚。疑似大骗局。俄国人不高兴。Qajar贵族和ulama都反对，收拾Moshir al-Dowleh。最后取消。

修建铁路对中东工业化起的作用有限。It did, however, increase the mobility of the population, as well as of foreign goods and the export of cash crops. Even in the Pahlavi era, construction of the trans-Iranian railroad did not result in any industrial miracle. 最早的铁路：比利时人修的连接德黑兰和附近shrine的Chemins de Fer。

改革无望，Moshir al-Dowleh失去支持，1881年或被定点清理，抄家。几个月前Ottoman刚刚处死了改革者、1876 Ottoman constitution的architect，Midhat Pasha。

Shah拒绝政治改革，也不搞工业化，但是迷恋欧洲物质文化。Unlike technology and industrialization, which were hard to import, material culture and luxury commodities traveled well. And it was these, rather than Europe’s industrial and political achievements, that first left their mark on Iran’s urban life, culture, and artistic expressions.

大兴土木，各种修欧式建筑：Golestan Complex, palace of ‘Eshratabad,Takkiyeh-e Dowlat

德黑兰建设：城市扩张，开始有市政服务，搞卫生，秘密警察。城市改造力度相对较小，老城完整保留到二十世纪三十年代。

“Persianizing” of European styles: contrary to what purists often claim, art and architecture of the Qajar period were neither decadent nor bastardized replicas of European archetypes. Rather, they emerged out of a period of cultural florescence, which displayed a distinct Persian taste.

画家代表：Abol-Hasan Ghaffari，建立最早的modern studio，给一千零一夜插图。现实主义风格，充满生活气息。给报纸画卡通。神秘死亡，或因得罪establishment。

Mahmud Khan Kashani Malek al-Sho‘ara

Mohammad Ghaffari Kashani: 现实主义

Amir Arsalan Rumi故事：以Ottoman王子为主角的奇遇记，fanciful Persianizing of Europe as a hostile yet seductive realm may be read as symptomatic of Iran’s conflicting aspirations.

现实主义社会批判小说Ibrahim Bag’s Travelogue: held the Qajar elite, along with the ulama, responsible for Iran’s chronic weaknesses and its curse of being subordinate to superior powers. Here we see the crux of an Iranian bourgeois ethos aspiring to reconcile adopted modernity with Perso-Shi‘i identity, a trait that was to be sharpened with the Constitutional Revolution. 被Constitutional Revolution革命人士广泛阅读

英国经济介入加深：开放Karun River。1889设立Imperial Bank of Persia，发行纸币，旧的bazaar金融被取代。一方面Shah的头像印上纸币，强化了Qajar威信，另一方面，由于货币金融被国家控制，出了问题大家都怪政府。

1890年代俄国人也设立mortgage bank，不过影响没英国人的大。

新首相：‘Ali Asghar Khan Amin al-Soltan, page boy出身，保守的Mostawfi al-Mamalek 的继任者。A cunning confidant of the shah and a master of realpolitik—more in the style of Aqasi and Nuri than Amir Kabir and Moshir al-Dowleh—he symbolized the eventual triumph of the Naseri courtiers over the divan class. The relationship between the shah and his last premier turned increasingly complex and mutually exploitative.

把烟草专卖权给英国人，The Regie monopoly: at the expense of a large sector of Iranian exporters, wholesalers, distributors。

引起烟草从业者全国性抗议：The Tobacco Protest was the first time that the merchants of the bazaar, a number of high-ranking clergy, and a handful of dissidents found common ground to mobilize the public nationwide and challenge the authority of the shah. 烟草商人请求local mojtaheds的支持，在清真寺集会谴责外国人（包括谴责其ritually polluting the handling of tobacco）。mojtaheds本来不倾向于批评政府，但是宗教税收入减少，不得不支持烟草商和烟草农。

Tabriz的抗议很厉害（受到俄国人支持），Regie在阿塞拜疆暂停营业。That a protest movement that had started in the south of the country was fully embraced in the northern commercial center signified a shared economy that surpassed Iran’s typical regional polarity.

1892年，以Mirza Hasan Shirazi的名义发布fatwa，号召禁止吸烟so long as its distribution remained in the hands of the infidels。说这种情况下吸烟tantamount to combating the Imam of the Age.

Mirza Hasan Shirazi在什叶世界很有影响力。1891年Sayyed Jamal al-Din Asadabadi（Afghni）曾致信Shirazi倡议反对Naser al-Din Shah，the first open call in modern Iranian history for the overthrow of the shah。

Afghani：著名dissident，stirred anti-British sentiments from British India to Afghanistan to Istanbul to Egypt.

The Tobacco Protest had widened the gap between the state and the ulama, and displayed the latter’s compliance with the grievances of their mercantile clients.

全国伊朗男女纷纷听从Shirazi的fatwa，连Naser al-Din Shah自己后宫的女人都不抽烟了。

The government’s threat to expel from the capital the chief mojtahed of Tehran, Mirza Hasan Ashtiyani, if he continued to provoke the public and refrain from breaking the smoking ban, backfired. He refused to accept the terms offered by the government. 引起示威，要求取消烟草专卖，要求Shah下课，暴力冲突。

The open revolt and clandestine propaganda denouncing the shah for despotism and corruption but also chastising the mojtaheds for compromise and inaction, were sufficient that both the shah and the ulama recognize the greater danger—an imminent uprising that threatened the very survival of both institutions. 示威后Shah取消了烟草专卖，安抚了扬言要集体出走伊拉克的mojtaheds。借外债给英国人付cancellation penalty。

之后各地示威不断，shah的地位下降。1896年shah在五十年jubilee现场被Afghani的追随者刺杀。

The bullet that killed the shah heralded the end of an era, a half a century of relative constancy. The veneer of modernization that covered the Qajar state was just that. The reformist measures by statesmen such as Amir Kabir and Moshir al-Dowleh never truly transformed Qajar society. Some features of European material culture came to shape urban space, art and architecture, dress, food, and music. The foundations of the state, however, remained largely unchanged（私人生活一贯糜烂，没有大的领土丢失etc）.

社会不满增加，通信发展：The Constitutional Revolution of 1905–1911 signified the rise of a new national community conscious of itself and its deprivations largely through press and telegraph communication inside Iran and with the outside world.

6 THE CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION: ROAD TO A PLURAL MODERNITY (1905– 1911)

1905年12月12日，星期五：德黑兰民众抗议政府mistreat糖商，要求mojtaheds出来支持。Jamal al-Din Isfahani, a middle-ranking popular preacher and a crypto-Babi发表演讲批评政府。Further, he declared that both the common law, as enforced by the state, and the Islamic law, as practiced by the mojtaheds, must comply with “the law” (qanun), a notion new to Iranian audiences that implied the Constitution. If the shah is a true Muslim, he stressed, he too must comply with the people’s wishes.

遭到政府镇压。引发ulama部分人士，和更多的同情者的抗议。

塑造革命的元素: 对低效、管得太宽的政府不满的商人与工匠; 中低层毛拉; the Qajar state对公众政治参与要求的回应; 为数众多的城市居民;接受西式教育的精英, who joined the indigenous radical elements and helped shape the parliament (Majles) and frame the modern constitution.

俄国人支持保皇派。后来运动也与clerical阶层利益发生冲突：The outcome was a multifaceted struggle that helped define Iran’s modern national identity, emerging first in the civil war of 1908–1909 and continuing in the two decades before the rise of Reza Shah and the establishment of the Pahlavi order in 1925.

草根性强，和精英主导的同期中东的类似革命不同。

巴列维时代，运动成就打折，1979革命后，1906宪法取消。 仍然是伊朗历史的转折点：because it marked a step forward on the path to sociopolitical modernity. Under the veneer of Western liberalism and constitutional order, the revolution tried to offer indigenous answers to a distinctly Perso-Shi‘i problem of social justice that had long been present in the milieu of Iranian dissent. In effect, the revolution sought to secularize Shi‘i millenarian aspirations by incorporating such modern concepts as nationalism, the rule of law, limits to state power, individual rights, and people’s representation.

改革/革命小册子主要通过手抄本在国外小圈子传播。批评保守官方。 提出的改革方案主要出自对法国启蒙 或者 俄式专制 的肤浅解读。Overall, they were naively praiseful of Europe, though often inconsistent in their quest for modernity.

主张教育改革，文字改革，提倡公共卫生。

Images of decay and deprivation in Iran were contrasted not only to idealized notions of Western material advances but also to an idealized vision of Iran’s ancient past. The reformist literature of the nineteenth century was generally oblivious to Europe’s colonial ambitions, and when it wasn’t, it often implied that falling under Western imperial might was an inevitable fate of the weaker nations.

Mirza Malkom Khan：推崇普世价值，试图说服Naser al-Din Shah承认basic rights，未果，在Qanun上批评Shah。

Afghani：政治伊斯兰先驱, albeit in the garb of Ottoman-backed pan-Islamic activism, an ideology with little popular support among Shi‘i Iranians. a nostalgic reading of the Islamic past was complemented by a call for religious renewal, for an Islamic Reformation, as he called it, that could rescue Muslims not only from the yoke of Christian colonialism but also from their tyrannical rulers.

Mirza Aqa Khan Kermani：来自宗教多元城市Kerman的民族主义者。an ideology of conscious nationalism rooted in the idealized narrative of the ancient Iranian past and set against the gloomy realities of its present。推崇古波斯，对Islamic历史持批评态度。His intellectual profile included not only the European Enlightenment but also a complex amalgam of materialist philosophy, socialist political programs, and nationalism with a chauvinist bent。被Ottoman逮捕引渡回伊朗后处决，被视为martyr。

Mirza Fath ‘Ali Akhundzadeh：在Tiflis做公务员的剧作家，亦批评Islam，观点近似Deist ideas of the French Enlightenment。通过剧作表达观点。把伊朗的困境归于什叶信仰痛批之。膜拜欧洲，和大多数十九世纪改革人士一样，信奉“落后就要挨打”，不怎么批判欧洲殖民主义，看不上本土什叶改革运动如Babi 运动。

王子Jalal al-Din Mirza：出版去掉阿拉伯语借词的历史书Nameh-ye Khosravan，强调pre-islamic时代的辉煌。

Themes of civilization and reform, the need for constitutional recourse, the heritage of the ancient past versus decline in the present, and the critique of conservatives’ obstacles to modernity all laid the foundations of the constitutional discourse.

Mozaffar al-Din Shah继位：a man of gentle disposition, with an earnest desire to open up the country to social and educational reforms.

premier ‘Ali Khan Amin al-Dowleh短暂的改革：阻碍很大（foreign interests, court intrigue, economic downturn, clerical conservatism）。新式学校受到clerics的反对。改革走入死胡同，被撤职。Amin al-Dowleh’s dismissal marked the end of 半个世纪以来的ministerial reforms from above。

外贸收支不平衡，进口增多，出口衰落，货币贬值。

革命前夕不满发酵：1900年，Jamal al-Din Isfahani发表Libas al-Taqwa，号召抵制洋货支持民族纺织业。组织秘密革命组织Progress Society，引导商人采取公司制。 In due course this budding commercial bourgeoisie placed new demands on the state and contributed to the growing public discontent. 1903年和Nasrollah Beheshti发表Roya-ye Sadeqeh，批判多数政府和宗教人士自私贪婪虚伪。后来主要批评Qajar保守人士。1907年创办报纸散布批评。

The most progressive preachers, journalists, and activists shared their criticism of the conservative Qajar aristocracy and the high clergy, though seldom by name, favoring instead the pro-constitutional and the enlightened members of the state elite.

Yusef Khan Mostashar al-Dowleh比较法国宪法和古兰经条文，试图reconcile二者。By the time of the Constitutional Revolution a trend within the Iranian opposition indeed articulated an Islamic discourse similar to that of Mostashar al-Dowleh.

Babi-Azali低调行事隐藏身份（taqiyyeh），Baha’is受迫害：The growth of these anti-Baha’i campaigns may be attributed to the mojtaheds’ losing ground to more liberal voices outside and within the religious community. Yazd 1902-1903大规模迫害。As a result of concealing their identity, many Azalis inevitably were assimilated into the majority Muslim population at the expense of the gradual fading away of their Babi identity，但仍然反Qajar。

中下层毛拉抗议者向政府提要求，受到Behbahani与Tabataba’i的支持。Tabataba’i in particular was endowed with a genuine urge to establish a pluralistic society based on rule of law and individual freedoms, concepts that he himself acknowledged as inconsistent with the best interests of the mojtahed class.

早期抗议者缺乏政治纲领：要求建立house of justice。The notion of the house of justice, which eventually transformed into a call for a national assembly, had its roots in the writings of the Bab and the messianic aspiration to establish a house of justice (bayt al-‘adl) under the Imam of the Age.

运动有messianic色彩：the beginning of the constitutional movement in AH 1323/1905 CE was only six years before the millennial anniversary of the “Greater Occultation”。社会上存在对马赫迪归来的期待。

西方思想和本土观念结合：一方面有助于运动发展，另一方面also injected into the process inherent ambiguity, even some resistance to divulging the true secular agenda of the constitutionalists. 希望以此安抚保守人士，避免异端的标签。As such, they introduced a troubling feature to the Iranian experience of democracy, one that would remain inherent for decades, if not for a whole century thereafter.

Joseph Naus事件：表达对其（比利时人，海关官员）偏向俄国公司的不满。

1906年7月，the restive Tehran population gathered in Tupkhaneh Square (Maydan-e Tupkhaneh), adjacent to the citadel complex, and staged one of the earliest public demonstrations that had occurred outside the mosque or the shrine setting. 镇压引发Tabataba’i领导的ulama的抗议。示威者在British legation寻求庇护。it was in the British legation that the protestors openly demanded for the first time the establishment of a constitutional (mashruteh) order. 商人是抗议活动的主角。英国使馆提供了secular空间。

mashruteh：“conditional”之意。implies a familiar chapter on “conditions” (shorut) in Islamic law, which in turn gave it a certain Islamic acceptability and in the eyes of the ulama and the public put it at a safe distance from such alien notions as constitution and constitutionalism.

As has often been noted, only a small number of the elite understood the idea of the constitution and the liberal values associated with it. Yet the Iranian public was quick to employ the term to air its resentment of their destitution, material decline, and the insecurities they faced in everyday life.

抗议之下，Shah解除保守premier ‘Ayn al-Dowleh的职务，1906年8月10日发布Constitutional Decree，called for the establishment of a “national consultative assembly ”

Majles组成：the princes of the Qajar family, the ulama, the notables (a‘yan), the nobles (ashraf), the landowners, the merchants, and the guilds. The Electoral Law Committee appointed to draw up election bylaws consisted of mostly young Western-educated bureaucrats. Perhaps inspired by the model of the Estates-General during the French Revolution, the committee opted for a representational system that surprisingly gave the greatest number of “deputies” (vakils) to the guilds and the merchants.

过程和1905 Russian Revolution类似，可能受其影响。

The inauguration of the Majles in October 1906 aimed to frame the “Fundamental Law”. 迅速起草：The Fundamental Law recognized the separation of three powers. 1907年签署Supplement to the Fundamental Law保证基本自由。

Mohammad ‘Ali Shah继位。

Anticonstitutional clerical camp：Shaykh Fazlollah Nuri。一开始支持以sharia为基础的宪政，后来视Majles及其支持者as no more than a conspiracy hatched by heretics, Babis, and atheists, 号召clerics反对之。

英俄达成协议。The agreement reaffirmed the powers’ traditional guarantees for the Qajar throne without acknowledging the Majles or the new constitutional process.

Hasan Taqizadeh:first Majles的阿塞拜疆代表，能言善辩。backed by the semi-clandestine socialist circle in Tabriz and by the Iranian émigré community in the Caucasus.

Only in the 2nd Majles, after 1909, 宗教少数 (zoroastrians, jews, christians) 得到代表，but the Babi Azalis or Baha’is were never elevated beyond the label of “despicable heresy.” 女性也没机会。

The Supplement to the Fundamental Law 受法国、比利时、保加利亚宪法启发，but in substance was adopted to the requirements of the Iranian environment and the precepts of Shi‘ism. It reflected contingencies and contradictions inherent in the Iranian system that were hard to overcome. Yet every article of the constitution was genuinely argued and heatedly debated in open sessions and before enthusiastic audiences. One of the most remarkable aspects of the Majles was indeed its openness.

The shah was acknowledged as the head of the executive, whose divine grace was bestowed on him by the will of the people. This was the first time in the long history of Persian kingship that a document subordinated, albeit partially, the king’s authority to the people’s institutional mandate—an assertion over which a bloody civil war would soon be fought.

为了安抚ulama，宪法规定Majles制定的法规只限于政治领域，不掺合shari‘a管的范畴。In reality, however, it subverted the accepted universality of the shari‘a in some key provisions.

1907 Supplement to the Fundamental Law第一条定Twelver Shi‘i Islam为official religion. 第二条表示尊从Islam原则。it reflected the framers’ serious dilemma of how to reconcile the will of “the people of Iranian nation” as a source of the constitution’s legitimacy with the ancient pillars of authority: Shi‘i Islam and Iranian kingship.

The Majles approved, after several drafts, 五名mojtaheds和伊斯兰律法专家组成的委员会确保立法和shari‘a的兼容性。Though in reality the committee never convened and was forgotten after 1910, compatibility with the shari‘a remained an issue that would reemerge seven decades later during the Islamic Revolution of 1979. Other articles of the constitution betrayed the same undercurrent of obsequiousness in fear of being labeled “irreligious.”

Under enormous pressure from the court, however, the framers of the constitution were obliged to assert in article 35 that “the sovereignty is a trust confided as a divine gift by the people to the person of the king.”

The deputies of the Majles and the people who elected them to office soon realized (as did the English, French, and Americans) that a constitution and constitutionalism did not come easily or cheaply. The mashruteh and implementation of the Fundamental Law resulted in much bloodshed, political conflict, and the chaos of a civil war before being acknowledged as a “revolution” (enqelab).

Between May 1907 and July 1909, the Majles at every turn faced enormous threats to its very survival：disagreement on limits of the legislative authority, growing tensions with the shah and his court, and a constant barrage of defamatory propaganda. Unrest in the provinces provoked by the court and by the powerful tribal khans and the local ulama, as well as serious skirmishes and sectarian fighting on the Ottoman borders, further challenged the young order.

Amin al-Soltan再次出任premier，试图在Majles和Shah之间斡旋，激化了Majles温和派和激进派的矛盾。1907年8月被刺杀。刺杀前，the prorevolutionary orators in Tehran had called for the premier’s removal as the opening act of an inevitable revolution. 激进派代表人物Haydar Khan, 在Tiflis受过电气工程训练的马克思主义革命者。

1907年，英俄在圣彼得堡签约，划分势力范围（背景：德国崛起）。One outcome so far as Iran’s domestic politics was concerned was a greater polarization of Iran’s revolutionary politics, which less than a year later led to open confrontation with the Qajar shah and a civil war.

激进派受到revolutionary societies (anjomans)的支持。Whether former Babis, nationalists, or socialists, the anjomans’ leadership came to play a decisive role in the political process. 出版各种革命/改革报纸。anjomans成功动员bazaar的商人，行会，政府官僚，电信邮政运输工人

Majles试图改革财政。削减世袭贵族开支。害怕失去英国支持，不敢设立国家银行。

没能建立国家军队。

1908年2月，Haydar Khan指挥下，炸弹刺杀Mohammad ‘Ali Shah失败。Shah非常insecure，俄国人建议摧毁Mojles。

1908年6月23日，德黑兰发生政变：哥萨克军队包围Majles，轰炸之。逮捕了一批，杀了一批，流放了一批。报纸关闭。

The Majles’ failure to deliver remedies to the country’s economic and social needs was an added source of public frustration. By the time of the coup, it was as though the whole mystique of the mashruteh had been spoiled, if not lost altogether.

内战爆发。The accelerating revolutionary process clearly set “supporters of the constitution” (mashrutehkhvahan) against the royalist camp, who invariably labeled them “supporters of the tyranny” (mostabeddin).

Tabriz是斗争的中心之一：一方面经济发达，处在伊朗现代化的前沿，另一方面传统宗教势力也很强。

Tabriz resistance的领导者都是来自Shaykhi wards的luti。It was primarily the two leaders’ sectarian rivalry with lutis of the opposite league that shaped the conflict and ensured its resilience.

受到当时在高加索流行的社会主义革命思潮的影响。大批来自Baku和Tiflis的émigrés revolutionaries加入Tabriz resistance。志愿者们各怀绝技。还有西方人加入：如在美国人开的教会学校教英语的美国人Howard Baskerville。

Bakhtiyari部落有人支持Tabriz：It was headed by ‘Ali-Qoli Khan Sardar As‘ad (1856–1917), a cultivated khan with nationalist predilections whose interest in Iranian history, and that of his own tribe, along with his previous residence in Europe, had converted him into a liberal nationalist of some valor. 轻松拿下Isfahan。

政府镇压，但是resistance士气高，熟悉本地情况，军纪也慢慢变好。

俄国人出兵Tabriz（heavily invested in Mohammad ‘Ali Shah’s survival；担心高加索稳定），停火。

The call for a concerted march to Tehran first came from the fighters in Rasht. Gholam-Hosain Khan Tonekaboni(Sepahdar)’s rise to prominence denoted the dawn of a provincial landowning class that would come to play a major role in the politics of the postrevolutionary era.

In April 1909 英俄发话：warned the shah that unless he restored the constitution and removed its enemies from his court, he stood to lose the two powers’ already-sinking confidence in him—a warning that appeared to the shah’s opposition as a green light to capture Tehran. In reality, it was meant to encourage the shah to restore some semblance of a constitutional regime in order to stop the constitutionalists’ advances.

1909年7月，Sardar As‘ad和Sepahdar带领下的nationalist军队（军纪良好）进入德黑兰。7月15日宣布Mohammad ‘Ali Shah退位，小儿子Sultan Ahmad继位。

The conquest of Tehran was an ephemeral, but defining, moment in Iran’s modern history. 推翻俄国人支持的Shah：For a moment, it seemed as if the desire to create a liberal democratic order had overcome not only the impediments of arbitrary rule and reactionary ulama, but also brutish European imperial ambitions.

俄国人进军伊朗北部，反俄情绪增强。

是伊朗第一次成为世界头条。纽约时报、泰晤士报的报道非常orientalist： there was an obsessive anxiety that the “safety” of the European residents in Tehran would be violated by hordes of nomadic invaders and socialist radicals.

Contrary to the cynicism of most European observers, and contrary to perceptions of failure in later historiography, the Emergency Committee, formed just after the conquest of the capital, mustered an impressive list of accomplishments. 恢复秩序，指派政府，Sepahdar成为premier，修改选举法搞direct representation，举行全国选举，1909年11月the second Majles出炉。

全国大赦，处理了少数反动人物如Shaykh Fazlollah Nuri。

更多报纸出版：如Mohammad Amin Rasulzadeh担任主编的日报Iran-e Naw。

革命政权判记者Hasan Mo’ayyed al-Islam Kashani亵渎罪（批评Islam是伊朗落后的罪魁祸首）。Idealizing the ancient Iranian past as an alternative to its recent Islamic legacy was to become a pillar of Iranian conscious nationalism in the postconstitutional period.

2nd Majles：riddled with factionalism, ideological rifts, and foreign intimidation

The period between 1909 and 1911, and in a broader sense between 1905 and 1921, proved an unequal experiment in Iranian history. Remarkable though it was, however, it ended in tragic setbacks for it was unable not only to keep European intrusion at bay but also bar the old landed elite from return to power.

出现两个阵营：the moderates（ consisting of landowning magnates and tribal leaders among the nationalists, the younger generation of the Qajar officialdom, remnants of the Qajar elite, and the leaders of the Tabriz resistance）the social democrats（mostly intellectuals inspired by European liberal thought, by the Caucasian and Russian socialists, and by the Young Turks）

The Democrats’ most urgent demands included basic land reform, the elimination of hereditary privileges, public education, use of the state apparatus for social reform, and even a call for the inclusion of women in the public arena.

Constitutionalists内部分歧加剧，派系斗争，出现刺杀。Sayyed ‘Abdollah Behbahani被刺（Haydar Khan指挥），clergy退出革命舞台。

Three major assassination attempts since 1907, all orchestrated by Haydar Khan and his cohorts, helped polarize the climate.

Tabriz fighters不满：缺钱，被排除在警察外，和政府军发生冲突。被解除武装。The incident was a clear victory for the government and the Majles, which had long called for the disarming of the revolutionary factions. Sattar’s downfall epitomized the end to street resistance in favor of the provincial landed elite.

What was missing was a common vision to nurture an indigenous mode of democracy that had been first made tangible in its early days of the revolution.

mutual distrust between the Majles and the executive branch: 内阁频频换人，立法行政分工不清。

英国俄国频频施压政府和Majles成员。

为了改革财政和金融，请美国政府推荐banker William Morgan Shuster来协助改革。

Shuster and his American team represented the first serious involvement of the United States in Iran. 伊朗和美国1883年建交，美国知道伊朗是英俄传统势力范围，非常谨慎。

Shuster尖锐批评伊朗政府和英俄势力。1912年出版The Strangling of Persia描述伊朗困境。在伊朗期间困于英俄intrigues。

1911年，反革命复辟活动如火如荼，退位的Shah率turkmen进军德黑兰，其兄弟Abol-Fath Mirza Salar al-Dowleh率kurds进军Tabriz，受到俄国支持。被击败。俄国人十分生气。Majles要没收反革命王子的财产，俄国人称其欠俄国人钱，阻挠抄家。下最后通牒要求伊朗政府为“冒犯俄国consul general”道歉，否则就打。伊朗外交部长亲自道歉。结果在英国人支持下俄国人发出第二道最后通牒，要求伊朗满足三个条件（1. 解职Morgan Shuster 2.以后伊朗雇外国人必须经过英俄同意 3. 要求伊朗政府为派往伊朗的军队出军费），否则就占领伊朗。The two powers in effect blatantly required that Iran reimburse the cost of the violation of its own sovereignty to an aggressor who, as it turned out, went on a rampage of massacres and maltreatment of defenseless Iranians.

第二道最后通牒引起举国愤怒，Mohammad Kazem Khorasani号召抵制英俄货物。女性也参与进来。

Bakhtiyari部落主导的内阁屈服（波斯湾发现石油了，正在和英国人谈生意，不想得罪英国的朋友俄国）。Majles反对到底。Mohammad Kazem Khorasani神秘死亡（正在考虑向俄国发起jihad）。

1911年底俄国军队占领Tabriz，烧杀抢掠，抵抗力量寡不敌众（俄军得到保皇部落Shahseven支援）。1912年初几乎占领整个伊朗北部。圣城Mashhad的抵抗力量躲进全伊朗最神圣的Eighth Shi‘i Imam的shrine，俄军洗劫shrine。英国人借口保护英国利益，从波斯湾港口进军Shiraz和Isfahan，遭到抵制（关闭bazaar，抵制英货，禁止给侵略军卖货）。 Qashqa’i和 Khamseh部落造反，反对亲英的Bakhtiyari khans，不过虎头蛇尾。

在英俄的压力下，亲英的Bakhtiyari khan，Najaf-Qoli Khan Samsam al-Saltaneh，下令占领Majles，把所有deputies赶走，禁止在议会集会。担心俄国报复，regent Abol-Qasem Nāser al-Molk下令结束2nd Majles，宣布suspension of the constitution。

Shuster被迫离开，离开前夕引发抗议。Shuster himself called the destruction of the democratic experience in Iran “a sordid ending to a gallant struggle for liberty and enlightenment.”

Constitutional Revolution的其它外国支持者：英国学者Edward Granville Browne。Browne’s The Persian Revolution of 1905–1909, published in 1910 was a remarkable work of contemporary history. Almost an instantaneous classic, Browne’s account questioned not only the imperialist biases of his own time but also the validity of the all-embracing critiques of Orientalism and the common assumption that Orientalists invariably were pioneers of imperial hegemony.

Constitutional Revolution时期的诗歌：Using classical Persian forms and images, the host of poets of the period went beyond political discourse to appeal to their audiences not only through press and publications but also through musical concerts, performances, and especially the medium of popular songs (tasnif).

主要诗人：Mohammad Taqi Bahar Ashraf al-Din Qazvini：the message of despair was blended with satire and put in a language more accessible to the people of the street Dehkhoda

Throughout, there was precious little articulation of political thought. In part, such disinterest toward modern political philosophy can be attributed to the petrified scholastic tradition, which had prevailed since the late seventeenth century. There was little effort in earnest to articulate theoretical boundaries of liberal democracy. In other words, Islam as a comprehensive divine order with claims over the individual, the government, and the community was never seriously dealt with in the constitutional period, nor was an effort made to spell out a workable compromise

例外：Mohammad Hosain Na’ini, a high-ranking jurist then residing in Najaf: He argued that in the absence of the just and equitable rule of the Imam of the Age, constitutionalism is the lesser of the evils and the most viable alternative to autocratic rule, despite its shortcomings. 后期也趋于保守

Neither Na’ini or anyone else was willing to acknowledge such issues as inequalities of Muslims and non-Muslims, limitations on freedom of speech and association, gender inequality, slavery, torture, and intolerance toward nonbelievers.

Translations and adaptations of Western works of political philosophy, published in Persian before and during the Constitutional Revolution, came to substitute for the paucity of a robust theoretical discourse and helped shape the ideology and rhetoric of the revolution.

Despite staging an earnest liberal movement with urban support, the Iranian constitutionalists never really succeeded in defining the relationship between the religious and the political spheres. Nor did the geopolitical contingencies of European powers allow for the natural growth and fruition of this experience.

Iran in 1914 was fundamentally different from Iran of 1905. In less than a decade not only were the two pillars of the old order, the Qajar monarchy and the mojtahed establishment, weakened; the revolution had also managed to remove important barriers to social and cultural change. The modernizing project of the early Pahlavi era was the legacy of the Constitutional Revolution.

The ideology of Iranian nationalism and its historical narrative, moreover, was nurtured during the constitutional period.

For some, the experience of the Constitutional Revolution proved that Western powers would not allow the establishment of a free and democratic regime and that domestic political players were incapable of maintaining it. For others, the mashruteh liberal democracy was an imported commodity, even an “ailment” devoid of imagined “authenticity.”

40年代同盟国占领、50年代石油国有化运动：players and observers view their own national aspirations and the foreign intrusions as continuation of the constitutional struggle.

Mohammad Mosaddeq：worldview and ideals were largely shaped by the Constitutional Revolution and its prescribed parliamentary process.

Khomeini’s doctrine of Islamic government under the “Guardianship of the Jurist” was a clear rejection of the secular liberalism of the constitutional period, and more along the lines first preached by Fazlollah Nuri and supporters of the mashru‘eh.

7 THE GREAT WAR AND THE RISE OF REZA KHAN (1914–1925)

1921年2月21日，Cossack Division军官Reza Khan发动军事政变。

Reza Khan’s meteoric rise to power and eventual establishment of the Pahlavi dynasty in 1925 was as much the outcome of the frustrations and setbacks experienced after the Constitutional Revolution as it was the outcome of a decade-long foreign occupation and imperial ambitions.

一战前，德国开始在中东有存在感，伊朗nationalist对其的印象是a dynamic but relatively benign world power. 对德国模式（以民族主义为意识形态，发展工业，强军）感兴趣。一战开始时，nationalist寄希望于德国对英俄霸权的挑战可以让伊朗获得自由。In reality, however, further misfortunes, prompted by the war, brought the Iranian government to a standstill and the country to further disarray and misery. the country’s sovereignty was undermined, and its people were subjected to starvation and disease directly or indirectly resulting from the military operations.

1900年英国金融家William Knox D’Arcy从Qajar政府取得六十年的石油勘探/生产/出口特许权。1901年Mozaffar al-Din Shah签署。1908年在Khuzestan中部（Bakhtiyari 部落的地盘）发现Masjed Soleiman油田。1909年海军部许可下设立Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC)。1914年英国政府控股APOC大头。购买APOC是丘吉尔引以为豪的成就。英国工业、军事对伊朗石油依赖日增，Khuzestan油田安全成为英国人主要关注点。1907年印度兵进驻Bushehr维护工厂和管线安全，1916年升级为South Persian Rifles，控制整个英国在伊朗南部的势力范围。

一战期间（1914年起），成为俄国和Ottoman互殴战场，两国进进出出，伊朗平民遭殃。亚美尼亚难民大批涌入。瘟疫饥荒流行。英国人切断波斯湾到伊朗内部供给线，经济雪上加霜。

1914年12月，召集3rd Majles。仍是Democrats与Moderates对立。危机重重，政府频频换人，外国干预人事。1915年，英俄准备瓜分伊朗，试图排除德国和Ottoman势力。nationalist一开始寄希望于德国和Ottoman。德国人支持下nationalist成立Committee for National Defense，向Qom撤退，打算说服Shah迁都Isfahan。德国人安排的政变失败，计划流产。在Qom和Hamadan被俄军击败，西撤到伊朗-Ottoman边境地区，在德国与Ottoman支持下建立临时流亡政府。被进犯的俄军逐出伊朗。和德土签订协议以求在德黑兰恢复nationalist政府。Ottoman在俄军攻击下败走，伊朗抵抗力量很快消失。

一战期间德国人试图在伊朗建立anti-Allied coalition of nationalists and tribal forces。

当时，伊朗有一批亲德知识分子和诗人，包括Mohammad Taqi Bahar, composed popular poems in support of Germany and Perso-German symbiosis. By 1918, however, hopes for a German victory over the Allies fizzled, and with it the prospects of ending the Anglo-Russian hold over Iran. Later during the interwar period, German cultural symbiosis with Iran, underscored by archeological excavations and philological studies of shared Aryan roots, held powerful sway over the Iranian imagination.

The short-lived provisional government in exile, barely lasting until 1917, revealed all the flaws of the nationalist resistance since the days of the Constitutional Revolution: 内斗，新老代沟，为了小事没完没了。支持临时流亡政府的西部部落被欧洲现代化军队打得损失惨重。

南部部落在德国人支持下与英国-印度武装发生冲突。英国人成立South Persian Rifles（战后SPR的移交问题：英国人提条件，要求在英国人指导下成立国家军队。Reza Khan崛起后英国人才终结SPR），由Percy Sykes（外交官，历史学家，殖民主义者，曾出版殖民视角的两卷本History of Persia）领导，和伊朗的gendarme units发生冲突。

Iranian Gendarmerie：1911年Morgan Shuster开始搞的，在伊朗乡下活动，很多军官同情nationalist和临时政府，倾向于德国方。是英国人支持的SPR，俄国人支持的Cossack Division的counterforce。

到1917年，英俄重创伊朗抵抗力量，德土败退，伊朗nationalist梦碎。十月革命让希望短暂重燃。

控制了伊朗将尽三分之二领土的沙俄的垮台，让伊朗人既害怕又兴奋：一方面害怕共产主义，另一方面沙俄垮台结束了俄国霸权。布尔什维克新政权谴责1907年的英俄协议，免除伊朗还款要求，取消沙俄时代的各类特许，撤销条约里的沙俄特权，把里海设施还给伊朗，Russian Mortgage Bank的控制权交给伊朗。1921年签订Soviet-Iranian Treaty of Friendship。本地Democrats不少十月革命欣赏者。

Soon the majority of the Iranian polity began to feel the Soviet ideological and military presence. 1919年末，布尔什维克游击队登陆里海港口Anzali，试图夺取俄国舰队，把白军从伊朗北部赶出，最远打到Qazvin。英国人命令下成立的North Persian Force帮助白军，占领伊朗北部。一战结束时Bolshevism在各种幻灭的伊朗nationalist中的吸引力增强。

1919年和英国签订Anglo-Persian Agreement（英国人George Curzon和Percy Cox的主意）。伊朗事实上成为英国的semiprotectorate。

协议表面上促进英国和伊朗的合作，英国提供金融，技术，军事支持，换取伊朗国防和外交依靠英国。提供贷款，以伊朗政府收入和海关关税做抵押。

英国实际动机：The British motives for entering into the 1919 agreement sprang primarily from Curzon’s desire to create a chain of mandatory states and protectorates to guarantee a secure overland connection throughout the empire. 控制伊朗军政经济，隔离布尔什维克威胁，把伊朗纳入pax britannica。

伊朗政客，如Hasan Vosuq al-Dowleh内阁，认为协议有助于伊朗恢复秩序，排除布尔什维克威胁，获取急需的资金技术，英国强力支持有利于确保伊朗的主权与领土完整。

Most Iranians detected the ghost of British hegemony，反对签订协议。Vosuq al-Dowleh,和外相Firuz Mirza Nosrat al-Dowleh被nationalists视为卖国者。之前巴黎和会上，英国人想办法阻止伊朗代表主张权益。美国政府也对英国的做法十分不满。

Vosuq al-Dowleh政府在英国人帮助下平息叛乱。失去英国人支持，1920年被Shah解职。协议名存实亡。

Jangal movement：领导者是Mirza Kuchak Khan。曾参与革命，后来对革命失望。受pan-islamism影响，在Young Turks支持下，一战中在Rasht开始打游击抗俄。He may also be considered a crucial link between romantic nationalism with a socialist flavor and new interpretations of Islam as an anti-imperialist force. 没什么突破，一度式微，直到十月革命。到1918，失去Young Turks支持，Kuchak Khan and his followers deemphasized pan-Islamism and instead highlighted revolutionary socialism。布尔什维克夺回里海舰队，开始支持Jangalis，也让Kuchak Khan失去对运动控制。布尔什维克想借Jangal运动输出俄国革命。从socialist Adalat Party of Baku来的Ehsanollah Khan加入运动。在俄国人支持下，1920年Ehsanollah建立Gilan Socialist Republic。夺下Rasht，被德黑兰政权视为威胁。Kuchak Khan在内斗中失势。

一战期间发生大饥荒。流感流行。保守估计死了一百多万人。外国占领加剧了饥荒。世界性通胀与经济萧条影响贸易。一战期间各方武装部落的做法影响了安全稳定，影响了生产力和贸易，土匪横行。商人阶级损失惨重（包括受到Jangal运动激进人士的敌意）。

For the Iranians, it was as if the entire world around them were crumbling：Ottoman，Arab，Russian，Germany都情况不妙。1920年，英国mandate发生的什叶起义被镇压。

Reza Khan政变前，There were as many rumors about an imminent takeover of the capital and partition of Iran into a Bolshevik north and a British south as there were yearnings in nationalist circles for the rise of a leader who could offer a viable alternative to the bleak state of affairs.

1920年12月，Moshir al-Dowleh辞职，伊朗政坛群龙无首。4th Majles也组织不起来。Ahmad Shah担心英国人离开伊朗的后果，手足无措。革命时期的领袖disillusioned and divided。

英国envoy Norman于是接受Sayyed Zia（记者，亲英，1919协议的支持者，反布尔什维克）的提议打算搞政变。英国人在伊朗驻军财政上无法维持，相中Reza Khan（有战斗经验，管理经验，反布尔什维克）为合作伙伴。Reza Khan出身低微，野心大，在升官中倚靠英国人，政变受到英国人支持，但Reza不完全是英国人的傀儡。

政变后大规模逮捕软禁。Ahmad Shah任命Sayyed Zia为首相（it was the first made from outside the circles of the Qajar elite, anticipating a new era of middle-class politics）。

发布公告。第一份公告提出改革目标，第二份透露出Reza Khan的个人野心。

With minor variations, Sayyed Zia’s program following a course already set out by the governments of Vosuq al-Dowleh and later Moshir al-Dowleh, and it served as a blueprint for the forthcoming Pahlavi reforms.

宣布和苏联缔结友好条约。苏联放弃沙俄时代特权，表示尊重伊朗主权。条约包含伊朗在受到第三方威胁的时候进行军事干预的权利，in effect reaffirming the conduct of tsarist Russia since 1909.

Sayyed Zia的内阁执政百天: nevertheless, was a major shift, for it relied on a coup by a populist British proxy and a Cossack officer to implement a course very different from Curzon’s vision to incorporate Iran into the British colonial sphere. The move cost Norman his career.

Reza’s rise between 1921 and 1925, culminating in his ascent to the throne and the founding of the Pahlavi dynasty, brought to power a new military elite, co-opted some Qajar notables but marginalized the rest, crushed the Jangal movement and other centers of autonomy and secession, bulldozed through a state-sponsored program of secular reforms, and pacified the countryside with ruthless efficiency.

一开始得到nationalists和左翼的支持，但因为独裁很快失去其支持。

Reza Khan 对暴力扑灭异议毫不犹豫， as long as they could secure the backing of the growing class of professionals, modernist intellectuals, and even a generation of mullahs who exchanged their clerical garb and turban in exchange for European attire. These new sectors laid the foundation for the secular middle class that would form the backbone of Pahlavi Iran.

Two months after the coup, when he assumed the position of minister of war, he was widely recognized as Iran’s savior, and treated accordingly. Reza Khan was a figure reminiscent of Nader in 1732, when he elevated himself to the position of Safavid regent.

Sayyed Zia很快出局。Reza soon realized that collaboration with select members of the Qajar elite and landed aristocracy was more advantageous than working with a rabble-rousing journalist tarnished by his close association with the British.

受到呼罗珊Gendarme军官Colonel Mohammad Taqi Khan的反对。叛乱被扑灭。

1921年中解决了内斗严重的Jangal运动。The defeat of the Jangal movement signified the end of a socialist anti-imperialist tendency in Iran. Rooted in the Constitutional Revolution, the Jangal movement thrived in its aftermath but lost out to a centralizing state that relied on a superior military aimed to implement a secular state-building project.

阿塞拜疆的民族主义者&社会主义者反叛：Abol-Qasem Lahuti，Mohammad Khiabani，均被扑灭。Contrary to Azarbaijan’s Iran-centered nationalism throughout the constitutional period, and despite the fact that Azarbaijanis acted as the engine for that revolution, both the Khiabani and Lahuti revolts pointed at an emerging ethnic resentment, which would pan out in a generation during the post–World War II Azarbaijan secessionist crisis. 受到Young Turks的pan-Turkism和苏联阿塞拜疆宣传的影响。

Reza Khan’s military not only curtailed the Jangal movement and wiped out the nationalist-Islamic idealism embedded in it but also crushed nearly all sources of tribal resistance to the centralizing state：镇压库尔德Shakak部落和其它不听话部落。部落对中央集权造成威胁。后采取游牧民定居政策，引起不少反抗。

1921年South Persian Rifles合并入中央军队。

军政府：暴力，效率，纪律，让民众敬畏。军费大增。

1922年10月，德黑兰bread短缺，引发抗议和对政府的批评。

抗议阵线组成：部分Majles成员；The parliamentary minority was backed outside the Majles by a handful of journalists and intellectuals, middle-ranking clergy in Tehran and elsewhere, a few tribal chiefs, discontented merchants of the bazaar, and elements of the Qajar court and aristocracy buoyed by the prince regent Mohammad Hasan Mirza (1899–1943)

By autumn 1922 the anti–Reza Khan coalition was able to put a temporary halt to the otherwise irrepressible rise of the commander in chief.

Reza Khan表现不错（纪律，决心，政治精明），赢得英国人和苏联人的欣赏。暂时辞去War Ministry职务，和各方达成和解。By October 1923, when Reza Khan formed his first government, with himself as the prime minister, he extended his power base beyond the military and presented a program of reforms. 得到公众支持。

1923年11月，土耳其共和国成立。凯末尔的经历吸引伊朗知识分子。凯末尔和Reza Khan有某种相似性。5th Majles准备效仿土耳其建立伊朗共和国。受到亲Qajar人士、Qajar贵族、害怕Reza Khan独裁的liberals、害怕Reza Khan的世俗化倾向的教士的反对。

社会风气的变化引起保守人士恐惧：The landed notables, mojtaheds, petty merchants, artisans, and shopkeepers of the bazaar formed the backbone of the conservative sector. 发动穷人搞抗议。

1924年3月22日，五千人在Baharestan Square抗议，反对republicanism。在Majles，温和派领军人物Modarres的操作下，搞共和国的法案没有通过。If Modarres’s opposition to establishing a republican regime was based on the best intentions—that he sensed the coming of a military dictatorship and moved against it—in the end his recourse only helped monarchical autocracy to endure。

凯末尔废除caliphate，让什叶clergy担心Reza Khan也会做类似的事。3月22抗议几天后，Reza Khan去Qom朝圣，和来自Najaf的大ayatollah（其中包括霍梅尼的老师）会面，请他们调解。Reza Shah发布公告称共和制不适合伊朗，assuring the public that he would focus on promoting “Islam’s prominence,” “Iran’s sovereignty,” and a “nationalist government.” 大ayatollah随后也发布公告让大家放心。

Despite all the negative publicity surrounding the republican initiative then and later—that it was a backdoor to Reza Khan’s dictatorship, contrary to Iranian political tradition and against Islam—its defeat proved a major loss for Iran’s political future. 巴列维王朝后来搞世袭monarchy，比军事独裁共和国更不利于政治变革。

In July 1924 the minority in the Majles held a vote of no confidence in the government on the grounds of the unconstitutionality of Reza Khan’s conduct in office, disrespect for the Majles, mistreatment of citizens, and financial misappropriation. Yet their maneuver was defeated by a vast margin. In a short period, the climate had dramatically changed against Modarres and his supporters.

Imbrie Affair：greatly contributed to the atmosphere of fear and intimidation and may have struck the final blow to Reza Khan’s opposition. 1924年七月，出现传言，说出现神奇喷泉，不愿意pay customary donation的巴哈伊当场失明，放弃异端信仰付了钱后立刻恢复。美国legation的Robert Imbrie（为了促成美国石油公司Sinclair Oil和伊朗政府的合作来到伊朗的）也去看喷泉。Imbrie是国家地理杂志的记者，打算在喷泉拍照。被周围的伊朗人反对，不让infidel拍圣泉。被打伤。到了医院后被暴徒当着警察面在手术室殴打，不久死亡。

It never became clear if the incident was a fantastic mob outburst perpetrated against the American diplomat, or against the Baha’is, or more likely a maneuver orchestrated by Reza Khan’s agents that had gotten out of hand.

Reza Khan宣布戒严，逮捕批评者。The Imbrie Affair also allowed Reza Khan to outmaneuver Arthur Millspaugh（美国金融家，反对Reza把APOC的收入都用于军队）。The Imbrie Affair served to cast off the stigma of irreligion from Reza Khan. 各种秀虔诚。

开始利用波斯历史记忆增强legitimacy：使用Nader Shah，Cyrus，Darius的image。

pre-Islamic考古发展促进文化民族主义发展。形成一种辉煌过去在新时代复兴的叙事。

Crafting his own image after these glorious narratives of Iran’s distant past —a notable feature of the emergent Pahlavi era—made Reza Khan and his modernist project appear wholly distinct from the ethos of the Qajar era.

1925年废除Qajar titles，in favor of adopting family names through a national registry. Reza Khan给自己取的姓是Pahlavi，很高大上（an aristocratic clan of the Sasanian period; Middle Persian的别名）。

登基前几个月和Majles的部分deputies频繁会面寻求建议。灌输宪政民主观念失败. Efforts to educate him succeeded only in allowing Iran’s strongman to articulate a nationalist vision of his own of territorial integrity, centralized and effective state power, independent foreign policy, and a program of cultural reconstruction.

1924年秋Khuzestan campaign：It boosted Reza Khan’s prestige and reasserted control over this oil-rich but otherwise isolated and impoverished province. Reclaiming Khuzestan marked the last stage of moving away from the concept of the Guarded Domains of Iran toward the centralizing “Sublime State of Iran” (dowlat ‘alliyeh Iran).

英国人允许Reza Khan的行为： it created a centralized military capable of securing Britain’s investment and strategic interests; he offered a reliable bulwark against the Soviet threat.

More than at any time in its modern history, during World War I and its aftermath, Iran was affected by the military, economic, and human repercussions of a global conflict. The Iranian state survived heavy blows to its sovereignty. The war also brought into light political players, intellectuals, and military officers who were the product of the Constitutional Revolution. The Iranian state employed its meager resources to withstand secessionist challenges. In despair, the ruling elite also subscribed to a halfhearted British effort to resuscitate the Qajar state. Yet the nationalist polity took advantage of the international uproar to successfully resist the semiprotectorate status that the 1919 Anglo-Persian Agreement offered. Its failure paved the way for the rise of a rough and ready strongman in the person of Reza Khan. In retrospect, Reza Khan’s consolidation between 1921 and 1925 appeared as an unavoidable outcome of World War I.

8 REZA SHAH AND THE PAHLAVI ORDER (1925–1941)

By the fall of 1925 all that was needed to remove the Qajars and establish the new Pahlavi dynasty seemed to be in place: Ahmad Shah自愿流亡；其兄Mohammad Hasan Mirza已被孤立；保皇派已经噤若寒蝉；mojtaheds已经搞定；部落叛乱已经平定；公众满足于秩序与稳定，纵容Reza Khan滥权，不再上街抗议。

1925年10月31日：5th Majles通过法案，废除Qajar王朝，宣布Reza Khan为His Royal Excellency，负责临时政府。修宪后，Majles解散，announced the convening of a constituent assembly to determine the country’s political future. 只受到象征性的反对。

1925年12月12日，新招开的制宪议会投票，一致通过巴列维世袭君主制。三天后Reza Khan登基成为新shah。1926年4月的加冕仪式气氛欢乐，和什叶肃穆十分不同，was an event meant to announce clearly the advent of a “modern” era. 新王冠造型inspired by the Achaemenid scaling up motifs as appeared on the ramparts of Persepolis。仪式淡化伊斯兰成分。

To symbolically right the wrongs of the founder of the Qajar dynasty, one of Reza Shah’s earliest acts was to order that the remains of Karim Khan Zand be exhumed from the ivan of Golestan Palace and reinterred in Shiraz.

上台首个十年，Reza Shah及其支持者准备大跃进。自信现代化强国梦能迅速实现。It was as if the whole nation were ready to make a new start.

之前二十年的民主宪政实验的种种不如意之处，had convinced most urban Iranians of the necessity of the alternative offered by Reza Shah. 一战后国际上不少国家对威权主义的认可也正高涨。

As early as 1924 a group of four officials formed an informal alliance that placed them above the old Qajar cabal of the earlier decades. They aimed to harness Reza Khan’s power toward creating a more institutionalized order and transform the regime’s image from that of a mere military dictatorship. Reminiscent of Naser al-Din Shah’s court, the shah controlled his ministers and officers. On the more positive side, the shah was receptive to initiatives his ministers and advisers proposed and saw them through with tenacity. As long as the blend of ministerial initiative and dictatorial drive worked, there was a visible change in the affairs of state, at least in a material sense.

The four civilian ministers soon dominated the new government and initiated many of the reform projects during the first decade of Pahlavi rule.

‘Abd al-Hosain Teymurtash：来自呼罗珊地主家庭，在俄国受的教育，曾管理Gilan。Teymurtash helped shaping Reza Khan’s public image. Though Russian-educated and for a while an Anglophile, under Reza Shah he steered a steady course in tune with Iran’s nationalist ethos. 后来失势，被指控是苏联间谍，1933年被捕，服刑时被谋杀。

Firuz Mirza Nosrat al-Dowleh：Qajar贵族出身，在巴黎学习法律，曾是Vosuq al-Dowleh政府的司法和外交部长。1925年加入内阁，先任财政部长，后任司法部长，与Teymurtash合作, 进行巴列维时代最早的改革. 和英国人走太近，1929年失势，被指控贪污，1936年被流放，后被谋杀。Firuz Mirza was an asset to the new shah, strengthening the regime’s ties with the old nobility and adding to Iran’s international reputation.

‘Ali Akbar Davar：来自中层官僚家庭，在瑞士受的法律教育，早期是左翼激进分子，was most instrumental in overhauling the government administration. 废掉Qajar法案的提出者。As minister of public works in 1925, and minister of justice between 1926 and 1932, and thereafter minister of finance, he was responsible for implementing the most radical reforms under Reza Shah: 重组司法系统，引入现代民法和刑法典，巩固公共财政框架. More than anyone else in high office he promoted the cult of state intervention, which in the long run deteriorated into a malignancy. 1937年在对Reza Shah的恐惧中自杀。

Ja‘far-Qoli As‘ad Bakhtiyari：Constitutional Revolution领导者Sardar As‘ad Bakhtiyari之子。He was an important agent of stability in the early Pahlavi era, an advocate of the policies of pacifying the tribes and making them sedentary. 同样被怀疑，失势。在狱中被下毒，1934年被谋杀。

Reza Shah utilized them to his own ends before destroying them, just as Naser al-Din Shah did many decades earlier. 国王权力无限制的政治文化得以延续。

Reza Shah时代还有很多和四位ministers命运类似的知识分子/政治活动家/部落领袖/旧官僚…

修建从波斯湾到里海的铁路。然而伊朗的铁路，主要用于进口，而不是出口，或者带动本土经济。二战后的阴谋论，称修建铁路是为了推进英国的战略利益。The Khuzestan line helped incorporate the oil-rich province into the state system and enforced Iranian sovereignty in the south. The most expensive and most extensive project ever in modern Iranian history.

公路交通也发展：By the end of 1930s, the road network of fourteen thousand miles—and along with it the culture of motorcars, trucks, and buses—had already began to transform the face of Iranian cities and facilitate the demise of the provinces’ isolation.

出现本土修车业、替换零件制造业，由精通技术的亚美尼亚人主导. Armenians of the postconstitutional and early Pahlavi periods contributed more than any other community to Iran’s material modernization and technological culture.

航空和空军发展：到1930年代早期，伊朗发展出了viable的空军力量

市政建设：垃圾处理，电话系统，电力网络，街灯，马路…

改造德黑兰：城区改造，修建大型公共建筑 modern functional architecture with a thin veneer of Persian architectural references. 波斯花园和城门不见了。

Major buildings of the Qajar complex, including the royal residential quarters, were razed to make room for the Ministry of Justice and later on the Ministry of Finance, and for other government departments.

Soon thereafter, and increasingly in the 1940s and 1950s, most provincial centers were also subjected to the forces of Europeanized modernity and with mixed outcomes. The old neighborhoods were gradually demolished or badly segmented by the introduction of the Western grid; many instantly turned into slums. 部分历史建筑被毁。

The centralizing economy of the early Pahlavi era was characterized by the state’s intervention in finance, modern banking, trade, and industrialization. 有的政策是constitutional时期的延续，有的是效仿土耳其和苏联。Thanks to the growing population, urbanization, greater consumption, and new sources of revenue—including royalties from the Anglo-Persian Oil Company—the economy grew in size and diversified.

人口和state budget迅速增长。

乡下经济变化较慢，bazaar衰落，世界经济大萧条造成破产和失业。苏联消灭市场经济也对伊朗商人造成困难。

The arrested growth of the private sector（国有经济主导地位）, the widening gap between living standards in the city versus the countryside, and the rise of the state’s reliance on independent income through monopolies on commodities and oil revenue were the most significant legacies of the first Pahlavi era.

金融财税改革，增加收入。

收入来源包括石油、糖、鸦片、烟草的专卖。As a sign of the changing times, control of the commercial markets faced no resistance from the bazaar, in stark contrast to the Tobacco Protest of 1891–1892 or the protests against government price controls on the eve of the Constitutional Revolution. bazaar商人是输家，愈发保守，和clergy靠拢。

建立银行体系，取代bazaar金融，和Qajar晚期以来的小型金融网络。建立央行性质的National Bank of Iran，取代英国人的银行发行纸币。改货币名称为rial。钞票印Reza大头。

英俄德成主要贸易伙伴。进口大幅增长。石油外的出口停滞。政府财政依赖石油。Reliance on royalties thus anticipated a long-term pattern in Iranian finances as the state became addicted to oil revenue to finance its needs and less accountable to its citizens.

工业化：纺织厂，水泥厂，炼糖厂，发电厂。试图自给自足，如使用本地silk

波斯地毯制造和出口发展，是石油后的第二大出口产品。The early Pahlavi era witnessed a greater awareness of the carpet as a national heritage worthy of protection and improvement.

工业工人，地毯工人，石油工人，服务业人员：工人阶级的核心。成立工会。The high inflation of the postwar era wiped out much of the workers’ job security, adding to the discontent and radicalization of labor.

发展公共教育：延续了Qajar晚期和立宪革命时期的传统，国家重视教育。From the mid-1920s, with the growth of state-run schools, a standardized curriculum, and a highly regimented pedagogical outlook came to dominate Iranian public education 缺点：填鸭式教育; 人文课程贬低近代伊朗；语言课程不重视地区/民族多样性。极度淡化什叶/伊斯兰identity

设立德黑兰大学：a hotbed of political dissent and a core for antiregime protests and rallies。终结Qatar时代的高等教育机构Dar al-Fonun。前往欧洲留学者增加。代表人物‘Ali Akbar Siyasi，索邦毕业的德黑兰大学校长。

留法学生主导了伊朗高等教育，二战后仍忠于nationalist cause。留学德语国家的伊朗留学生往往左倾，在Tudeh Party以及其他社会主义运动中有影响力。

上传统学校Maktab的人减少。女孩上学的很少，只有大城市上中产家庭的女孩才接受教育。

Despite the obvious inadequacies of the maktab and the madrasa, the inclusion of such texts as Sa‘di’s Golestan, passages from the Qur’an, the utterly impenetrable Sarf-e Mir in Arabic grammar and syntax, and Jami‘ al-Muqaddimat, a compendium of rudimentary logic, did nurture a level of Perso-Arabic erudition that was largely missing from modern schools.

The modern school curriculum entailed a paradigmatic shift from an overtly Shi‘i identity expressed in Arabic to a rarefied Iranian cultural identity manifest in Persian.

文化民族主义：state sponsorship of Persian high culture; ignoring, or actively suppressing, a plethora of languages and dialects throughout Iran(kurdish, azerbaijani, gilaki, luri, baluchi, arabic…), along with their associated regional cultures and folklores; an obsession with “purifying” Persian of its foreign words. Served to homogenize the Iranian population through education, press, and the media.

强调波斯语的连续性：went hand in hand with renewed interest in Zoroastrianism as the indigenous religion of an “authentic” past, and archeology further buttressed such claim.

德国考古学家、历史语言学家Ernst Emil Herzfeld：发掘Achaemenid的第一个首都Pazargadae, Persepolis, 以及位于伊拉克的萨珊都城Ctesiphon。 In his many years of residence in Iran, he was instrumental in raising awareness about Iran’s pre-Islamic heritage among officials in charge of cultural affairs and scholars alike.

Iranian cultural archaism and the coining of “pure” Persian words were never as severe as critics often alleged. 和同期类似做法对比：远没有Turkish/Hindi/Tajik的“语言净化”激进。

负责语言改革的机构：由Mohammad ‘Ali Forughi（用波斯语写作西方哲学史;翻译Avicenna著作;点校Sa‘di的诗歌）领导的The Farhangestan-e Iran. Over the course of six years, Farhangestan proposed Persian equivalents to Arabic, Turkish, and French terms that found public acceptance and became part of everyday language of Iranians. Prudently, however, it avoided the sensitive debate about reforming the script, which Farhangestan’s constitution had called for.

出版各种词典、名著新校版本、百科全书：Close paleographic and bibliographic research unearthed forgotten texts and laid the foundation for a Persian literary canon. In turn, a new cultural and linguistic style was made current through textbooks, the press, literary journals, and later radio broadcasts.

Preserving Persian at the core of cultural identity is also evident in the lexicographic production of Ali Akbar Dehkhoda. 出版Loghat-nameh. 出版谚语词典Amsal va Hekam.

Mohammad Taqi Bahar出版Sabk-shenasi：a systematic study of Persian prose over a millennium, tracing its roots to the pre-Islamic Pahlavi and Avestan languages. 曾随Herzfeld学习古波斯语言。Awareness of the link between pre-Islamic and Islamic Iran served as the impetus to form a Persian canon.

流亡德国的知识分子（代表：Hasan Taqizadeh）出版Kaveh：反俄反英，关注国运，后来转向波斯历史文化和伊朗学。

Jamalzadeh写作短篇故事：masterfully employed street language, folk expressions and proverbs, and nuances of regional, class, and ethnic parlance to poignantly depict life in the postwar era.

Mohammad Qazvini: a hybrid scholar between traditional madrasa education and modern Orientalist scholarship. 神学院出身，痴迷东方学学术，曾参与编辑Hafez的Divan。

Edward Granville Browne: 对伊朗人影响大。An exceptional blend of nineteenth-century romanticism, literary and historical scholarship, and antiimperialist advocacy. 出版四卷本The Literary History of Persia.

形成关于伊朗历史的新叙事：纳入pre-Islamic past, The Orientalist scholarship and the state’s support for new archeological expeditions emphasized the Achaemenid Empire as Iran’s moment of civilizational inception and the Zoroastrianism revival of the Sassanian era in late antiquity as a moment of rebirth.

Beyond the traditional Persian sources, Iranians for the first time were learning about the Persian empire. 1934年庆祝Shahnameh千年。

Public display of cultural symbols and the commemoration of Iranian literary and intellectual icons such as Ferdowsi (and later Ibn Sina), made the Iranian nationalist narrative to gradually trickle down to the level of general public.

Ibrahim Purdavud (1885–1968) can be regarded as a key scholar responsible for incorporating ancient Iranians languages and texts into the Pahlavi nationalism. 其生涯clearly displayed the shift from the activism of the constitutional era to Iranian nationalist discourse of the Pahlavi period.

Awareness of Zoroastrianism and revival of the ancient Iranian memories incited a challenge to the whole project of Pahlavi secularism on the side of the Shi‘i clerical establishment. 和ulama关系恶化。clergy地位下降。 eroded an ancient social accord that tied, at least in theory, the “good government” with the “good religion,” the “inseparable twins” as they were known to classical authors. In due course the experiences of the Reza Shah era transformed the Shi‘i clerical establishment into a force of political dissent.

1927年强制征兵，引入西式dress code，削除宗教教育，1935强制除面纱（引发流血冲突）。

Reza Shah和巴列维精英明确将clerical establishment and what it stood for视为进步阻碍，想方设法缩小其规模，减弱其在保守bazaar sector的影响。

拉拢温和宗教人士，the state never dismantled the clerical hierarchy or the institution of the madrasa, the waqf, and other means of revenue. 部分文化精英早年接受的是madrasa教育。Qom地位提高。

历史叙事里淡化什叶作用，the potent Shi‘i story was diluted into a facile history of the Imams. Even the role of Shi‘ism in the rise of Safavids and as an important element of national identity was downplayed. Most displays of collective rituals were banned. 摧毁Tekkiyeh-e Dowlat.

Clergy面临brain drain：年轻人倾向接受现代教育，做公务员或者从事专业工作。clergy收入减少（国家控制charitable endowments）。

司法改革让学习Islamic jurisprudence变得没用。Shi‘i law of contracts (mo’amelat) was no longer considered valid. Interpretation of law and its enforcement were now squarely in the hands of state courts and thus outside the traditional domain of the jurists. What was left unregulated, however, was the devotional and obligational aspect of the shari‘a dealing with purity and pollutants, as well as rules on prayers, fasting, pilgrimage, alms, and other devotional acts.

巴列维司法改革，主要依据拿破仑法典，adopted the French system to reasonable dictates of the Shi‘i shari‘a, and did this perhaps more effectively than many other Muslim countries in the twentieth century. The Islamic provisions in the system proved vital for the state’s legitimacy. Family law部分仍然受到传统律法很大影响。

The dress code of December 1928: The introduction of dress uniformity, with its militaristic undertones, was a radical departure from this landscape of apparel diversity（各种身份的人可以从衣着识别） Like the ideologies obsessed with uniforms in Europe and in neighboring Turkey, the Pahlavi dress code was a powerful tool to transform Iranian society into a bland and featureless mass, amnesic of its diversity and ready to be recast in a Westernized mold.

ulama免于新dress code，但是仍痛恨之，They resented the Pahlavi outfit primarily because Westernized uniformity was a symbolic statement against what they stood for. Having been excluded from the mandatory dress code, the clergy stood out as a historical anomaly and were looked upon by the modernizing middle classes with condescension, if not disdain.

In the aftermath of Reza Khan’s rise to power, and especially during the debate over republicanism, support for unveiling grew as women’s groups organized and demonstrated, casting off their veils and clashing with opponents. By 1934, in the aftermath of Reza Shah’s official visit to Turkey, the new government decree required nationwide mandatory unveiling among all classes.

Ugly scenes of the police forcefully removing women’s chadors in the streets, reprimands and sacking of military and civilian officials who were reluctant to abide by the new policy, and general disregard for conservative sentiments against unveiling cast a shadow over the whole episode. Yet contrary to a common perception that mandatory unveiling was unpopular and oppressive, its liberating effects were undeniable. 1941年后强制unveiling停止后只有少数女性自愿穿回。

教士们敢怒而不敢言; no major fatwa against unveiling was issued at the time, though in later years there was ample resentment toward enforcement of the hijab.

Ulama守旧，不愿意与时俱进：Mohammad Hasan Shari‘at Sangelaji之类愿意有所创新的人被谴责。陈旧的和当代生活不兼容的部分带来的问题：all these remained unresolved.

Greater cleavage between the modern and traditional sectors of Iranian society.

The clergy also lost ground in the public forum against the media and entertainment. 不少保守人士拒绝听广播。

With the growth of modern entertainment, storytelling in coffeehouses and by wandering dervishes, who displayed large-scale paintings as visual aids for their narratives of the Shi‘i tragedies and the Shahnameh stories, gradually disappeared.

到1930年代中期，Reza Shah政权越来越专制、难以预测。尽管表面上看似拥有绝对权力，巴列维政权的民众基础已经被侵蚀，其合法性也受到质疑。1941年Reza Shah被迫退位，英俄再度占领伊朗。

1939年二战开始时伊朗宣布中立。英国人怀疑伊朗通德（德国在伊朗很有存在感，伊朗依靠德国技术金融专长，德国是伊朗贸易工业伙伴，政府里有亲德人士，纳粹雅利安神话在伊朗有一定影响），1940年准备占领Khuzestan油田。

害怕英国因为伊朗和德国的联系惩罚伊朗，Reza Shah提出愿意和英国军事合作抵抗苏联（当时仍是德国盟友）。Shah把亲德首相换成亲英首相（激怒在伊朗的德国人，攻击Shah是英国走狗）也没用。Shah地位岌岌可危。

尽管英俄承诺尊重伊朗的领土完整，in what seemed a predetermined course, 英俄1941年下最后通牒，要求驱逐所有为伊朗政府服务的德国人. Shah照办。红军开始在北部边境集结。BBC开始批判Shah独裁腐败。That the BBC championed the liberal and constitutional cause in Iran was a surprise shift from its earlier condoning of many years of the shah’s autocratic rule. The skeptical Iranian public interpreted the change in tone as proof that Reza Shah was no longer in control, even as a presumption that he was no longer a useful puppet in the hand of his British masters.

伊朗政府满足最后通牒要求，还为苏军提供支援。1941年8月25日，英俄军队从南北进入伊朗。

Allied air forces began bombing civilian and military targets in major cities, causing havoc and undermining civilian confidence, while leaflets dropped from the air spoke of the occupiers’ benevolence, friendship toward the Iranian people, and desire to leave Iranian territory at the close of the war. 伊朗军队无力抵抗，解散。

英俄逼Reza Shah退位。保证让儿子继位。1941年9月26日王子Mohammad Reza Pahlavi宣誓。Shah被流放到约翰内斯堡，死在那里。

Reza Shah：可能是16世纪早期Isma‘il I后伊朗历史上最有影响力的统治者, he was instrumental in carrying out massive changes that transformed Iranian society, culture, and economy. He has been remembered as a man of vision and resolve but also as autocratic, avaricious, and increasingly paranoid. Reasserted sovereignty and carried out nearly all the nonpolitical objectives of the Constitutional Revolution. 建立现代化的centralized国家，engendered an optimistic sense of national identity that revolved around cultural heritage, collective memory, and national symbols. It increased government revenue and efficiency and restrained foreign influences in domestic affairs. It curbed the power of tribal leaders, checked the conservative clergy, and lessened—if not demolished—the long-held monopoly of the Qajar ruling elite.

局限：仍然是农业经济。地主剥削不减（reinforced by Reza Shah’s own greed）。 The industrialization and trade policies relied heavily on government monopolies and state ownership, at the expense of fostering an expansive industrial bourgeoisie.

The hasty introduction of new secularized institutions, with few exceptions, was marked by uncritical borrowing of Western models and misconceived positivist values, combined with contempt for Iran’s indigenous traditions and cultural mores. The nationalist ideology of the Pahlavi era, too, tended to undermine Iran’s ethnic and linguistic diversity and to accommodate Iran’s long and complex Shi‘i past.

The budding aspirations of the constitutional period for democracy and popular representation were not completely crushed.

促进独裁的因素：传统的制衡被打破。整个政权军事化。一战后的国际独裁潮流。Reza上台前的动荡。

9 CHAOTIC DEMOCRACY, OIL NATIONALIZATION, AND DENIED HOPES (1941–1953)

The occupation triggered one of the most eventful episodes in Iran’s modern history and revealed persistent themes in the country’s recent past: the struggle for democracy, foreign intervention, and grave tensions within the polity and between the center and the periphery.

经济受扰，政局不稳，部落造反，分裂运动。戒严频繁。

出现石油国有化运动，政治空间扩大，更多出版自由，议会政治回归，新生劳工运动。The resumption of a process that was first started with the Constitutional Revolution but interrupted by the rise of Reza Shah.

新的意识形态：马列主义，极端民族主义，Islamic extremist。

政坛老面孔归来：Ahmad Qavam; Sayyed Zia al-Din Tabataba’i; Mohammad Mosaddeq

新一代中产知识分子倾向于马克思主义或世俗民族主义。bazaar和城市下中产倾向Islamic activism.

The new era of political pluralism facilitated under the aegis of the same occupying powers that had helped shut down Iran’s democratic process three decades earlier. 苏联想扩大影响力，输出共产主义；英国人有石油利益；美国人有冷战战略。

In response to the domestic turmoil and foreign ambitions in the 1940s and early 1950s, a potent nationalist response seemed unavoidable. The rise and fall of Mohammad Mosaddeq characterized the successes and failures of the period, revealed first through legislation and parliamentary maneuvers, then through nationalization of the Iranian oil industry, and finally during Mosaddeq’s turbulent term as prime minister. Ending with the coup of August 1953, his story is an unhealed wound in the Iranian persecution narrative and a well-known chapter in the history of covert Anglo-American interventions. Iran’s return to arbitrary Pahlavi rule after 1953 put a premature end to Iran’s perilous experiment with participatory politics.

盟军占领严重干扰伊朗经济：军需超过伊朗经济支持能力，人工贬值伊朗货币造成严重通胀，进出口受干扰。贫穷是造反和加入Tudeh Party的动因。运输大量物资，战后被誉为Bridge to Victory，但是得到很少补偿。

Forughi政府和盟军签约，纸面保证伊朗主权和领土完整，要求战争结束后半年内离开。Forughi’s famous pronouncement in response to public anxiety—“They come, they go, and they don’t bother us” proved a gigantic understatement. 然而约定里，盟军人数不设限，full access to伊朗通信交通设施，可随意hunt伊朗的德国agent（引起亲德人士不满）。

1943德黑兰会议美英苏感谢伊朗政府，承诺提供经济援助，尊重伊朗主权。实际：Iran’s future was not a priority for the Allies.

部落造反：Tribal rebellions were in greater part a response to years of harsh treatment under Reza Shah and to his pacification campaigns. 冲突影响部落经济和周边农村生活。

The central government’s answer to these mounting problems was at best conciliatory, occasionally draconian, and often ineffective. 各方利益角逐。政府频频换人。

赤字严重，资金不足。借美国外债，但因此受制于美国。石油成增收希望，触及英国利益。早在1946年就出现石油国有化声音。

局势动荡，军队维稳：the armed forces were reorganized in early 1942, 受美国人支持。1942年军队镇压要求Ahmad Qavam下台的人群。

共产主义者和社会主义者（出狱的，国外流亡归来的，魏玛受训的，苏联受训的）成立Tudeh Party。The Tudeh quickly developed into a disciplined and doctrinaire political machine with growing membership among the intellectuals and urban middle classes and some industrial workers, and with almost complete loyalty to Moscow.

伊朗人对社会主义不陌生：六世纪Mazdakism，九世纪Khorramdinan运动，十五十六世纪Noqtavi运动，Babi运动，近代俄国革命影响。

Reza Shah时期镇压左翼，宣布共产党非法。Loyalty to the Soviet leadership over world communism reduced most socialists in the eyes of authorities to dangerous agitators, if not traitors. 共产主义运动从海外招人。

Taqi Arani：左翼知识分子，早期是nationalist，在柏林学习时成为社会主义者。逮捕判刑死在监狱里。

后来在Reza Shah时期入狱的共产主义者：倾向于马克思列宁主义，支持苏联。1943年支持伊朗政府给苏联里海石油特许。支持苏联占领阿塞拜疆。

Tudeh的主要影响对象：中小学教师，大学生，部分大学教师，低级公务员，知识分子，工会组织者，北部工业中心Rasht与Tabriz的活动家，Isfahan工业工人，南部油田石油工人。Tudeh有组织有纪律（至少在其普通成员中如此），频繁组织街头示威、劳工抗议，以及通过众多出版物和‘辩证’辩论来吸引公众。1946年发动南部油田罢工。和liberal nationalists有某些类似的主张，尽管有共同之处，Tudeh经常给liberal nationalists扣美帝工具的帽子。

阿塞拜疆危机：战后撤军时限到了，苏军以保护巴库油田，防止来自伊朗的破坏为理由，赖着不走。Azarbaijan Democratic Party要求从伊朗分裂出去。同期Democratic Party of Kurdistan同样受到苏联支持。

Azarbaijan Democratic Party的领导Sayyed Ja‘far Pishehvari：a communist in action but an ethnic nationalist at heart.

Reza Shah时期强制推行波斯语教育，引起阿塞拜疆人不满。对政治经济利益分配不满。寻求自治。

The Azarbaijani Democrats envisioned their role, at least early on, as saviors of all of Iran. 实际：分离倾向明显; 亲苏; 和中央政府争执; 解除中央驻军武装; 解除非阿塞拜疆人职务; 压制反对; and promised to defend itself “to the last drop” against Tehran’s attempts to reintegrate the province. 在阿塞拜疆搞土改，给女性选举权。Subservience to the Soviets aside, the successes of the autonomous government were impressive even in the eyes of critics. No Pahlavi provincial authority had made such gains in a short period. 阿塞拜疆当年曾是伊朗全国革命的powerhouse，分离倾向部分是对Perso-centric nationalism的反应。

英美担心伊朗阿塞拜疆和库尔德斯坦成为苏联卫星国。但是各方行动缓慢。只能谈判。

Ahmad Qavam（Qajar世家贵族，1906年曾起草Constitutional Decree最终稿）出任首相。1946年1月到1947年12月间担任首相，大搞balancing act，typical of the Qajar elite. 1946年和苏联人谈判（Qavam-Sadchikov Accord）：苏联撤军。成立苏联-伊朗联合石油公司。阿塞拜疆危机是伊朗内政，要和平解决。和阿塞拜疆Democrats谈判：It conceded to them genuine grievances and their proposed reforms while modifying their claim of autonomy by defining the Democrats’ elected assembly as a provincial council. 让四名Tudeh Party成员加入内阁，赢得苏联媒体greatest politician of the East赞誉。

成立Democratic Party of Iran：各方势力的wide coalition。

He formed for the first time a supreme council for devising a planned economy, overhauling labor laws, and reforming the much-abused election laws; he established a stateowned investment bank for industrial and mining developments; and he began to distribute state-owned agricultural lands to small landowners.

中南部部落造反，受到英国人支持。

内战危险和部落造反，各方压力，Qavam被迫调整。1946年底控制阿塞拜疆。As it turned out, the real winner of the “heroic” return of Azarbaijan to the motherland was not Qavam but the twenty-seven-year-old Mohammad Reza Shah and generals of his army, who were anxious to score a victory to reverse the bad memories of the 1941 fiasco and years of imposing unpopular martial law over the Iranian public.

Qavam政府成立苏联-伊朗石油公司的提议受到反对，法案在15th Majles受阻。Soon after the vote, Qavam’s government, the longest serving in the postwar years, began to crumble. Massive strikes and frequent demonstrations orchestrated by the Tudeh Party and affiliated labor unions, which had become Qavam’s sworn enemies, paralyzed his government.

北方石油concession宣布无效immediately rekindled both in and out of the Majles the longstanding demand to renegotiate the oil concession that had been granted to the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC).

伊朗人政府分得利益少，伊朗人员受英国人歧视，工人被剥削：The AIOC—the forerunner of today’s British Petroleum (BP)— ran the Iranian oil industry not unlike a colonial plantation, exerting the hierarchy of class-conscious English society and preserving a culture of colonial privilege.

With negative equilibrium, the nationalists aimed to cancel unfair privileges of both powers and to preserve Iran’s precarious balance in an increasingly polarizing world. （此时西伯利亚发现石油，苏联方面已经不那么急迫了）

Demands for better terms, and eventually for nationalization, 受到战后去殖民化运动的鼓舞。Partitions in Palestine and India were seen as British ploys to divide and prolong colonial rule in a new disguise, in the same way that AIOC was exploiting the fractured Iranian polity for its own benefits.

Besides being an issue of Iran’s moral right over its own resources, the demand for higher oil income became an urgent national cause given the fall in other sources of state revenue. 战后萧条，其它收入减少。Enamored of the then-popular idea of the state as agent of economic development, 伊朗nationalists认为基建与工业发展必须要有石油收入。

Even though the Labour government at the time was nationalizing major British industries including coal and the railroad, the rationale for nationalization was barely extended to investments abroad.

1949年，Tudeh成员行刺Shah，Tudeh被宣布非法，镇压左翼。修宪，给Shah解散议会权力。

16th Majles选举后，不满选举结果，Mosaddeq要求Shah重选举。In January 1950 when the Tehran electorate went to the polls, Mosaddeq and candidates of the National Front gained the highest number of votes, 通往首相之路的开始。

美国政府和沙特的ARAMCO deal对半分利。By November 1950, when the Majles finally rejected the Supplemental Agreement, the reluctant AIOC began to entertain similar terms of fifty-fifty profit sharing, which, as it turned out, was too late. Despite signs of earlier moderation, the Majles’ Oil Committee—chaired by Mohammad Mosaddeq —was no longer interested in anything short of full ownership of Iran’s oil industry. Razmara提出渐进国有化，激进人士不满。Razmara得罪各方（decentralization program，反腐，土改计划，限制court权力，美国人支持… ）。

1951年，支持Supplemental Agreement的首相Razmara被刺，行刺者是Ayatollah Abul-Qasem Kashani 的追随者。两周后石油国有化bill通过，受到广泛民众支持。Triggered a massive anti-AIOC strike throughout the oil industry, organized by the Tudeh Party. It turned violent and cost many lives

Ayatollah Kashani的政治崛起：clergy重归政坛的标志。As an influential cleric, Kashani appealed to the National Front for he mustered large crowds of the lower-middle classes and the bazaar merchants in support of the nationalist cause. Later as the speaker of the Majles he proved only partially committed to the National Front’s program and soon after became something of a liability for Mosaddeq. By 1953 he had abandoned the National Front altogether and implicitly defected to the shah’s camp, a glaring shift of loyalty to be followed by most members of the clergy.

Fada’iyan-e Islam：激进军事组织。founder and leader was a maladapted seminarian in Qom who once was an AIOC employee in Abadan。受到埃及穆斯林兄弟会启发。战后各种刺杀。Their radical convictions led to their eventual destruction however when in 1955 Navvab Safavi and two of his lieutenants were executed after a failed assassination attempt against the prime minister Hosain ‘Ala.

1951年4月28日，Mohammad Mosaddeq出任首相。

Mosaddeq身体不好，Qajar贵族出身，在瑞士学习法律。和clergy家庭结婚。Mosaddeq’s somewhat unusual union seems to have helped give him a new perspective on the place of Shi‘i Islam in Iranian society and traditions. 学位论文on will and testaments and inheritance in Islamic law. Examining subtleties of the Shi‘i legal system through the lens of modern European law helped him recognize impediments in enforcing these in a modern context. Reza Shah时期曾短暂在政府任职，均以辞职告终。反对Reza Shah的政策没人听。1928-1943隐居，种地，生病。

1943当选Majles代表，重返政坛。和中产阶级站在一起。He was quick to learn the populist politics of the postwar era and quicker to grasp and indigenize its anti-imperialist message as it circulated throughout the non-Western milieu. Mosaddeq represented a new face of postcolonial leadership pioneered by the likes of Mahatma Gandhi and later by Sukarno in Indonesia and Jamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt. Yet in contrast to most postcolonial leaders, Mosaddeq was an anomaly: he neither rose from the underprivileged classes or the bourgeoisie, nor did he entertain revolutionary views at the outset of his career.

石油国有化，由此获得经济主权，经济繁荣，物质发展，结束外国干预，是Mosaddeq的核心agenda。 但也主张给AIOC补偿，并且不打算驱逐英国技术人员。

面临各种困难：英国人反对； Tudeh反对（希望和苏联石油合作）；Shah和保守人士反对；政治盟友反对。担任首相期间反复更改人事任命。管理失误，加上健康问题，焦虑，固执，never allowed him to fully grasp the reins of power.

一开始，派伊朗人员接管AIOC。英国人撤走所有人员，拒绝提供技术支持。英国政府向海牙ICJ抗议，要求宣布伊朗的石油国有化非法。杜鲁门派人调解，Mosaddeq拒绝对半分利方案。英国告到安理会。Mosaddeq到纽约应对，寻求美国支持，受到美国反帝民众支持。英国实行伊朗石油出口禁运，威胁潜在顾客。英国人靠伊拉克和其它海湾国家的石油补足需求。禁运影响伊朗经济。引起通胀。1952年初石油停产，政府濒临破产。

国内斗争加剧：Tudeh把Mosaddeq描画为地主贵族，资产阶级自由分子，美国走狗，说石油国有化是为了给美国人开后门。

Tudeh经常组织集会反对。Fada’iyan-e Islam，还有伊朗纳粹组织Sumka反对Tudeh。警察（多pro-Shah，反对左翼）暴力镇压。

Social unrest and violent rallies tarnished Mosaddeq’s image as a well-intentioned leader inundated by enmity and intrigue. Serious fractures within Mosaddeq’s own ranks heightened doubts of his political survival.

As the oil dispute heated up and the stakes got higher, other allies of Mosaddeq, such as Baqa’i and Makki, gradually abandoned him; some switched to the shah’s camp, others abstained from taking sides, and others openly criticized the premier.

By mid-1952 it was as if he had exhausted most of his options and was ready for an honorable exit. 但是坚持要完成石油国有化。

英国军事威胁波斯湾。美国人害怕直接和伊朗军事对峙武力移除Mosaddeq会让苏联得利，英国人准备等Mosaddeq下台。

Shah怀疑Mosaddeq想推翻巴列维王朝建立共和制。经常和Mosaddeq发生冲突。Confrontation with Britain and engaging in street politics, the shah believed, is bound to result in economic ruination and possibly even a communist takeover. 旧式精英，军队高层，ulama高层，商人，都持有类似观点。

Mosaddeq认为Shah是石油国有化障碍，和Shah的关系紧张，指责Shah干预政府任命，和外国敌手走太近。

到1952年初，Mosaddeq骑虎难下，没进展，但也无法妥协。Mosaddeq也急了，为保优势选举选一半停了。

1952年七月，和Shah为了军权问题发生争执，辞职回家。7月17日，Shah任命经验老到的Ahmad Qavam为首相，打算解决危机。Qavam任命四天后，海牙传来喜讯。民众仍然大量支持Mosaddeq，Qavam受到各种反对。7月21日反对者示威，发生冲突，军队镇压。7月22日，Qavam辞职，Shah立刻再次任命Mosaddeq为首相，也同意了其军权要求。

“We sacrificed our lives, we write with our blood: either death or Mosaddeq,” 民众视Mosaddeq为民族拯救者. 美英挫败，本来支持Qavam是不搞coup的最佳选项。

受到公众支持+在海牙胜利，Mosaddeq stood to gain an unprecedented advantage, and he was quick to exploit that in hopes of implementing his reform agenda beyond oil nationalization. 获得full legislative power，实际上rule by decree。

To his credit, Mosaddeq employed his extraordinary powers to carry out a series of urgent reform measures. These included purging the army and the administration of corrupt elements, balancing the budget through higher taxation, and reforming election laws. Yet in reality, the sum total of Mosaddeq’s second government included measures that could least be justified by Mosaddeq’s own moral standards and legal principles. 侵犯civil liberties，实行戒严，管制出版，清洗对手（引起军队，法律系统不满）。

Mosaddeq’s more successful measures in the area of finance, labor laws, rural development, and housing—to the extent they ever were implemented —projected the image of a welfare state committed to the improvement of the standard of living and well-being of ordinary citizens.

1952年10月，和英国断交。英国媒体描述Mosaddeq为a dangerous xenophobe, an erratic rabble-rouser, and—after July 1952—a dictator。

To them, as to many in the British establishment (and the British public at large), clinging to AIOC not only seemed vital for the postwar recovery but also symbolically crucial to project abroad an image of power and prestige, despite the realities of a waning empire.

艾森豪威尔当选美国总统。Dulles的外交政策更加aggressive。

From the British perspective, the only feasible option in the oil dispute with Iran after the defeat of Ahmad Qavam was to bring about the downfall of Mosaddeq, rather than to opt for leniency or wait for Mosaddeq’s government to fall under the weight of its own difficulties.

伊朗政府和英美谈判没有进展。英国人要求巨额赔偿。It was as if the terms were designed to be rejected, paving the way for an aggressive course. Mosaddeq寻求和解，提出让步，如让ICJ仲裁补偿金额，和AIOC建立partnership等。无果。

By March 1953 艾森豪威尔政府确信政变是唯一选择。

一开始（杜鲁门时）美国的外交政策是supporting nationalist and anticolonial movements all over the world as a bulwark against communism，在调解中也被认为是伊朗盟友，伊朗人认为美国和苏联英国帝国主义者不同。但此时美国政策后来变化。

Mosaddeq访美时，最高法院大法官William O. Douglas表示支持伊朗的石油国有化运动。此人是登山爱好者，多次前往伊朗爬山，长期观察伊朗政治和社会。Douglas called on Truman to value leaders like Mosaddeq and Jawaharlal Nehru as statesmen withstanding communist penetration. 表达对Mosaddeq的个人支持。后来批评艾森豪威尔政府的不义行为。

Mosaddeq是《时代》1951年的年度人物。刊文称Mosaddeq is an inevitable voice of the developing world’s national aspirations who nevertheless is a hazard to the West’s economic and strategic concerns.

By early 1953 the image of the United States as a benevolent savior of the weak had fully evaporated in the heat of the oil dispute.

1953年早期，美国驻伊朗使节Loy Henderson预测Mosaddeq正在失去支持，迟早被迫支持Tudeh Party，然后Tudeh会夺权，变成亲苏政权。Henderson也倾向于除掉Mosaddeq。

Despite the joint American and British pressure, and the behind-the-scenes selection of Fazlollah Zahedi as a viable replacement, the shah was not willing to dismiss Mosaddeq outright. Shah害怕1952年7月的情况重演，打算等到Mosaddeq山穷水尽。

1953年7月，因为警察torture反National Front人士，不信任案提上Majles。Mosaddeq催促allies都一起辞职。

7月21日周年，Mosaddeq called for a public referendum to ratify his decision to dissolve the Majles, amend the election laws, and rule by decree.

The referendum, carried out in mid-July 1953 haphazardly and without any serious debate, was unprecedented and clearly damaging to Mosaddeq’s image as a man of principle. 反对公投者指责Mosaddeq 独裁，煽动民众。

美国彻底停止调停，也不给承诺的一亿美元贷款。The oil dispute had reached total deadlock despite Mosaddeq’s conciliatory pleas, and he had alienated the shah and most ranking army officers. Short of quitting, appealing to the people on the streets and mobilizing the public remained the only available path to Mosaddeq.

1953年六月底，Operation Ajax提出。说服Shah同意政变，签订免职Mosaddeq和任命Zahedi的decrees。

第一次政变受挫：8月16日，免职decree送达Mosaddeq。直接把送decree的人抓了起来。Shah得知消息后，躲到罗马准备退位或者永久流亡。

The news of the failed coup had a great radicalizing effect on Mosaddeq’s supporters. On the same day Mosaddeq officially dissolved the Majles and in a public rally openly attacked the shah and the royalist officers involved in the coup. His foreign minister Hosain Fatemi openly called for the shah’s abdication and an end to the Pahlavi monarchy.

Tudeh表达支持Mosaddeq，倡议建立共和国。To many, even among Mosaddeq’s supporters, this was ominous, a euphemism for a Tudeh-dominated pro-Soviet regime.

8月18日打算再次举行公投，决定巴列维王朝命运。Henderson亲自警告Mosaddeq他马上要倒台，Tudeh 要夺权。宣布戒严（阻止了次日他的支持者上街支持他）。

8月19日，第二次政变。雇佣穷人，包括lutis，妓女，进行pro-Shah游行。军队上街，炮轰首相官邸。Mosaddeq 措手不及。Once Mosaddeq realized that the troops would not be countered by a popular uprising in his favor, as had happened in July 1952, he opted to resist to the last. 挂出白旗（床单）希望停止攻击，没用。和支持者逃走。第二天自首。

Once the military authorities solidified their ground, Mosaddeq was transferred to police headquarters and charged with treason and insubordination. 在军事法庭上为自己的政治生涯系统辩护。上诉无果。

政变后戒严四年。Mosaddeq的人马被清洗，decree被撤销。Zahedi得到美国政府信任，大胆腐败，积极反共。Tudeh元气大伤。

Mosaddeq的困境与悲剧：was that in the outset he tried to fulfill national aspirations while remaining committed to the principles of constitutionalism and democracy. Yet his disturbing display of autocratic conduct toward the end of his premiership may be seen as a conundrum, a vacillation between two modes of constitutional liberalism and radical populism. Mosaddeq and his colleagues also exhibited another dichotomy familiar to the constitutional period: they paid homage to Islam as a source of Iranian identity and courted religious authorities while also hoping to preserve the ideals of a secular society, freedom of the press, and equality before the law—notions that were in contrast to the conservative outlook of the Shi‘i establishment and its radical allies.

Above all, the political volatility of the postwar era and the presence of many players created an environment of perpetual turmoil. A potent combination of security and energy dimmed the chances of nationalist movements at the outset of the postcolonial age and made inevitable violent clashes of interests. Mosaddeq’s own behavior in office did not help alleviate his differences with many domestic and foreign nemeses.

Mosaddeq自己调子定太高，公众期望太高。AIOC and the British government never really offered any plausible deal to Mosaddeq for a viable compromise. Nor could US mediation substantially change the British resolve.

The lack of organized political support with a coherent program contributed to the volatility of Mosaddeq’s power base and his government. 依赖街头政治而不觉其局限。

如果Mosaddeq没有被推翻，下台辞职也是迟早的事。 Yet the prospect of foreign involvement in the form of a conspiracy to oust a nationally mandated leader —almost a prophetic figure—profoundly changed the political climate and brought about a paradigm shift.

The coup of 1953 put an end to an era of political engagement, no matter how imperfect, and launched a second era of Pahlavi autocratic rule that by and large excluded the public from the political process. The fall of Mosaddeq came to be seen by most Iranians as a flagrant intrusion by Western powers into Iran’s sovereignty and economic destiny.

The fall of Mosaddeq turned into a traumatic memory that in the coming decades produced a narrative of victimization. It reinforced not only xenophobic suspicions but also pushed the Pahlavi opposition forces toward an anti-Western—more specifically, anti-American—discourse.

10 THE WHITE REVOLUTION AND ITS OPPONENTS (1953–1963)

1953年后，参与性政治实验结束，重回autocracy。稳定但repressive，到1979年革命前基本没怎么变。

1953-1979: 对城市中产来说，是相对繁荣的时期，但是经济发展没有转化为政权的政治资本。农村生活水平也有所提高，实行土改，教育医疗改善。农村向城市移民。移民不满，痛恨特权阶层，开始接受激进化的clergy（来自类似背景）的message。

The second Pahlavi era was marked by royal politics of self-aggrandizement, especially in the 1970s, and this image was enhanced by the growth of oil revenue, the rise of a subservient technocrat class, and the unprecedented expansion of security forces and the secret police apparatus.

60年代早期的白色革命的成效到70年代中期显现：工业增长，基建发展，制度建设，计划经济实施，专业技能增长，女性教育和法律方面的进步。

These crucial transformations also triggered contesting visions of modernity. The shah’s image of progress, patterned on a Westernizing model similar to his father’s, was questioned by a small but influential circle of secular dissidents and intellectuals—many with roots in the Tudeh and the National Movement of the postwar era.

With the uprising of June 1963, a turning point in Iran’s shift to Islamic activism, this laymen’s critique of repression, nepotism, and the perceived “moral decline” of society increasingly took on an Islamic veneer.

Islamic militants, mostly under the aegis of Ayatollah Khomeini, were the ultimate beneficiaries of anti-Pahlavi discourse. They succeeded in incorporating the semantics of the nationalists, the anti-Westernists, and the radical Marxists into their own rhetoric of “pristine Islam.”

Shah的逐渐政治崛起并不意外：得到军队和美国人的支持。General Zahedi有效镇压异议。

石油问题的解决：纸面上承认了伊朗国有化石油工业。1954年成立National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC), 和由美英欧石油公司组成的Iranian Oil Participants Limited (IOP) 对半分利，结束了AIOC的垄断。和安排沙特石油的ARAMCO类似。和国有化运动原本目标相去甚远，民众不高兴。对Shah和美国只能算挽尊。

IOP held full control over all operations. A victory for the big oil companies in tightening their monopoly not only over Iranian oil but also over more than 80 percent of world oil production.

1954年给IOP 50年concession，更是背离国有化运动目标。直到1973年，Shah才谈判出更好的deal。1975年，Shah再次搞“国有化”。

With the Americans holding the upper hand, the issue was not so much the AIOC’s colonial culture, which was gradually disappearing, but a new corporate mentality that allowed the oil companies to manipulate prices and production levels for the Middle East oil market.

石油收入增加，在伊朗经济中的分量越来越重。成为政权稳定的关键。

美国50年代60年代大力提供经济军事援助。对美国来说，援助性价比很高：The US government’s aid program in reality was a fraction of what US oil companies collected from investing in Iranian oil and a negligible expense compared to the benefit of keeping Iran as a strategic ally in the Cold War. From the American perspective, Iranian collaboration had to be preserved at any price so as to eradicate any remnants of the Iranian Tudeh and other real or potential sources of dissent after the Mosaddeq era.

英国人影响渐弱。

政变后除了镇压Tudeh，也镇压bazaar和大学的抗议活动（如向抗议尼克松访问的德黑兰大学学生开火）。新政权不得bazaar商人，左翼知识分子和大学生人心。说服美国人放弃支持政变功臣General Zahedi。1955年General Zahedi辞职，到罗马做外交官，移除了Shah的对手，但也让Shah失去挡箭牌，暴露于公众批评。

美国人乐见Shah清洗Tudeh成员和亲Mosaddeq人士。

To seek rapprochement with the high-ranking clergy in Qom and elsewhere, the shah capitalized on the common dislike for Mosaddeq and a joint desire to eliminate the Tudeh.

1954年秋处死Mosaddeq的外交部长Hosain Fatemi（entertained some Islamic sentiments），引起clergy不满，clergy枪下留人的请求被无视。Shah打算加入Baghdad Pact，需要clergy的支持

Shah试图接近Ayatollah Sayyed Hosain Borujerdi（在伊拉克Najaf受的训练，把Qom打造成什叶中心，the first marja‘ to emerge inside Iran）。精明实际坚定的Borujerdi愿意和Shah谈判, 支持王室，换取a freer hand in quashing presumed threats to Islam and Muslims.

The renewal of the ancient fellowship of the “good religion” and “good government,” especially after a cooling off under Reza Shah, required the public disowning of a “heretical” Other. Tudeh和Mosaddeq都已出局。发起anti-Baha’i campaign很自然.

Among the Shi‘i authorities, animosity toward the Baha’is was deep. Through intermediaries Borujerdi demanded that because the clergy, with himself at the helm, supported Tudeh purges, in return the shah should repay them by eradicating the Baha’i menace.

1955年斋月开始：Borujerdi 的直接支持下，Falsafi攻击巴哈伊教异端、 反伊斯兰，说教徒卖国, 道德败坏, 是伊朗伊斯兰教的最大威胁. 要求政府禁止所有社群活动，管理机构，没收教产和信徒个人财产，把教徒从政府和私人公司里清除出去, 集体驱逐出境。

Falsafi’s campaign found resonance among the clergy and their conservative following, resuscitating a sense of unanimity, especially in the aftermath of Mosaddeq era. 巴哈伊教徒一直受迫害，但此次的卖国指控是空前的。These set the ground, starting in the 1960s, of accusing the Baha’is of being agents of British colonialism, and soon after of being agents of American imperialism and international Zionism, charges that after the 1979 Islamic Revolution had serious repercussions for the Baha’i community in Iran.

The anti-Baha’i campaign soon led to discrimination against the Baha’is and acts of violence, especially against smaller urban communities and those in rural areas. Majles识时务，迅速提出法案（最终没成），没收教徒财产，把教徒逐出伊朗。1955年5月政府军队占领德黑兰的巴哈伊中心，军队领导亲自爬上屋顶砸穹顶。

受到西方和国际批评，到斋月结束时基本收手。Yet the ban on Baha’i communal activities remained in force. They continued to be banned from government employment, at least officially, 德黑兰的巴哈伊中心后来成为秘密警察Savak总部。 anti-Baha’i campaign的强度不是同期地区最坏的，如不及同期埃及反犹力度。

For years to come, the low-intensity anti-Baha’i posture gave to the Shi‘i leadership weight and panache. 如因包装厂老板是巴哈伊教徒发布fatwa禁止百事可乐。为Borujerdi的其它计划提供了方便，如出版Safavid时代的保守hadith学者Baqer Majlesi著作的新译，用来攻击巴哈伊。

Yet rapprochement between the shah and the proregime clergy did not stop Shi‘i radicalism altogether.

到五十年代末，General Teymur Bakhtiar(1961年被指控反政府，被迫流亡日内瓦，和流亡Tudeh领袖，以及霍梅尼形成反巴列维阵线，后被Savak暗杀)领导的秘密警察Savak迅速扩张。Crucial in suppressing all forms of opposition, a successful tool in intimidating the general public.

Tudeh被抓得差不多了(处死后来成为左翼martyr和抵抗标志的Khosrow Ruzbeh)，Savak开始寻找新目标：独立政治人物，年轻知识分子，前National Front成员，学生抗议领袖，敢言的教士

整个六十年代，强制退休了一批高级军官，撤职了一批职业官僚（指控贪污或者是苏联间谍） revealed the shah’s desire for greater control, in the style of his father.失势者要么倒台得很不光彩，要么受审被囚，要么流放。军政人士识相，开始大唱赞歌，Shah ego膨胀。

Mohammad Reza: 刚即位时面对动荡政局手足无措。He was suspicious of elder statesmen and wary of the freer political climate that had emerged virtually overnight. 全都在批评他爹。王位受到各方政治挑战，the young shah could do little but to nurture the loyalty of the statesmen and army officers who had served his father. 阿塞拜疆危机是转折点，He was recognized not merely as the nominal head of the armed forces but also as an active participant in the campaign. 阿塞拜疆危机也是他依赖美国的开始。

1949年暗杀未遂，和1953年政变，transformed the young shah from a reactive maneuverer into a shrewd, even devious, manipulator. The bitter experience of the Mosaddeq years washed away whatever faith he might have had in the democratic process or in what his more liberal-minded advisers urged him to adopt.

一开始曾支持石油国有化运动，后来被边缘化。从他的角度，Mosaddeq不仅要推翻他，还要把国家带入混乱。第一次政变失败时仓皇逃跑是黑历史。后来每年都要庆祝政变成功

不信任英国人，害怕苏联人。倚靠美国人。美国人基本容忍了其authoritarian统治，除了肯尼迪时期。说服美国和西方视其为伊朗的唯一可行选择，a bulwark against rising anti-American sentiments in the region.

到六十年代早期，农业为主经济结构发生转变，识字率提高，城市化加深，生活水平提高。白色革命带来农村人口剩余，大量涌入城市，unleashing a popular force that, though first backing the Pahlavi reforms, eventually shifted away from the state toward other alternatives.

50年代时，随着美国援助和石油收入增加，政府腐败和管理失误严重，赤字严重。以贪污腐败处理军队和政府官员也无法赢得民心。

1958年，审判Mohammad Vali Qarani，指控其在CIA支持下要搞政变。Qarani’s case, in effect, was an early sign of American displeasure with Iran’s unstable state of affairs.

为了减轻公众不满，曾想尝试两党制。In reality, the two parties: the Melliun Party (the party of the nationalists) and the Mardom Party (the party of the people), were presided over by two of the shah’s most trusted aides, known for their subservience to the royal’s wishes. 选举操纵舞弊严重。

任命亲信Ja‘far Sharif-Emami（来自clerical家庭，任命是做给clergy看的）引起公众不满。贪污丑闻不断。

肯尼迪当选前引起Shah的焦虑。肯尼迪批评共和党对发展中国家的外交政策，质疑对不民主政权的军事援助，倾向于通过经济援助和政治改革，而不是扶植强人，来抗衡共产主义。当时伊朗处于经济危机中。Shah的批评者寄希望于美国态度改变。

任命‘Ali Amini为首相。Disliked by the shah because of his American connections and the fact that he was personally acquainted with Kennedy, Amini was expected to liberate Iranian politics from the yoke of autocracy and represent a wider political spectrum.

Hasan Arsanjani搞土改：The village economy was barely able to withstand drastic changes such as those introduced by the land reforms of the 1960s. The substitution of the landlord by a government-run agency—first the Ministry of Agriculture and then the Ministry of Land Reform—added layers of bureaucratic complexity to the system and with unexpected outcomes. “liberated”农民缺乏资本，也不会使用农业机械，合作社失败，产量反而下降。

1960年出台土改法，启动土改第一阶段large estate的分配。对地主的补偿实施困难。1966年时，涉及30%农村人口。分给农民的地不好。1965年和1969年第二阶段和第三阶段的土改更加保守。政府对农业合作社支持不利。农村工作生活条件差，也是土改缓慢的因素。

政府试图通过小额农业贷款，派遣技术员和扫盲队来解决问题。后来试图成立区域性合作社。Despite the regime’s optimistic wish to create a rural utopia, villages stubbornly preserved some of their traditional customs and production methods, even though as the backbone of the agrarian economy they were visibly weakened.

By the 1970s villages were rapidly becoming a liability for the state rather than functioning as productive agricultural units. 农业衰落，农村凋敝。农民进城打工。农业减产。70年代中期起成为粮食进口国。

伊朗农民的生活质量在中东算可以的。 土地改革改变了农村生活。把农民从土地解放出来，profoundly changing Iran’s socioeconomic and cultural composition. 电影Gaav反映了农村的转变。

Amini搞财政改革：austerity，反腐，借美债。成效低，成天被媒体攻击。60年代早期全球经济衰退影响伊朗经济。伊朗政府濒临破产。

Amini’s hesitancy to hold yet another election to convene the Majles brought him head to head with the revived second National Front. Amini担心会让反动地主掌权影响土改。Relying on popular support, the National Front rejected Amini’s argument having been convinced that the premier, in collusion with the shah, was determined to bar members of the opposition from entering the Majles.

Loyal to the constitution’s principles, the leaders of the National Front neither could fully embrace the aspirations of the younger generations of activists nor were they able, or willing, to collaborate with the Amini government. They were instead harassed, arrested, and eventually banned from political activity by the shah.

Amini政府打算削减军费，引起Shah反对。Amini辞职离开伊朗。

The shah’s return to center stage, to the displeasure of the opposition, began a new era of a more determined imperial rule that lasted until the end of the shah’s reign.

将自己打造为工农拯救者形象。The “Revolution of the Shah and the People” underscored a new mandate that bypassed the old structure of power, in effect eliminating the intermediaries who stood between ruler and ruled.

1962年4月访美，得到肯尼迪经济军事支持。

任命Asadollah ‘Alam为首相。He proved himself a trusted agent who was ready to implement the shah’s “royal wishes.” 加速土改，受到很多反对。

1963年举行关于白色革命的公投，女性第一次获得投票权。With no meaningful debate put forward and with heavy propaganda in the state media，获得91.6%支持。白色是和红色（共产主义者）与黑色（教士）对比。

扫盲队：Aside from land reform, the most effective article in what came to be known as the “six points” of the revolution was the Literacy Corps, inspired as much by Kennedy’s Peace Corps as by the Soviet, North Vietnamese, and Chinese regimented literacy campaigns. 高中毕业的城市知青下乡扫盲。成效最初impressive。但是村民接受教育后更想移民城市了。

知青在乡下：social alienation was prevalent. 有些人认为是浪费时间，对村民态度不好。有的被农村的贫困震惊到，后来激进化。即使如此，Literacy Corps was effective in breaking through the barriers between city and village. 产生的摩擦：有的知青抽鸦片，参与决斗，追求农村女孩，发生性关系，违反本地风俗宗教习惯 etc

识字率不断提高，This success was offset by the uncritical nature of state-sponsored education in the cities as well as in the countryside. 七十年代，政府对白色革命成功的宣传和日常生活实际的对比愈发瞩目。对受过点教育的年轻人, education contributed to their fascination with the alternative ideologies that would soon shake the Pahlavi regime to its core.

白色革命，尤其是土地改革和女性在公共生活中visibility提高，引起社会中保守人士不满。The up-and-coming clerics with radical views and their students in Qom clearly were disgruntled with the Pahlavi state on ideological as well as material grounds.

1962年时不满就已经很明显，美国情报人员称伊朗政治结构脆弱，存在革命可能。

1961年Borujerdi死亡，引发领导权争夺。温和派和激进派之间的tension显现。霍梅尼是激进派代表人物。By 1963 he mobilized against the shah a sizable sector of the population, mostly associated with the bazaar and the urban lower-middle classes. 1979的预演。

霍梅尼：A blend of Shi‘i jurisprudence, speculative mysticism (as opposed to mysticism of the Sufis and the Sufi orders), and Islamic ethical and revivalist awareness characterized Khomeini’s training. Yet despite his interest in speculative mysticism, he remained loyal to the jurist tradition that carried a certain element of clerical entitlement. He not only inherited this conservative, pedantic, text-oriented legacy but also shared a sense of communal loyalty to fellow jurists that was reinforced by isolation under the Pahlavi rule.

He remained troubled by the predicaments of his time and what he considered the fading of Islam as society’s moral standard. The very resistance to state-enforced conformity helped fashion a new ethos of dissent. Speculative preoccupations brought Khomeini in the 1940s and early 1950s to the limits of madrasa tolerance. Fearing charges of heresy, and even denunciation by the Qom jurists, he was persuaded to abandon the teaching of philosophy—at least in public—and return to the jurists’ fold.

Yet what turned him into a revolutionary prophet anxious to save the “wronged Islam” from threats of a secular world came essentially from his mystico-philosophical bent. Ibn al-Arabi’s claim to be the “seal of the saints” may well have contributed to Khomeini’s later articulation of the doctrine of the “authority of the jurist”.

Khomeini utilized features of Shi‘i culture, complete with intonation, figures of speech, and a firm loyalty to the popular myths of rituals of suffering and martyrdom.

As early as 1944, in an open letter he called on Iranians to rise up against the “injustices” that the “despicable” Reza Khan imposed on them.

What set Khomeini apart from other resentful Islamic advocates was his loyalty to the conservative Islam of the jurists and the clerical establishment, whom he wished, even in the early years of his activism, would become natural leaders of the community, at the forefront of the war against satanic forces that threatened Muslim integrity.

Amini时期政治氛围宽松，给了霍梅尼舞台。五十年代后期六十年代早期开始质疑国内外政策。1962年以反对女性投票/反对代表宣誓不需要效忠古兰经为名义反对引入地方议会选举。Asadollah ‘Alam的政府放弃。1963年反对公投：反对女性投票权，认为土改不符合伊斯兰律法。得到地主和部分商人支持。

Qom发生支持霍梅尼的反政府示威。政府武力攻击。霍梅尼在纪念仪式上声情并茂谴责政府，谴责Shah和以色列。霍梅尼讲话录音传遍伊朗，引起uprising。霍梅尼被逮捕入狱，亦引起支持者uprising。德黑兰的示威人群向Shah的office进军。军警镇压。戒严。

至少上百名示威者死亡，更多人被逮捕。各地部落起义，perhaps the last of the tribal unrest Iran was to witness。霍梅尼被关押一段时间，经高级clergy求情，1964年3月回到Qom。要求在Qom收回土地改革，实施Islamic laws，要求解散议会，指控巴列维政权是以色列走狗，巴哈伊通以色列。要求implementation of article 2 of the 1907 Supplement to the Iranian Constitution, which stipulated the creation of a five-member mojtahed body to oversee the legislation of the Majles.

半年后反对给予美国军事顾问豁免权，将其与十九世纪记忆对比。To Khomeini, and to the majority of the Iranians, this was nothing short of neocolonial indenture. 借机批评政府。批评美国。批评Lyndon B. Johnson。

被直接飞机送走，开始流亡。流亡期间仍收到供奉。

1965年1月，对释放霍梅尼起了关键作用、试图和霍梅尼和解的总理Hasan-‘Ali Mansur被和霍梅尼有联系的Fada’iyan-e Islam assassins刺杀。

With the effective removal of the liberal and nationalist option of the Mosaddeq era, the Pahlavi royal autocracy and the Qom clerical militancy stood face-to-face, each prescribing a very different vision of the future.

二战后多数知识分子受左翼影响。采用新表达形式，远离波斯古典表达形式，关注普通人生活。知识分子开始质疑全盘西化，质疑西方霸权。The debate over the evils of Westernizing gradually shifted the intellectual horizons from a typical wariness toward anything Islamic—calling it superstitious—to an idealized interpretation of Islam as remedy against Westernism and a means of resisting the Pahlavi regime.

该时期文艺作品里反复出现“无边的看不到黎明的黑夜”的意象。知识分子中存在渴望救世主，渴望革命，以改变现状的心理。 仍受到the legacy of Iranian messianism/the cult of revering the failed hero的影响，both in motif and in aspiration.

An early critic of the moral universe of Shi‘i Islam and European cultural intrusion was Ahmad Kasravi. His vision was an uneasy marriage of nationalism and prophetic inspiration.

Dissecting the arcane Islamic tradition, and especially Shi‘i orthodoxy, also produced works of remarkable complexity and penetrating satire by Sadeq Hedayat, arguably the greatest literary figure of twentieth-century Persian literature. Hedayat’s bitter sarcasm and fatalistic disdain for anything Islamic came with a nostalgic allure for the pre-Islamic past.

Perhaps the most iconoclastic literary figure of the 1940s and 1950s was the poet Nima Yushij. 新诗代表人物。

Mahdi Akhavan Sales：He lamented not only the demise of the National Movement and the return of Pahlavi coercion but also the futility of the experience of the left and the ideological betrayal it sustained. Resorted to the memories of Iran’s pre-Islamic past.

Against a background of shattered hopes, a yearning for a rebirth, a nostalgic longing for a world of natural purity, began to emerge in the poetry of Forugh Farrokhzad.

Ahmad Shamlu: 先锋诗人。He, too, engaged with melancholic disillusionments and delved into the discourse of messianic aspirations, but with the image of a savior who preached not only a worldly reality devoid of hereafter but also peace and nonviolence.

Ironically, much of this gloom in the poetry of the period was expressed at a time when Iran of the 1960s experienced tangible material progress, relative prosperity among the secular middle classes, and a level of general stability. Perhaps this was also the best decade of the twentieth century in terms of artistic ingenuity and poetic symbolism, even though the poets and intellectuals of the period were essentially at odds with the Pahlavi regime.

11 DEVELOPMENT, DISARRAY, AND DISCONTENT (1963–1977)

霍梅尼的流亡，Shah让反对力量闭嘴的成功，一时间让Shah自信爆棚。1963-1973是Shah的黄金年代: 经济发展，外交成功，相对受到国内民众欢迎。Despite repression and movements of radical dissent, for a moment the shah seemed to have cast away the shadow of dependency on the West.

1965-1975年间伊朗人口增长了40%。汽车文化盛行，交通拥堵，空气污染加重。

六七十年代搞基建：路，水坝，电网，净水站，灌溉设施。发展重工业，石油设施。民营工业发展。国内消费能力增加。By the mid-1970s Iran had developed a substantial domestic market for cars and related industries, household goods, clothing, food and drinks, furniture, and construction material, and the balance of the public and private sectors promised a viable mixed economy for a developing nation that still was heavily relying on oil revenue for its public investment.

受到倾慕苏联模式的左翼批评：belittled much of Iran’s industrialization as a mere “assembly” (montage) of useless products that had been imposed by Western consumer culture and were for the benefit of a “dependent bourgeoisie.” 后来被激进伊斯兰人士学腔。不过后期政府搞的工业化项目确实存在浪费、腐败、缺乏规划等问题。

商品进口增加。大宗进出口和商业转移到bazaar外。bazaar的变化：In due course the bazaar came to house mostly small merchants, distributors, wholesales, and retailers of small industries catering to the poorer and more traditional sectors of the population. Undeniably, demographic changes turned these old centers of commerce not merely into bastions of conservatism but also into important components, financially and otherwise, of the fomenting Islamic activism. The bazaar’s prosperity and what it offered, at least economically, was no longer essential to Iran’s economy.

石油生产和石油收入继续增加。1971-1977预算增长八倍。石油涨价，伊朗分得的share也提高。The massive oil price rises in the following years proved to be not entirely a blessing for they shook the Iranian economy and helped in due course to unsettle Iran’s sociopolitical balances.

1972年起一直处于OPEC石油涨价campaign前线。1973石油危机后，伊朗没有参与禁运，从涨价中获利。1973年，对产量不满的Shah宣布不会renew 1954年和IOP签的协议（将在1979年过期）。 后来在到期前宣布协议无效，称之为“国有化”，a new laurel for the glory-hungry monarch.

The impact of increased oil income on all aspects of the Iranian economy and society cannot be exaggerated：经济增长同时，通胀也高。石油是Shah的伟大文明复兴梦的关键。

新的technocrat阶层：接受现代教育，留过学，有欧美经验，the new class of officials was essentially nonideological, and they seldom possessed any political agency.

1965年Mansur被刺后，任命Amir ‘Abbas Hovayda为首相。当了十三年首相。Shah认为Hovayda没有威胁, 是听话敬业大臣, a role with a long history in Iran’s ministerial past. Hovayda was prepared to play such a part while quietly expanding his network and advancing his agenda. It is fair to say that he was responsible for the culture of ministerial passivity that prevailed through his tenure as prime minister. 除少数例外，这一代高级官员普遍顺从听话胆小奉迎没骨气。接受Shah的权威，不敢批评Shah，没有独立思考。

The censorship and coercion imposed by Savak, the closure of even the pro-regime political parties such as Iran Novin and Mardom in favor of the all-embracing Rastakhiz (Resurrection) Party in 1975, and the absence of any alternative political forum effectively eliminated all chances of building up a civil society outside the bounds of the state and untouched by royal wishes and whims.

The gap between state actors and the general public widened throughout the 1970s.

The small network of well-connected and compliant technocrats thus came to control and use up, if not squander, the massive oil revenues that began to pour in after 1973.

Hovayda also tried with moderate success to arrive at a rapprochement with discontented intellectuals。雇佣知识分子，发展文化机构。

到六十年代晚期，国内四大势力都对Shah恭顺：Asadollah ‘Alam管理的宫廷; 首相Amir ‘Abbas Hovayda领导的政府;皇后Farah的圈子（对广播电视系统有一定影响力）; 军队系统。

名义上是政府部门，实际under the shah’s surveillance的还有：Savak, the National Iranian Oil Company, the Planning Organization, and the Pahlavi Foundation. 外交更是直接管。

各种大事小事都要Shah过目和批准。

Shah和亲信大肆敛财。There were few major economic projects in the country that could successfully operate without some form of partnership with members of the ruling elite or paying kickbacks in the form of bribes, commissions, and shares in new ventures.

Yet Iran under Mohammad Reza Shah was not a mere kleptocracy.

Shah的个性因素：不安全感和追求荣耀的心理。促使Shah micromanage. 追求复兴古代荣耀让Shah脱离现实。

外交成Shah个人舞台。是美国和西方国家的坚定盟友，同时也在改善和苏联，东欧，中国的关系。越来越独立，甚至开始玩大国平衡。不同于伊朗人眼里美国走狗的形象，有时候美国和西方还得听他的。

美国政坛和公众基本一致认为伊朗是美国在中东不可缺少的盟友，Shah是modernizing agent for his people.

和以色列友好。比以色列和沙特地位更重要：和苏联有较长边境线（比土耳其的更长），是美国抵抗苏联不可或缺的桥头堡 。油气储量大。比阿拉伯人更值得信任。政治稳定，政权亲西方。

随着英国七十年代早期退出波斯湾，伊朗在维护海湾安全中的地位更重要, providing free Western access to its oil resources. Policing the Persian Gulf, which was eagerly embraced by the shah, became a bone of contention with the newly emerging United Arab Emirates and its supporters in the Arab world.

美国政府一直赞扬Shah，支持Shah的改革。美国人默许了Savak的活动，尤其在七十年代中期发生数次针对美国军事顾问的暗杀后。对Shah的负面消息，they treated such issues as an unavoidable evil to be tolerated from a loyal and dependable friend. 认为是伊朗内政。

In the mid-1960s he had gained enough confidence to engage in complex international diplomacy involving many players. 和苏联及东欧改善关系，访问苏联。和苏联合作在伊斯法罕建钢铁厂。愿意和不结盟运动国家发展关系，和罗马尼亚、南斯拉夫、印度、巴基斯坦、中国靠近。

The increasing Pahlavi power in the 1970s ironically reduced Iran’s dependency on the United States at a time when Iranian public perceived US influence to be at its maximum.

Iran-US relations, especially resolving their differences, were conducted through informal diplomacy and the shah’s effective lobbying of key policy makers and influential Washington mediators. 1973-1979的驻美大使是Ardeshir Zahedi，政变功臣Zahedi将军的儿子。

During the Kissinger years, with his shuttle diplomacy, direct channels of communication with the shah were important for both parties on such breakthrough issues as the Egypt-Israel peace process and the security of the Persian Gulf. 基辛格盛赞Shah。Gerald Ford就职时表示全力支持Shah。

和美国关系，以及外交大方向，不仅受到冷战地缘政治影响，也受中东局势影响：Iran’s evolving role in the region as the West’s chief ally against the Arab regimes in the contest for supremacy over the Persian Gulf.

Iran’s often strained relations with neighboring Iraq after the 1958 Iraqi revolution and with Nasser’s Egypt throughout the 1960s carried heavy ideological and ethnocentric undertones. Competing Arab and Iranian nationalist ideologies manifested in border disputes with Iraq and regional rivalries with Egypt brought these differences into sharper focus.

Closely tied to the narrative of glories of ancient Iran and the Pahlavi’s revival of “modern Iran,” portrayal of the “Arabs” as backward Bedouins hostile to “authentic” Iranian culture was firmly incorporated into popular Iranian nationalist narrative and generally accepted by majority of Iranians.

By 1950, during a volatile period of national politics, Iran offered Israel de facto recognition, largely as a result of the new Jewish state’s efforts to win over non-Arab friends in the region.

巴列维政府和世俗化的伊朗中产阶级对犹太人态度较好，比伊拉克和其它阿拉伯国家的counterparts的态度好。伊朗犹太人支持和以色列友好。

伊朗犹太人：曾大批投奔巴哈伊教。此时越来越拥抱Zionism。五六十年代不少移民以色列，被东欧犹太人歧视。

促使伊朗和以色列经济外交走得近的因素：Most crucial was Iran’s search for security in the face of its Arab adversaries.警惕和苏联友好的泛阿拉伯联盟。担心纳赛尔的野心。

As Egypt further gravitated toward the Soviets—especially after the Eisenhower administration’s failure to collaborate on the Aswan High Dam project—Egypt’s sensitivity toward Pahlavi Iran as an ally of the US and Israel substantially increased. 埃及纳赛尔政权批评伊朗和以色列美国走太近。伊朗和埃及断交。

Growing oil exports in the early 1960s from the Persian Gulf increased Iran’s anxiety over the Egyptian and other radical Arab influences in the region.

纳赛尔试图染指波斯湾，拉拢刚刚独立的科威特，试图将波斯湾改名为阿拉伯湾。巴列维政权为了确保financial security，必须把纳赛尔挡在波斯湾外。

埃及穆斯林兄弟会对伊朗的Islamic militants很有影响，first for Fada’iyan-e Islam and later for the young clerics in Khomeini’s circle.

六十年代Shah土改和其它改革抓得紧，部分是为了和同期搞改革的埃及和伊拉克竞争。

Facing domestic and regional challenges, both secular and Islamic, it was not unreasonable for the shah to display greater signs of religiosity：如1968麦加朝圣，助力成立伊斯兰合作组织

1958年伊拉克革命。1967年Ba‘ath Party上台。伊朗-伊拉克发生边界冲突，宣传战。伊拉克政府欺负南部什叶人群。到1971年萨达姆崛起，和伊朗冲突加剧。

萨达姆的威胁让Shah和美国走得更近，买更多武器。萨达姆则几乎成为苏联client，1975年和苏联签订友好合作treaty，成为苏联最重要的阿拉伯盟友。

Ba‘athist hostility toward Iran was rooted in historical tensions that frequently flared up along the countries’ common border：历史上伊朗政权多次征服现伊拉克境内领土。

Iraq, charged with a sense of Arab pride and laying claim to the legacy of the Abbasid caliphate of Baghdad, as well as the ancient Babylonian civilization and the Assyrian Empire, had developed a brand of national identity under the Ba‘athist regime that was existentially antagonistic to the realities of its own diverse population. It was at odds with its own Arab neighbors as well, let alone non-Arab Iran.

萨达姆对库尔德人强硬, 1974伊拉克库尔德起义，伊朗人长期给伊拉克库尔德人提供武器和供给，为难民和游击队提供庇护，引起伊拉克政府不满。伊朗对伊拉克库尔德人的支持主要是政治性的。巴列维政府一直反对伊朗境内库尔德人的自治要求（包括文化上的）。

1968-1974伊拉克驱逐境内定居了几百年的伊朗后裔什叶。激怒伊朗。

至少五百年来，伊朗在伊拉克南部维持着宗教、政治、文化存在。自十三世纪伊儿汗国以来，Iran had laid a moral claim over the Shi‘i shrines of Karbala and Najaf and drew on the loyalties of the Iraqi Shi‘is in the south.几乎所有的什叶shrine和其它宗教场地都是波斯统治者和要人修建+修缮+出资的。伊朗朝圣者是伊拉克的什叶圣地的一大收入来源，神学院里充满伊朗学生，收到大量伊朗捐赠。

Saddam’s regime despised the Iranian Shi‘i connection and found it against its project of Arab homogenization. Typical of any dictatorial regime with a constructed identity, Saddam determined to wipe out the Persian malady.

1975年两伊签订The Algiers Accord：the basis for bilateral treaties later that year, calling for the delineation of common boundaries based on the 1913 Constantinople Protocol; delimitation of the water boundaries of Shatt al-Arab/Arvand Rud, based on the thalweg line; and joint monitoring of the boundaries to guarantee the security of both sides.

伊朗在波斯湾的involvement达到Abbas I以来的新高。

巴林宣布独立：历史上巴林断断续续受到伊朗控制。Already in 1970 the United Nations had held a plebiscite that established the Bahraini desire for independence. The eventual settling of the Bahrain question obliged Iran to renounce its claim of sovereignty over the island. A fair amount of nationalist uproar at home for what was viewed as bowing to British pressure persuaded the shah to remain adamant about the Iranian claim to the three islands in the middle of the Persian Gulf.

失去巴林，吞并波斯湾中三个小岛。在波斯湾野心大，引起周边不满。

支持Oman镇压Dhofar地区的共产党武装。

和约旦国王、埃及萨达特、黎巴嫩的什叶/马龙派领导、巴基斯坦Bhutto政府、阿富汗Mohammad Daoud Khan政府友好。

回头看，Shah晚期是伊朗近代外交最稳的时期。 Shah倒台后整个地区大乱：苏联入侵阿富汗, 巴基斯坦政局不稳, 萨达姆成为地区威胁, 沙特成为石油帝国输出Wahhabi-Salafi militancy.

卡特1977年的人权政策出台前，美国国内，包括情报系统，基本不存在对Shah的批评。有批评也是从美国经济利益角度出发的。

反美情绪增长。越战大大影响了美国在普通伊朗人心中的形象。美国被认为是自私的超级大国，榨取伊朗自然资源, 扶植Shah，维持压迫。反美情绪滋长下，七十年代的伊朗人渐渐忘了美国人十九世纪以来曾经的帮助与贡献（经济、文教、医疗）。

七十年代中期，成千上万的美国人在伊朗工作，including in substantial number in the service of the government as military advisers, contractors, technicians, and skilled labor. 比本地同等技能经验者工资高得多，引起不满。

Even less complimentary for average Iranians was the mere perception of the American military and security personnel as training, supplying, and monitoring the Iranian security forces and supervising the Savak.

Predictably, Iranians began to perceive two faces of America, almost independent of each other: a benevolent America and a superpower America.

到六十年代中期，巴列维政权基本拆散了all semblance of independent political organization: 第二National Front已经摧毁，Nahzat-e Azadi没什么影响，Niru-ye Sevvom消失。

到七十年代早期，Shah甚至不能容忍忠于他的人和他的主张稍有不同。The shah seldom allowed any official with independent standing, military or civilian, to emerge on the national stage.

Savak大搞白色恐怖。The television broadcasts in the late 1960s and early 1970s, mocked by the public as the “Savak Show,” only added to the rampant cynicism and fear of the organization’s long arm of intrusion and terror.

Savak和国外情报组织联系紧密。Having been barred by the shah from foreign intelligence gathering, it primarily focused on domestic security rather than international espionage. Vetted government appointments and kept extensive files.

Savak was as paranoid as the shah and his top statesmen, subscribing to conspiratorial theories involving imagined foreign hands, superpowers, and former superpowers in Iran’s domestic troubles. Even among ministers and top civil servants Savak suspected foreign moles and sympathizers, oddly enough more British and American than Soviet.

Savak没有预见1979革命，革命到来时瘫痪，无力处理。For its entire history Savak was more in the business of coercion and abuse than inquiry and analysis.

装样子的两党制搞搞，搞不下去了，干脆一党制：1975年3月成立Rastakhiz Party. Inherently autocratic, the party was hailed by the regime’s propaganda machine as the magic solution to political bickering, going beyond the politics of the elite, and a way to mobilize ordinary Iranians over common goals of the “Revolution of the Shah and the People.” 用Shah自己的话，谁不入党谁不爱国，赶紧放弃伊朗国籍滚出去。

口号喊得响，官媒天天播。手头各种资源。resulted in superficial extensive grassroots mobilization in the villages, factories, neighborhoods, schools, and government offices and for a moment created some stir.

1977年就搞不下去了，Shah试图通过更换领导来挽回颜面。A year later the last-ditch effort to reinvent Rastakhiz also failed, even as the shah tried under public pressure to liberalize the party. 抗议中最先倒下的Pahlavi enterprises。

通胀严重（主要是石油收入猛增引起的），试图稳定价格。The campaign resulted in a wave of business closures, massive penalties, state takeover of private industries, and detention of industrialists and wholesalers for alleged hoarding and price hiking.

Undermining domestic markets, the newly earned revenue favored importers but worked against other sectors of the economy, especially manufacturers and their suppliers. To remedy the situation, however artificially, the state effectively retaliated against the industrial and retail sectors, the backbone of its consumer economy.

难以满足伊朗人日益增长的物质需求。缺电少粮。

缺乏其它世俗异议方式，巴列维专制又全面就位，六十年代末伊朗游击运动兴起，吸引了不少年轻的异议者。

In the absence of the Tudeh Party, which had once been a grassroots political organization, the hard-line alternatives were narrowed down to two: 反巴列维反世俗的伊斯兰武装（主要吸引bazaar和周边的下中产虔诚人群）, 和目标推翻巴列维政权的游击队武装斗争（主要吸引大学生为主的年轻中产）。

游击队受到当时风靡全世界（卡斯特罗，格瓦拉，毛，越共，巴解，五月风暴，阿尔及利亚独立）的激进左派活动的影响和鼓舞。The Iranian guerrilla organizations viewed themselves as one such vanguard in a grand struggle against Western hegemony and its agents, and the shah in their eyes was a prime candidate. 对苏联幻灭。

伊朗游击队崇拜的对象：六世纪的Mazdak，Jangal运动领导者Mirza Kuchak Khan，Reza Shah时期的共产主义者Taqi Arani，Tudeh领导Khosrow Ruzbeh。Mosaddeq地位微妙，admired for his anti-imperialist stance but was also seen as a transitory figure whose struggle was bound to lead to the revolution of the masses.

伊朗游击队的意识形态：马列主义，毛主义，with nationalist traits inspired by Latin American movements. To a lesser extent, the experience of the Iranian left since the Constitutional Revolution informed the new radical trends. Not free of Tudeh’s Stalinist legacy. Nor did it budge from the Tudeh ideal of dismantling the Pahlavi “bourgeoisie comprador”—seen as an agent of Western capitalism—and creating a dictatorship of the proletariat.

1966年，年轻马克思主义者成立游击队组织Fada’iyan-e Khalq。Bizhan Jazani是代表人物。Their advocacy of autonomy for Iran’s ethnicities —mostly in the realm of imagination—was theoretically luring but politically dangerous, giving an ominous green light to Kurdish, Azarbaijani, Turkmen, Arab, and other dormant cessation tendencies.

同期活跃的游击队组织还有1965年成立的Mojahedin-e Khalq (People’s Crusaders)：a movement with firmer grass roots bridging Marxism and political Islam. Masses were to be liberated through the exemplar of Shi‘i Imam ‘Ali and his son Imam Hosain to create a classless society, not by the forces of historical materialism but by means of egalitarian Islam and collective sacrifice on the model of Karbala. 1979年改名Paykar，后来被革命卫队处理。

In more than one way the guerrilla movements in the late 1960s and 1970s left their mark on Iran’s radical politics. 被大赦国际之类的人权组织批评，损害了国际形象。

The most striking at outset of the guerrilla armed struggle was the Siahkal episode.

游击队活动resulted in several assassinations of military prosecutors, police chiefs, Savak agents, and state officials, and at least four instances of assassinations of American military advisers.

1974年Khosrow Golesorkhi被处决。

By 1978 the era of urban guerrilla struggle was almost at its end. Fada’iyan-e Khalq死者里女性比重比Mojahedin-e Khalq死者女性比重大。

12 CULTURES OF AUTHORITY AND CULTURES OF DISSENT

六七十年代的伊朗：艺术创造力迸发的年代，新人辈出，国际曝光增加，政府资助力度加大。 通过采用象征语言的文艺（电影、诗歌、流行音乐）表达异议。政府容忍，甚至通过国有媒体和政府控制/半控制的文化机构支持之。被视为知识分子异议的出口，文化安全阀。同期大搞吹捧美化巴列维统治。Curiously, the two currents—cultural subversion, operating underneath a calm surface, and glorification of the monarchic cult—lived side by side and even nurtured each other.

1965年，Shah躲过一次很险的暗杀，更坚信自己有天佑。同年，给自己安上Aryamehr（“Sunlight of the Aryans”）的title。

1967年搞盛大加冕仪式。

1971年搞波斯帝国建国2500年大典（最早是欧洲的伊朗学学者的主意），庆祝伊朗的“immortality”。庆典开始时，Shah站在Cyrus陵寝前，宣布“Cyrus the Great! Rest in peace; we are awake”。豪华盛宴，大阅兵（据说道具受到好莱坞道具师的支持），花了2100万美元。

Yet from nearly all these festivities, even the march of colorful imperial armies, the Iranian general public was excluded as if the events were merely to impress foreign guests and satisfy an outsized royal ego that had been long injured by a sense of inferiority.

伊丽莎白女王和尼克松以安全顾虑为由没有出席。全国安全措施大升级，逮捕大量异议人士。各种封路。

建了Shahyad Aryamehr（注：设计师是本书作者的哥哥）。Renamed Borj-e Azadi (freedom tower) in the aftermath of the revolution, in the following decades it transcended both its monarchical and revolutionary past to become perhaps Iran’s most popular icon. No longer a state symbol, it was adopted by most Iranians as a national emblem and as late as June 2009 as a memorial site for the Green Movement’s mass rallies.

Shah相信自己有神助。Asadollah ‘Alam的秘密日记记录了Shah和他的私人谈话。

For the Shah Iran increasingly turned into a utopian object to be desired, a mechanical contraption to be assembled, and an edifice to be embellished rather than a complex society.

However, self-aggrandizement, coupled by a profound conspiratorial perspective in international and domestic politics, misplaced pride, and overconfidence in his judgment, blurred the royal’s vision and prevented him from seeing trouble on the horizon. 陷入阴谋论思维。

By the middle of the 1960s cultural patronage came to occupy a greater place in the Pahlavi search for imperial legitimacy and for appeal to a larger spectrum of Iranian population.

资助艺术：Empress Farah and her coterie were instrumental in projecting a softer, more refined image of the Pahlavi state through media, music, architecture, literature, and visual arts. So long as the boundaries of political dissent were not crossed, artists and intellectuals could explore new, even implicitly subversive, themes through television production, cinema, theater, painting, and music.

Farah Pahlavi’s frequent travel to remote towns and villages of Iran also presented a new image of a caring queen willing to learn about the country and help improve the lot of ordinary folks.

Although regional identities, ethnicity, religion, and class remained indelible parts of the landscape, public education, growth of a national market, and growth of media and entertainment boosted a greater sense of homogeneity.

An earlier example of the state’s patronage of high-quality programing, with the aim of offering a more sophisticated take on Persian musical heritage that was more palatable to the middle classes, was the celebrated Golha (注：录音档案库，关于这个节目的讲座) program produced by Radio Iran.

上过Golha的著名音乐家：小提琴家Abol-Hasan Saba，歌唱家Gholam-Hosain Banan，钢琴家Mortaza Mahjubi，歌唱家Marziyeh，作曲家指挥家Ruhollah Khaleqi。

By all accounts the Golha project rescued Persian music from the formulaic tedium and barren repetition to which it had fallen for decades.

‘Ali-Naqi Vaziri: He established the first academy of music in 1924 and soon after Iran’s first national orchestra, and he was among the first to commit Persian music to Western notation. Although occasionally criticized for trying to discipline the probably undisciplinable Persian quartertone, Vaziri’s contributions were crucial not only for the development of technique and for adapting the radif to orchestral demands but also for presenting Persian classical music as a “respectable” tradition on par with Western tradition, and for including music in the school curriculum.

Ey Iran：1944年Ruhollah Khaleqi作曲，Banan首演，非正式国歌。All through the Pahlavi era and later under the Islamic Republic, “Ey Iran” reflected dissenting sentiments.

1967年成立National Iranian Radio and Television (NIRT)。国有媒体吸收了部分有文艺才能或者技术/媒体专长的知识分子和对现实不满的大学毕业生。有着和其它官僚机构不同的机构文化。An effective means of diverting dissent into exciting yet politically benign activity, NIRT reserved relative independence in its production and internal policies so long as it paid effusive homage to the shah.

Beyond the propaganda function, NIRT also conveyed a message that inadvertently contrasted the regime’s glossy narrative. Audiences began to learn through domestic productions about their own country, its social problems, and its ordinary people and their subsistent struggles. Though sanitized and made politically harmless, 本土电视剧fostered a certain level of social awareness. 受欢迎的电视剧：Da’i-jan Napoleon

The cultural sponsorship of NIRT was complemented by other sources of patronage linked to Farah Pahlavi’s cultural office. A whole generation of artists, filmmakers, and actors who later became representative of Iran’s independent cultural flourishing in the post-1979 era first learned their trade in the Pahlavi institutions and with some form of state support.

举办Shiraz Arts Festival。After a decade during which it was annually held and at great expense, the festival left behind a mixed legacy. Above all, it helped promote traditional Persian music, boosting its preservation and development for decades to come. The Western music and theater, classic or avant-garde, and other ethnic performances in the festival left only little lasting impact. 一批艺术家在Shiraz艺术节起步。比如是Mohammad Reza Shajarian最早live的地方。

戏剧发展：A new lease on life for Persian theater came in the late 1960s, this time voicing a more refined critique of the prevailing social order. Despite their innocuous surface, the new plays predominantly cast a skeptic, at times surrealistic, shadow on the boasted “glories” of the Pahlavi state and its White Revolution with subtle hints to the suffocating political climate. 代表性作品：音乐剧Shahr-e Qesseh

Only a handful of artistic personalities of the period were able to transcend political disenchantment that dominated the culture of the late Pahlavi era.

Sohrab Sepehri: 诗人。He was a poet of water, of trees and birds, of solitude and serenity, an artist in pain about a fast-disappearing space that was about to be conquered by the forces of modernity. Much of his appeal to the younger generation of Iranians lied not only in his poetic simplicity but also in his desire to experience an authentic self.

Parviz Tanavoli：雕塑家。As one of the founders of the saqqa khaneh (water fountain) artistic genre, Tanavoli sought in Shi‘i popular symbols and rituals raw material for his abstract sculptures. His journey through mourning emblems and shrine symbolism and his recasting of Farhad, the tragic hero of the Persian romance, as his artistic alter ego, eventually led him to an existential quest.

流行歌曲：Googoosh，Dariush，Farhad Mehrad

流行歌曲里有The “Siahkal genre”，romanticized for a generation an armed revolt that idealized revolution as the only way ahead.

大众电影 filmfarsi：competed with foreign imports, both Hollywood and Indian productions, in offering entertainment and moral messages customized for Iranian popular tastes. 代表性作品：Qaysar Dayereh-ye Mina

美国电影受欢迎： It was essentially through film that Iranians perceived America as an exciting land of opportunity, though not free from violence. Biblical epics predictably were favorites of all classes, for they portrayed familiar stories of ancient prophets in a novel context.

For some, mostly the urban secular middle class, the films served as prototypes of fashion and outfit; for others—mostly males of puritanical religious persuasion—they were demonstrations of sinful outrage. It is not without reason that from the mid1970s movie theaters became chief targets of militant Islamist attacks, who burned them down especially in smaller and more religious cities as symbols of an alien malady.

The cinema and its popular heroes and antiheros had a strong competitor in the world of sports, an alternative arena in which the Iranian working classes could engage and occasionally excel.

Of all the Iranian sports, traditional wrestling (koshti) made the most successful transition to modern sports to become what is today freestyle wrestling.

As the Pahlavi state began to encourage and sponsor modern sports through schools, factories, and modern gyms, much of the zurkhaneh’s talent and energy was diverted to new sports stages. Freestyle wrestling, along with weightlifting and soon soccer, became popular sports.

著名摔跤运动员Gholam-Reza Takhti：奥运冠军。He was loved, however, beyond his sporting successes for his amiable personality, his shy and unassuming demeanor, and in later years, his independent political views. A stalwart supporter of Mosaddeq and a member of the second National Front, he personified in truth a modern luti in his most upright manifestation: someone who in the public eye revived the chivalrous tradition of the zurkhaneh and upheld its values. 1968年死亡。属于少数在1979年仍受到尊重的旧时代大众英雄。

Like societies of Latin America, Eastern Europe, and Africa, Iranian football soon emerged as an alternative public space reflecting collective aspirations, often in the absence of meaningful political venues.

1968年在德黑兰举行的伊朗-以色列亚洲杯比赛后（伊朗胜），德黑兰民众上街庆祝，很快变成反以色列（by implication 反政府）抗议。

Signs of dissent in music, cinema, and sports complemented a conceptual rethinking of Iranian culture, and eventually a reassessment of religious myths and values. At the heart of this revisionist trend was reassessment of such tokens as modernization and Westernization.

In the pungent days of the 1970s Al-e Ahmad（毛拉家庭出身的西化知识分子，Niru-ye Sevvom的创建者）’s discourse of cultural authenticity evolved into a journey of rediscovery for “true Islam.”

A powerful motif before and during the 1979 revolution, Gharbzadehgi later rendered a rhetorical tool in the service of the Islamic Republic and its polemicists.

Al-e Ahmad’s serious pitfall, however, was to take this accidental café talk on Gharbzadehgi a step further into a grand cultural theory that he hurriedly, and carelessly, pieced together. Gharbzadehgi turned out to be—independent of the author’s intention, perhaps—an ill-defined and self-righteous nativist theory.

A greater conceptual influence upon Al-e Ahmad came from Ahmad Fardid (1909–1994), who had coined the term gharbzadehgi. Fardid was a reinvented intellectual who came from a madrasa background. he was exposed to a discourse of Iranian Shi‘i philosophy advanced by Henry Corbin. Corbin also belonged to a European circle of anti-modernist intellectuals.

不尊重伊朗的实际历史是Gharbzadehgi最大缺点，经不起推敲的论断影响数代读者，贻害无穷。阴谋论史观，所有问题都怪西方。把各种历史力量/历史角色攻击了一圈。this litany of assertions was appealing to his young and historically uninformed readership and soothing to their injured sentiments. His rendering of the Islamic past triggered a sense of victimization inherent in the Shi‘i narrative and conveniently placed the fault of Muslim “decline” squarely on the shoulders of hostile others.

Al-e Ahmad’s paranoid history aside, in many respects his Gharbzadehgi, though rushed and polemical, anticipated not only critiques of Orientalism in the 1970s but also the world-system and dependency theories of the 1980s.

Deeper still in Al-e Ahmad’s Gharbzadehgi was a fear of an alien intrusion revoking a Shi‘i-Iranian dichotomy of the “chaste” body versus the alien “polluting” agents.

Of comparable standing to Al-e Ahmad in the shaping of a nativist Islamic discourse was ‘Ali Shari‘ati (1933–1977)。在法国学习宗教社会学, 受到Frantz Fanon很大影响。Through Fanon, Shari‘ati came to view the struggle against colonialism, then epitomized by the Algerian Revolution, as an existential struggle for human liberation in which suffering and sacrifice of the oppressed were to restore not only political freedom but also human dignity and moral responsibility. Moving to Tehran a couple of years later, he soon became the most prominent public voice in Hosainiyeh-e Ershad. Shari‘ati sought a massage of liberation in the Qur’anic narrative and in the Shi‘i past. 没有被当局彻底封口的原因可能是，巴列维政权视他为Qom快速激进化的教士反对派的有效抗衡。

国家的文化政策主要是针对左翼知识分子的，而不是面向异议宗教人士的。The former could relay cryptic message of dissent, as much as possible, and hope for better days. The latter enjoyed fewer forums and had to rely mostly on its own traditional venues.

13 THE MAKING OF THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION (1977–1979)

和之前的运动的联系：The Islamic Revolution proved far more encompassing, though much less “innocent,” than the Constitutional Revolution seven decades earlier. It was far less loyal to its own democratic and liberalizing promises than the Constitutional Revolution. By some stretch it was also a rebellious child of the National Movement of the Mosaddeq era. It inherited from that era not only street politics, on a much larger scale, but also a sense of defiance vis-à-vis the great powers. In its social exposure it was more widespread than both the Constitutional Revolution and the National Movement, and in certain ways it tried to complement the unfulfilled aspirations of both those events.

From the mashru‘eh demand of the constitutional period to the extremism of the Fada’iyan-e Islam of the postwar era and the ideology of the Islamic Revolution.

The Islamic Revolution may be compared in its intensity with the rise of the Safavid state and the establishment of Shi‘ism as the official creed. More immediately, it was perhaps less decisive for Iran than the rise of Pahlavi state had been half a century earlier. Yet it was far more instrumental in its long-term social and demographic impact.

The revolution also released an unprecedented reservoir of creative energies at what may be called the social peripheries of the Iranian society.

是穆斯林国家第一场也是目前为止唯一一场成功推进并维持了其意识形态agenda的大众运动。重燃各穆斯林国家的Islamist activism, propelled it beyond the postcolonial nationalist and socialist aspirations or Salafi obscurantism of earlier decades.

七十年代中期，晚至1977，伊朗只有最激进左翼，如Fada’iyan-e Khalq、Mojahedin-e Khalq 之类的游击队组织, 才渴望着革命。The road to revolution was to be paved, however, not by guerrilla warfare but by mass support for a prophetic figure.

1976年大选，卡特要搞人权外交（主要针对苏联东欧），给伊朗国内异议人士很大鼓舞。1977年初就有人给首相和Shah写公开信，提批评提要求。These voices, audible after years of silence, were a refreshing breeze in a climate of royal adulation and chronic subservience. 公开信广泛流传，were the first critical statements not retaliated by the Savak, at least not immediately，可能因为Shah正在根据美国政策调整。

It is wrong to believe that President Carter’s advocacy of human rights was solely responsible for raising such voices or for the shah’s greater latitude. President Carter’s human rights policy thus was more of a stimulant than a prime cause.

Shah七十年代早期诊断出淋巴瘤，秘而不宣。健康恶化，焦虑增加，影响决策。

1977年8月7日任命Jamshid Amuzegar为总理：was seen as the regime’s clear response to the restive popular mood. 回头看是Shah的一系列不可挽回的重大判断失误里的第一个。公众视其为Shah的听话仆人，不真诚。

有限提高新闻自由、政治活动自由，限制Savak：被公众视为政府虚弱的标志。抗议更凶。到1978年9月，抗议有转向革命的趋势。

1977年6月19日，‘Ali Shari‘ati死亡。三个月后霍梅尼的长子死亡。反对派认为都是政府主导的谋杀。

霍梅尼回归：被各种幸运机遇奇迹般地推向运动前台，做梦也没想到自己的形象很快就被神圣光环环绕。

1977年9月14日：斋月结束举行的祈祷活动，霍梅尼的前学生挑战Shah，和流亡中的ayatollah站在一起。

1977年10月：德黑兰的Goethe Institute举办多日的晚间读诗活动，现代文学icon们（主要是异议知识分子，还有Tudeh同情者）朗读充满压迫/反抗/造反意象的诗歌和散文，参加者大量。Though apprehensive of the radical clergy and their growing ambition, the intellectuals and their audiences showed their implicit solidarity with other voices of opposition, which included the supporters of Ayatollah Khomeini.

1977年Shah访美，白宫前支持Shah的学生（五千人，大使花钱请来的）和反对Shah的学生（一千人，学联成员）集会。抗议声震天，白宫讲话都听不到。因为警察和学生对峙使用催泪弹不小心扔到典礼这边，典礼被迫提前结束。

Shah的例行pilgrimage：1949年后，每次美国选出新总统，都要亲自去华盛顿见总统，to receive US blessings as a “不可或缺的战略伙伴” even though misgivings about his domestic policies remained at an all-time high.

对卡特政府，Shah是重要盟友（获取苏联情报，埃及以色列和谈etc），不是仅仅因为人权纪录说抛弃就抛弃的。虽然一开始给Shah冷脸，此时已经开始热络起来。试图满足Shah对军事装备的无限胃口。想办法修复Shah受损的形象。

卖给伊朗12亿美元的AWACS飞机。

Soon after his return to Iran the shah, having been reassured of US moral and material support, staged a show of power.

Savak agents carried out an attack on a meeting called by the newly revived National Front in a private garden near Karaj, in the vicinity of Tehran, and hundreds were indiscriminately beaten up and arrested. 镇压学生示威，反抗加剧。

1978年除夕卡特访美。宴会上赞美伊朗是中东的“an island of stability”。卡特访问两天前德黑兰的美国-伊朗文化中心刚刚被Fada’iyan-e Khalq游击队炸过。Shah的反对者说美国对Shah示好是侮辱伊朗人民。1978年9月华国锋在巴列维王朝风雨飘摇时访问伊朗。中美好像都没get到伊朗马上就要发生巨变。

By late 1977 the regime’s response to street protests was to use the liberalized press to its own advantage. 报纸上发文批评Mosaddeq，以抗衡正在升温的pro-National Front情绪。卡特离开后Rastakhiz党举办全国大会，在决议中表示要与“殖民主义”（实际暗指什叶clergy，指控其在殖民时期和英国人有联系[乱指控，英国人只是向伊拉克的什叶mojtaheds分发过来自印度的宗教Endowment的收入罢了]）斗争。

1978年1月8日，王朝喉舌Ettela‘at报纸发表署化名的攻击霍梅尼的文章，谴责“alliance of the red and the black reactionaries”，说霍梅尼和什叶领袖反动腐化是殖民主义走狗。说霍梅尼吸鸦片，是主人派来扰乱伊朗走向进步辉煌的。说霍梅尼不满地位低，为了博眼球才煽动作乱。

1978年1月9日，Qom神学院示威，多人死亡。Qom暴动是伊斯兰革命转折点： for it launched a whole year of rallies, strikes, and violence, resulting in a steady waning of state’s power in all major cities.

虽然之前大部分Qom marja‘s都视霍梅尼为麻烦制造者和可能威胁他们权威的人，此时不支持霍梅尼不行了，纷纷发表声明，表示谴责镇压。连温和型ayatollah如Mohammad Kazem Shari‘atmadari都不得不表态。霍梅尼的senior弟子，如Hosain ‘Ali Montazeri，在抬高霍梅尼地位中作用关键。Though not yet fully spelled out, the notion of welayat-e faqih was beginning to place Khomeini far above his cohorts not merely as a jurist but also as a savior of the nation.

1978年1月18日，Tabriz发生两天的暴力uprising，多人死亡。烧银行，烧政府大楼，Rastakhiz省总部，电影院，百事可乐罐装厂。政府宣布戒严，军队上街。1963年6月的uprising以来第一次戒严。 Further unrest in Ahwaz, Mashhad, Yazd, and Isfahan turned the crisis national and gave it the appearance of ominous regularity.

Throughout 1978 demonstrations recurred on the fortieth mourning commemoration (arba‘in) of the “martyrs” who had fallen in the earlier round of clashes. The numbers of victims almost invariably were exaggerated in the same way that government’s punitive actions were overstated. 全国发生集会的同时，public sector各种罢工罢课，静坐绝食。

示威者的要求有实际的也有政治性的：涨工资，加福利，解决住房需求；无条件释放所有政治犯，结束新闻审查，处理腐败官员；结束外国掠夺伊朗自然资源，伊朗货币脱离美元霸权，结束所谓的”montage industries”(指制造西式消费品的加工组装厂, enterprises dismissed by armchair revolutionaries who probably had read too much Al-e Ahmad as somehow inauthentic and useless).

在清真寺，激进clergy号召在工厂、政府、学校、私人公司建立“Islamic associations”。overnight activists demanded the swift exercise of “Islamic justice” and the removal from power of agents of the “idol” (taghut), a Qur’anic term euphemized to stand for the shah and the Pahlavi elite.

In university rallies, where the left held the upper hand, cries of victory to peoples (khalq-ha) of Iran and an end to the “exploitation of the masses” were audible. Still more widespread, the supporters of the People’s Mojahedin, the fastest-growing political movement among youth, called for victory of the “disinherited of the earth” (mostaza‘fin-e arz) and the establishment of a “classless” Islamic society. A language of political Islam inherited from likes of ‘Ali Shari‘ati quickly shaped the revolutionary discourse.

斋月抗议达到新高。1978年8月11日，伊斯法罕冲突激烈。Amuzegar宣布戒严。

8月19日，1953年政变纪念日，Abandan的Rex Cinema发生纵火，377人死亡。电影院正在放映讲下层反抗社会不公的电影Gavazn-ha。当时的流言说，电影院出口是Savak和亲政府人士故意堵住的。实际上，当时激进伊斯兰人士经常放火烧掉电影院之类的和“西方腐朽生活方式”有关的场所。The Islamic opposition, however, stood to reap major propaganda advantages from the tragedy in the prevailing environment of suspicion and anger.

Amuzegar政府对伊斯法罕暴乱和Rex Cinema大火的处理引发强烈批评。不光是一般公众批评，Majles代表（having serious credibility issues, tried hard to behave as the people’s genuine representatives）也批评。

8月27日，Amuzegar辞职。His resignation proved that a smooth reform movement by a chosen member of the Pahlavi technocracy could not remedy many years of absolutist rule.

Plunged into a deeper crisis of confidence, Shah任命曾在五十年代两度任首相的Ja‘far Sharif-Emami为首相。又一重大失误。

Sharif-Emami：He was too closely associated with the shah and the upper echelons of the Pahlavi elite to have any chance of withstanding the revolutionary storm that was sweeping the country. 出身教士家庭，有教士人脉，Shah及其顾问寄希望于此。他的“national reconciliation”政府由希望通过说服/安抚与温和clergy改善关系的官员组成。希望孤立霍梅尼及其支持者，增大政治空间。

That the shah at the time did not opt for a more credible figure from among veteran statesmen suggested that even by August 1978 he had difficulty grasping the depth of the revolutionary realities. Shah此时仍是阴谋论思维，称霍梅尼为“黑色反动派”，是英国阴谋，或者美国CIA搞出来的。

Opting for a moderate figure from among the liberal opposition may have been the only hope to realistically preserve the constitutional monarchy, if not the shah himself on the throne. That option, of course, required a near-complete delegation of authority by the shah to a reasonably credible government, holding of a free and fair election, and even the shah’s peaceful abdication in favor of his son and successor. Shah不愿意作出此类让步。

Stressing his independence and calling for an end to royal meddling in the affairs of the government, Sharif-Emami的一系列补救措施：废除imperial calendar；关闭夜总会和赌场；提高政府雇员工资；释放部分clerics；强制退休了一批名声臭的高级军官；放松审查；接受多党制（Rastakhiz完结，Tudeh再现）。

得到温和教士和National Front的回应：In response Ayatollah Shari‘atmadari cautiously welcomed the measures introduced by Sarif-Emami’s government and offered a three-month window to implement other public demands. The newly revived National Front issued a twelve-point declaration calling for restoration of the Constitution, free press and free elections, and dissolution of the Savak.

负作用：反对派更加大胆；在大众压力下，Qom的marja‘s给霍梅尼（正在从Najaf和巴黎发出火药味越来越浓的声明）越来越多支持。霍梅尼指责政府虚伪。首都大型集会支持霍梅尼。

1978年9月4日，德黑兰二十万人大游行。在很快就要改名自由广场的Shahyad Square集会, crying out “death to the shah” and calling for “sovereignty, freedom, and Islamic government.” 受到1974年葡萄牙康乃馨革命启发，示威者向前来镇压的军队表达友善，在枪管上放玫瑰和康乃馨。Rhymed slogans filled the air: “My brother in uniform; why fratricide?” (Baradar-e arteshi! Chera baradarkoshi?)

Sharif-Emami政府宣布首都戒严。Gholam ‘Ali Ovaysi将军出任首都军队司令。

宣布戒严后一天，9月8日，大批人群在Jaleh Square（the core of a religious middle-class neighborhood in east-central Tehran that had been the scene of repeated demonstrations since the beginning of the unrest）集结。也许尚不知戒严令，示威者忽视了一次次的疏散警告。示威者中来自左翼游击队的狙击手开枪。军队向人群开枪。95人死亡。首都其它地方的冲突也造成死亡。

The emotional impact of these events, which soon was marked on the calendar of the Islamic Revolution as “黑色星期五” was greater even than the loss of human lives. The clerical activists, backed by the Qom marja‘s, capitalized on the Jaleh Square massacre to paint the regime as brutal and illegitimate. 流言极大夸大死伤人数（夸大到上千），把开火军队说成是以色列雇佣军。

军队士气大减。Events of the next seven months clearly illustrated the security forces’ moral conundrum and their diminishing appetite to save the Pahlavi regime, especially in the absence of a resolute royal master.

Reacting to a flurry of smuggled cassette tapes with fiery messages from Khomeini calling on the Iranian people to rise up and oust the shah, 伊朗政府只好请求萨达姆把霍梅尼从Najaf赶走，天真地以为这样就可以让霍梅尼和伊朗人失去联系，渐渐被遗忘。萨达姆虽然是Shah的对头，但对萨达姆来说霍梅尼也是烫手山芋，萨达姆害怕霍梅尼成为伊拉克clergy（如Mohammad Baqer Sadr）的role model。萨达姆于是把霍梅尼赶出Najaf，扔到科威特边境。科威特拒绝霍梅尼入境，身边人（如 Sadeq Qotbzadeh）说服他去巴黎。1978年10月6日，霍梅尼到达法国，住在Neauphle-le-Château。

和伊朗政府的意图相反，霍梅尼在巴黎的三个月期间获得前所未有的媒体曝光自由，以及接见同情支持者的自由。

霍梅尼面对媒体很娴熟，谨慎而简短地回答媒体提问。各大媒体记者were often bewildered as they tried to read into Khomeini’s ascetic facade and deceptively brief answers. They often went away with implicit praise for a man who had resolutely defied the shah’s autocratic rule.

面对西方媒体和世俗反对派，霍梅尼把反巴列维运动形容为一场全面的伊斯兰解放运动，但对日后的伊斯兰乌托邦是什么模样故意语焉不详。描绘“伊斯兰共和国”正义平等的美好途径，同时强调伊朗人民的意愿决定伊朗的未来。强调在伊斯兰共和国，人人平等，包括犹太人，基督徒，和其它“合法”少数族群。教士负责道德上引导国家，但是没有政治野心，也不会独掌权力。未来的伊朗，各种群体各种倾向共存，但以伊斯兰作为sovereignty和religious identity的核心。

是真诚的宣言, 还是顾问一厢情愿修改出来的, 还是为了减轻国内外对神权国家的不安采取的欺骗性策略，不得而知. What was clear, however, was that 和伊朗政府的期望相反，霍梅尼挑衅的语气，反叛的信息，在国内外得到了更多的audience，更多的认可。

The remaining months of Sharif-Emami’s government were riddled with more violent clashes and angry demonstrations. The anticorruption measures and the government’s tone of appeasement only emboldened the opposition, which was succeeding in mobilizing new followers through the mosques and Muharram associations.

左翼学生（很多家长是左翼背景）：认为霍梅尼的崛起和伊斯兰狂热是通往大众统治的过渡性阶段。Others in the liberal nationalist camp perceived some form of future power sharing with the Islamists, hoping that Khomeini’s leadership would champion a free and fair constitutional regime—admittedly with a thin Islamic veneer. 左翼和liberals都大大低估了霍梅尼的精明操纵和他得到大众支持的程度。

1978年11月5日：首都暴乱，危机达到沸点。各种放火。街上无人维持秩序。是Savak自导自演，还是激进分子所为，不清楚。What was clear was that the riots succeeded in bringing the shaky government of Sharif-Emami to its knees.

1978年11月6日：Sharif-Emami辞职。Shah任命缺乏政治经验的Gholam-Reza Azhari将军为首相。天真地认为军政府可以和平结束罢工，让经济恢复正常。布热津斯基支持驻美大使Ardeshir Zahedi, 认为only a firm military stance could end the revolution and rescue the regime. 想重演1953政变，狼狈收场。

Shah自己都对军政府没信心。 Troubled by the rapid course of events, the murky prospects of his dynasty, and the conflicting messages from Washington, the shah was unwilling to allow a draconian measure that might result in another bloodbath like Jaleh Square. Shah意识到仅凭武力已经无法压制a popular revolt led by a determined and charismatic leader and backed by millions in the streets.

The army, it soon became apparent, lacked experience in civil affairs as much as it lacked the resolve to face a restive public. Shah had deprived the army of a spirit of institutional self-reliance and independent identity. One other systemic factor barring the officers from acting like a military junta was a justifiable fear of disloyalty from within their own lower ranks. 士兵不听话。1978年10月的时候，军队缺勤开小差变节就已经盛行。到年底加重到不服从命令。

1978年12月14日，德黑兰以北Lavizan barracks发生mutiny，士兵杀死长官，报复其反革命。空军地勤表示支持革命：They initially were vocal in demanding higher wages and better terms of employment, but soon, in February 8, 1979, they spearheaded mass defection within the air force personnel. 后来上街和革命者并肩作战。

Azhari将军任命当天，Shah亲自出现在电视上，表示支持伊朗人民的革命，说已经听到了人民的革命传达的信息。作为“guardian of the constitutional monarchy”—a divine “gift entrusted to the shah by people”，保证不再重复以前的错误，不再允许非法行为,压迫和腐败重演。让已经完全不相信他的公众放心，说军政府只是临时照看，他是因为无法建立可以代表国民意志的coalition government，才不得不搞军政府。 It was a deathbed confession at best and at worst a pitiable scheme to cling to power under the guise of a constitution for which the shah had shown little respect in the past. 对军政府过渡性质的强调严重威胁了其生存机会。

军政府暂时减弱了抗议强度。11月9日，以贪腐、卖国等指控，大批逮捕包括前首相Hovayda，前Savak掌门人Nasiri将军在内的高官。立即让寄望于Shah和军队的巴列维精英信心消散：Shah连忠于自己的首相和安全部门总管都无法保护，为了自己的生存都能牺牲他们，接下来就该轮到其它精英了。Bonds of loyalty that had long held together the Pahlavi regime were about to be quickly unraveled.

到1978年12月，Azhari的政府，无法恢复秩序，已经成为公众嘲笑对象。在给Senate的报告里，Azhari称夜间的 “Allah’u akbar”是磁带放的。很快，成千上万的游行者上街高呼“Allah’u akbar”，嘲笑Azhari：“O miserable Azhari! Dare say it again! Is this a [cassette] tape? Tape doesn’t have hands; tape doesn’t have legs.”

示威者和军警发生的流血冲突，让前者越来越坚定，后者越来越虚弱。革命的四大中心—the bazaar, the mosque and the Moharram committees, the university campuses, and the oil industry—现在一致谴责巴列维政权。但在多大程度上接受霍梅尼领导上仍无法达成一致，存在巨大的意识形态分歧。

The Moharram of year 1399 of the Islamic calendar, falling in December 1978, was bound to carry an even greater emotional weight than the usual commemoration of the Karbala martyrs. The forthcoming turn of the fifteenth Islamic century, and its messianic undertone for the advent of a “renovator [mojadded] at the turn of the century,” a dormant trait in the history of messianic Islam, had found an apt candidate in the person of Ayatollah Khomeini.

Ayatollah Mahmud Taleqani出狱。号召在day of ‘Ashura (December 11, 1978) 举行集会纪念革命烈士（其实可能只有数百人），据称百万人聚集Shahyad (Azadi) 广场。示威者提出的十七点要求里包括结束巴列维政权，建立霍梅尼为首的伊斯兰秩序。同时呼吁政治自由，公民权利，社会正义，结束帝国主义霸权。Here the dichotomy in denouncing the shah as traitor and welcoming Khomeini as savior pointed to a sad irony in a political culture that could only demand the removal of one autocrat by welcoming another, even though the latter was still in making.

对Shah的国际支持也在消失。美国共和党坚定支持Shah，但卡特不再坚定。12月7日被问及Shah的幸存机会时，卡特说“我不知道。希望如此吧。这事由伊朗人民决定”。Cyrus Vance领导下的国务院, was cautiously inching toward accepting the revolution as an unpleasant but unavoidable reality. 美国大使William Sullivan (1922–2013)认为和革命的clerical/lay leadership建立联系不可避免。国家安全委员会的以布热津斯基为首的强硬人士尚未完全放弃伊朗军队，但此时已经把Shah看作累赘。

1978年12月底，Azhari辞职，agreed to be a caretaker until a new premier is appointed.

12月中旬时，Shah已经意识到，他的唯一选择是：to call on a handful of veteran nationalists of earlier decades to form a government.

Karim Sanjabi, a statesman of the Mosaddeq era and a leader of the revived National Front who has been released from Savak’s temporary detention a week earlier, 毫不犹豫拒绝了Shah的offer。要求Shah无限期离开伊朗+delegate all affairs of the state to a privy council to be convened from among credible personalities. Shah仍然不愿意接受。

不到一个月前Sanjabi刚在巴黎见过霍梅尼，提出三点声明：It condemned the shah’s dictatorial rule as unconstitutional and against individual freedoms, and hence devoid of legal and Islamic legitimacy. It further denounced any collaboration with the regime so long as it continued to act undemocratically. Finally, it called for Iran’s future political order to be determined by a popular referendum. 霍梅尼对声明没什么兴趣。There was an ominous ring to the very act of seeking an open alliance with Khomeini, for it showed the secular opposition’s loss of momentum.

In search of a solution, and no longer sure of the United States’ support for his rule, he approached Gholam-Hosain Sadiqi, another veteran of the Mosaddeq era who was no longer associated with the new National Front. Sadiqi也迅速拒绝了Shah的offer:他被其它反对派人士提前警告过了，接受首相职位将是对革命团结的严重破坏。要求Shah留在伊朗国内，放弃军权。被Shah拒绝。

In his bewildered state of mind the shah, however, had declined both the offer to leave and the offer to stay, an indecision that implied to both veterans of the Mosaddeq era, Sanjabi and Sadiqi, a hidden agenda, perhaps to buy time and stage a military coup.

1978年12月底，在被Sanjabi和Sadiqi拒绝后，Shah开始秘密和Shapur Bakhtiar（another National Front member and leader of the newly revived Iran Party）谈判。

1978年12月29日，Bakhtiar接受首相职位。此时形势已经明了：任何没获得霍梅尼默许的世俗主义者政治上都没戏。By moving away from his comrades, and in effect working against them, Bakhtiar主动把自己逼进死胡同。进一步降低了一个团结的世俗阵线或许拥有的复活君主立宪制、抵御霍梅尼和他的激进追随者的微弱可能。对Bakhtiar本人，接受首相职位是直面伊斯兰狂信者及他们将带给国家的黑暗未来的威胁的英勇爱国举动。批评者则认为Bakhtiar’s是受做高官野心的驱动. Bakhtiar和他的内阁里的少数并不怎么热心的部长，clung to the implausible chance that through an alliance with the army they would prevail.

此时的抗议运动已经变得更加激进，伊斯兰色彩更浓。巴列维独裁政权下台的呼吁后面跟着的已经不再是恢复1906年宪法的要求，而是结束君主制暴政，回归“伊斯兰正义”，建立“伊斯兰政府”和伊斯兰共和国的声音。

The shift from political reforms to an Islamic order meant an adamant rejection of a liberal democratic alternative. In many slogans and on thousands of placards carried in rallies, the tone of the revolution had turned in favor of Khomeini and his evolving ambitions to create a new Islamic order.

The general enthusiasm for this Islamic alternative was as spontaneous as it was contagious. Half a century of Pahlavi rule and its state-initiated monotony had heightened the yearning for an alternative face and an alternative message. To many Iranians this idealized, politicized, and radicalized Islam—a construct that had gestated for many decades—became more appealing, especially in its revolutionary garb. 伊朗年轻人并不熟悉以前clergy的反世俗反动形象，准备接受“Imam”。

1979年1月1日，美国表示支持Bakhtiar政府。霍梅尼谴责新首相和他的过渡政府非法，号召抵制之。卡特政府对伊朗事务处理得不好，further reduced the frail chance of stopping Khomeini’s ascendancy. The Bakhtiar interlude, like Kerensky’s interim government in 1917 Russia, seemed the catalyst for the regime’s ultimate downfall.

By keeping the shah away, Bakhtiar hoped that he could deploy the army to harness the revolution and restore Iran’s constitutional regime. By implementing drastic reforms and carrying out an anticorruption campaign, he hoped to disarm Khomeini and force him to negotiate. 尽管兑现部分承诺，比如完全解除新闻限制，Bakhtiar政府完全无法恢复旧秩序。

1979年1月16日，Shah离开伊朗前往埃及。举国欢庆。巴列维王朝分崩离析。

18世纪以来伊朗的十三个统治者里，只有四个在位时自然死亡。剩下的，一个被处决，四个被暗杀，四个被流放。

Bakhtiar解散Savak，Privy Council还没召开，主席在巴黎和霍梅尼被拒绝接见，直接辞职了。数个部长还没就职就先辞职了。敢赴任的被挡在办公楼外不让进。Bakhtiar结束审查，保证新闻自由和结社自由，释放还没释放的政治犯。1979年1月25日，宪法支持者（主要是害怕theocracy的中产）在Baharestan广场集会，也无法改变大势。

Despite all his efforts, the focus of public attention was the much-anticipated arrival of Ayatollah Khomeini. Bakhtiar’s waning fortune and the army’s uncertain prospects boosted the chances of Khomeini’s return, which was set for January 26.

1月8日，白宫派Robert Huyser将军访问伊朗，试图促成军队和Bakhtiar政府合作。实际上是打算一旦Bakhtiar下台就搞准军事政变。然而Huyser面临的是士气低下的军队：忠诚迅速消失的下层士兵，不愿意和革命人群对峙的高级军官。Huyser认识到搞1953政变类似的政变没戏了。

The only outcome was that the army chiefs were convinced to stay out of the revolutionary trouble, start negotiating with Mahdi Bazargan, the prime minister of the provisional government, and with Khomeini’s clerical representatives, and eventually return to the barracks.

1979年2月1日，霍梅尼回国，去公墓向革命烈士致敬。

In his fiery sermon at the cemetery, the first in a repertoire that lasted a decade, he called the Bakhtiar government, the Majles, and the Senate illegitimate; he called Reza Shah a usurper who illegally came to power and Mohammad Reza Shah a puppet of foreign powers. He accused the Pahlavi regime of corruption and nurturing prostitution, appealed to people’s power and pledged on the blood of the martyrs to appoint a legitimate Islamic government to eradicate the seeds of oppression.

发言安抚军官。As it became abundantly clear some two weeks later, the soft gesture toward the army chiefs and senior officers was nothing but a cynical ploy to break up what little was left of the corps’ solidarity and loyalty to the shah.

During the following ten days, from February 1–11, 1979, revolution struck its final blows upon the dying Pahlavi regime and heralded the birth of a new one.

Mindful of a military coup, less than three weeks before his arrival, on January 12, Khomeini had appointed a semiclandestine Islamic Revolutionary Council.

On February 5, Bakhtiar政府尚未解散，Khomeini任命Mahdi Bazargan为过渡政府首脑. Bazargan’s mandate, as Khomeini’s “decree” asserted, 不光包括成立政府，管理国事，还包括举行公投，决定新政权的性质（a formality as it turned out），公开合法化伊斯兰共和国的诞生。过渡政府的任务还包括选举立宪会议，制定新宪法，主管第一次议会选举。

军队指挥官希望和霍梅尼过渡政府达成协议，条件是不动军队。 Bazargan and the Revolutionary Council, even Khomeini himself, shared such a prospect. By the first week of February, judging by statements issued from both sides, the army chief of command and Khomeini’s provisional government, the parties were on the verge of a compromise for a bloodless transition.

美国特使Huyser将军谈判无果，2月6日离开美国。华盛顿犹豫不决，卡特政府鹰派鸽派争执不下，最后的结果是放弃Shah，放弃军队干预。

除了少数声音，如英国foreign secretary David Owen作出黑暗预测，西方国家基本准备接受现状。苏联措手不及，also viewed with reservation the shaping on their southern border of an Islamic revolution led by a radical ayatollah.

2月9日，空军地勤Homafars表示全面效忠霍梅尼和革命。扰乱了临时政府和军队间的脆弱协定。

Spearheading clashes with the security forces, the Marxist Fada’iyan-e Khalq and their Islamic counterpart, Mojahedin-e Khalq, saw a golden chance to fulfill their long-awaited dream of dismantling the Pahlavi power. More than any other party, they were instrumental in the final collapse of the armed forces. This was an ominous overture to the left’s initiatives glorifying violence and enticing Khomeini supporters to go to extremes.

绝望之中，2月10日，德黑兰军队司令部宣布延长宵禁时间。愤怒人群视之为政变前奏。霍梅尼当天就发表措辞强烈的声明，督促公众上街，打破戒严。虽然没有直接要求群众占领警察局和军事设施，霍梅尼的声明让人群更加大胆。

2月11日，街上的抵抗变强。出现临时街垒，和针对警察局的袭击。In response, the military Supreme Council, consisting of all commanding officers and chiefs of the three forces, 发表声明宣布军队在当前危机中保持中立。进一步说军队站在人民和革命的一侧。呼吁各部队从街头撤退回到军营。

The conciliatory gesture, however, proved detrimental to the very survival of the most powerful and most symbolic institution of Pahlavi rule. 军队撤退后，示威者攻占了全德黑兰的军营。人群不光抢劫轻武器，还抢坦克，装甲车，重机枪。

At an amazingly fast pace the imperial army turned into a submissive shadow of itself and never recovered from that shock. 大批将军在办公室被逮捕。要么就是在穿上平民服装逃跑的时候被抓。同一天Bakhtiar辞职，躲了起来。

1979年2月11日革命的“胜利”，并不像过渡政府原来打算的那样，是通过顺利的权力移交实现的，而是通过大众暴动实现的。让霍梅尼及其追随者惊讶。霍梅尼的政治精明：That Khomeini successfully navigated the tumultuous course, rather than lagging behind the left and the angry masses who took over the barracks and overpowered the police, was early evidence of his political sorcery. Keeping up with the momentum, often at the expense of the moderate wing of the revolution, kept him in favor not only with his rapidly radicalized clerical base but also with the underprivileged multitudes who yearned for leadership.

Shah不经意中让大众革命成为他的独裁统治的唯一alternative。In the absence of genuine political institutions and the growth of a middle class devoid of political agency, the rise of a populist demi-prophet like Khomeini is understandable. 不民主的霍梅尼就像Shah的镜像。巴列维政权消除了所有其它温和选项，促进人选择左翼极端主义或者忠于教士。激进左翼因为自己的幼稚，意识形态远离大众，还有殉难崇拜，没什么支持。Qom教士的运动，反而更有适应力，更精明，更能赢得草根支持。

That the Pahlavi secular project eventually gave way to a religiously defined revolution cannot be viewed in isolation from a century-long rift between the state and the Shi‘i establishment. Nor can one ignore the widening gap dividing the Iranian secular from the religious worldview, a gap that the state-sponsored modernity could not successfully bridge. Moreover, the revolution can be fully understood only if we take into account dormant messianic traits in Iranian Shi‘ism, which periodically revolted against the state and religious establishment.

14 THE GUARDIAN JURIST AND HIS ADVOCATES

At least since 1961, and with a greater resolve since 1970, clerical Shi‘ism explored ideological Islam and contemplated juridical authority as an alternative to secular power. Shi‘i jurists by and large remained loyal to the idea of political nonintervention.

Already in 1969 in Najaf, Khomeini had delivered a series of lectures on the subject of the governance of the jurist, a pivotal notion that came to define the ideology of the revolution.

By any standard, the question of wilayat was viewed as a dry academic debate in the books of jurisprudence. It had preserved its arcane character since the tenth century with little change.

A few jurists in the Safavid period entertained, in theory, that guardianship of the jurist could mean something beyond such fiduciary duties. More specifically, they saw a public duty for the jurist on behalf of the community and in its dealings with the state.

Contrary to what has often been claimed, the most widely quoted source on the subject of guardianship, Mulla Ahmad Naraqi (1772–1829), an Usuli jurist of early nineteenth-century Kashan, never explicitly claimed welayat as ground for jurists’ political authority. On the contrary, he was known for his firm support for the Qajar state and his advocacy of the separation of clerical from temporal duties.

Khomeini’s novel reading of the notion of guardianship of the jurist as the only legitimate alternative to “unjust” temporal rule was at odds with the traditional Shi‘i aversion toward political power, avoiding government offices, and, for the most part, engaging in state affairs.

理论上：Shi‘i law generally held the position that in the absence of the Imam of the Age, any form of government, presumably even a government led by the jurists, is fundamentally “unjust” and therefore theoretically illegitimate.

实际上：In practice the Shi‘i jurists were generally accommodating toward temporal rulers, even if the sultans and the shahs were not particularly known for their religiosity or fair treatment of their subjects.

Rulers, even unjust rulers, were to be abided, even though they were not legally legitimate, so long as they confessed to be Muslims. The idea of resisting “oppressive” rulers was a mere philosophical ideal foreign to the mostly sheepish jurists taking refuge in the madrasa.

Shi‘i jurists were content with virtually any form of temporal power so long as it remained mindful of their jealously guarded clerical privileges and their shari‘a legal domain.

They were generally complimentary, if not always laudatory, toward the Safavid and the Qajar shahs, for these rulers honored a division between the authority to rule (wilayat-e hokm), which was the domain of the rulers, and the authority to judge (wilayat-e qada), which was that of the jurists.

Even in the Pahlavi era, when clerical power and privileges were curtailed or assumed by the state, the clerical establishment before Khomeini, despite its deep resentments, did not contemplate an Islamic alternative, let alone the political guardianship of the jurist.

The strongest precedent for conceptualizing clerical authority, perhaps, was the notion of the mashru‘eh (i.e., a system of government compliant with principles of the shari‘a), advanced by Shaykh Fazlollah Nuri and his supporters during the Constitutional Revolution. Khomeini’s guardianship of the jurist can be viewed as an indirect descendant of Nuri’s mashru‘eh.

Mohammad Hosain Na’ini, a contemporary of Nuri, offered a new reading of the shari‘a whereby, in the absence of the Imam of the Age, popular representation and a democratic constitutional regime (mashruteh) could be considered the legitimate, and expedient, form of government. Yet in the aftermath of the Constitutional Revolution, senior jurists, even Na’ini himself, frustrated with the outcome of the revolution, rejected democratic representation, and the mashruteh as a whole.

Khomeini’s “governance of the jurist” (a more apt translation for welayat-e faqih, in the political context) thus was a drastic departure from the Shi‘i jurists’ political quietism. He argued that contrary to the conventional view held by conservative and pro-regime jurists, in the absence of the Imam of the Age it is the inalienable duty of the jurists to try to erect a relatively just Islamic government.

In Khomeini’s view the Western colonial powers (which in his eye were not different from his contemporary Western superpowers) entertained conspiratorial designs to subjugate all Muslims in cultural, economic, and political spheres. In due course, he believed, they intended to destroy the very essence (bayzeh, or “seed”) of Islam. Since the holders of temporal power, he asserted, were facilitators of such hegemonic designs, they were no longer capable of discharging their traditional duty to defend the Muslim community.

Hokumat-e Islami: stood at the center of his radical theocracy. He relied heavily on the Qur’anic verses, the prophetic hadith, citations from the Shi‘i Imams, and the works of medieval Shi‘i scholars—mostly out of context—to underscore the duty of the jurists to defend the community against alien intrusions. Legally the most qualified leaders of the community, he prescribed, the jurists must aspire toward the creation of an Islamic government.

视美国为死敌。在Najaf的时候，阿拉伯媒体对巴勒斯坦在1967年战争后困境的报道无疑也吸引了霍梅尼的注意力。His disillusionment at the time with the rhetoric of the leadership in the Arab world, above all Nasser’s brand of Arab nationalism, along with increased anti-Westernism among Iranian intellectuals of the left and their greater awareness of political Islam all served as a backdrop to Khomeini’s evolving political outlook and his doctrine of an Islamic government. 美国整个六十年代在伊朗存在感加强，也影响了霍梅尼意识形态的形成。

Despite sharp attacks in his earlier writings on the Wahhabi teachings and those who echoed these teachings in a Shi‘i guise—such as Shari‘at Sangelaji, Khomeini essentially approved of a trait of activist Islam that intended to replicate an early Islamic community albeit a Shi‘i one. In this he was conceptually ahistorical and politically radical.

The idea of creating an Islamic government, or even the denial of the temporal state, it is important to note, came late in Khomeini’s career, in part was to satisfy the radical trends in his own camp.

Commonality with Sunni Islamist trends, however, did not devalue Khomeini’s scheme or diminish the place of the Shi‘i victimization narrative of Islamic past. He, moreover, deeply adhered to a Shi‘i juristic tradition as it developed over the course of a millennium. Yet these ideals meant to him something diametrically opposed to the conservative Shi‘i jurists of Qom, let alone the Pahlavi secular values against which he had revolted.

霍梅尼的前学生：crucial in organizing support and articulating his message throughout the 1970s.

Mortaza Motahhari: a teacher of Islamic philosophy and a prolific religious writer. Staying away from Khomeini’s doctrine of the guardianship of the jurist, at least on the surface, Motahhari was in favor of peacefully incorporating Islamic values into the Iranian cultural landscape rather than conspiring for the downfall of Pahlavi regime and its replacement with an Islamic alternative. Yet by 1977, Motahhari, typical of Khomeini’s students in the middle ranks of the Qom hierarchy, was carried away by revolutionary momentum and tilted more forcefully toward the radical Islamic alternative. Offering a more palatable Islam in modern guise, he borrowed concepts and terminology from Western philosophy and social sciences and engaged secular modernists, a bridge between Qom madrasa culture and lay Islamist such as Shari‘ati and Mahdi Bazargan.

Mohammad Beheshti (1929–1981): arguably the chief strategist of the clerical wing of the revolution.

Mohammad Mofatteh (1928–1979): another product of the Qom seminary with a doctorate in philosophy from Tehran University came to the forefront of pro-Khomeini activists in the late 1970s.

The three stood at the forefront of the Islamic protest movement in 1977 while most other pro-Khomeini clergy were either in detention or in exile. Educated and relatively nuanced they projected an alluring image of political Islam: cordial, inclusive, and in essence Iranian nationalist. By implication they also projected an amiable image of Khomeini as a spiritual guide who was reluctant, even unwilling, to hold the reins of political power and was tolerant of most, if not all, political outlooks. Tellingly, all three were early victims of the postrevolutionary scramble.

Beyond this, a larger number of clerical and lay supporters made up of Khomeini’s former students and loyalists spread the message of revolution. They were mostly from Khomeini’s days in Qom, and less so in Najaf. They also included those who aligned themselves rather opportunistically with his brand of Islam.

The shield of clerical immunity inherent to Iranian Shi‘i society protected them even at the height of Pahlavi power.

Inadvertently, it was as if banishment to remote towns and cities of Iran was a blessing in disguise, for it allowed them access audiences who had otherwise remained untouched by the message of religious dissent.

Clergy里的霍梅尼支持者多数来自农村或者城镇低收入家庭。一般不但接受过madrasa教育，也接受过世俗的公共教育。

Only gradually and from the early 1960s the activists among the clergy subscribed to the anti-imperialist message of the Mosaddeq era and came to see themselves as victims of the Pahlavi regime. Their dual education prepared them for an activist life beyond the madrasa and made them better informed on domestic and international affairs, ideologies of the left, and anticolonial popular struggles abroad.

Not only in outlook but also in style, Khomeini’s students represented a new hybrid. 和老一代说着重度阿拉伯语化的波斯语不接地气盛气凌人的毛拉不同，新一代毛拉接受过公共教育，可以更流畅地和听众交流。madrasa和公共教育混合的教育背景，以及低微的出身，形成了对意识形态竞争者（左派；多来自富裕家庭的liberal）的优势。

六十年代清真寺教众规模增大。资深clergy收入更多人脉更广，吸引更多追随者。 Savak忙着镇压知识分子和大学生，只有一小部分clergy发声并受到当局压力。

Hosein-‘Ali Montazeri：1979年前几乎所有著作都是关于晦涩的Shi‘i jurisprudence话题的，如religious alms, religious taxes, religious punishments and unlawful gains. 临近革命的时候才开始采取政治伊斯兰话语。His lectures on legal foundations of the doctrine of the guardianship of the jurist, which was rendered in Arabic and later translated into Persian, was one of several works articulated immediately after the revolution with clear political connotations.

As one of the framers of the 1979 constitution and as the designated successor to “Imam Khomeini,” Montazeri played an important part in the early consolidation of the Islamic Republic. 1988-1989和霍梅尼闹翻，经历过强硬人士骚扰，观点才变得更宽容, 成为同期Qom教士活动家中的异类。

Mahmud Taleqani：有社会主义倾向，和主流Qom权威不同。革命胜利后, his pluralist approach and greater tolerance for other readings of Islam and secular ideologies were increasingly at odds with Khomeini’s exclusivist brand. 相对温和、开放。1979年9月心梗死亡。

Of the second tier of students loyal to Khomeini were Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and Sayyed ‘Ali Khamenei. Their numbers exceeded no more perhaps than a half dozen, but they constituted a core for wider support within and beyond the clerical establishment.

Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani：In Qom, young Rafsanjani gravitated toward antiregime dissent and became one of the founders of the journal Maktab-e Tashayyu‘ (the school of Shi‘ism), one of the two major journals in Qom that since 1959 debated modern themes from an Islamic perspective with the hope of engaging a wider religiously inclined readership outside Qom. 早期寻求霍梅尼patronage而不得。

Sayyed ‘Ali Khamenei: 学术一般，主要以翻译闻名，包括把Sayyid Qutb的著作翻译到波斯语。对诗歌有兴趣，包括新浪潮诗歌。Only in the months leading to the Islamic Revolution, however, did Khamenei gain some visibility in Khomeini’s inner circle as a skilled orator capable of articulating his mentor’s message.

These students in one way or another shared the marginality of the madrasa environment. 穿着教袍，和巴列维时代社会主流格格不入。因为共同的坐牢流亡经历而相互团结。These experiences allowed them to forge ties with other political tendencies in prison and in exile and helped sharpen their rhetorical skills in encounters with the Mojahedin, Marxists, and other shades of political dissent while absorbing many of the themes and arguments proposed by other forces of opposition and making them their own.

Even during his Najaf exile Khomeini had preserved an impressive array of agents in Iranian towns and cities：替霍梅尼收捐赠，传播他的著述，冲在集会的最前线，负责招募革命人士。革命后成为伊斯兰共和国各种革命机构的骨干。

除了教士追随者，霍梅尼主要依赖bazaar获取道德、金钱、人力支持。对动员大众关键的组织The Coalition of Mourning Associations就成立于德黑兰bazaar。

霍梅尼也吸引了一批lay Islamists在革命早期为其效力，这些人多数很快幻灭，认为自己被利用了。对霍梅尼和支持他的教士，这些西装革履的革命支持者是局外人，用完就扔。

Mahdi Bazargan: Bazargan’s “scientific” reading of Islamic doctrines and practices may well be attributed to his exposure to the revival of neo-Catholicism in France in the interwar period. His articulation of the existence of God based on the laws of quantum physics and his advocacy of the aerobic benefits of setting the daily prayers five times were just two examples. 尽管敬重霍梅尼，他是革命后的种种过火的批评者。就职八个月后辞职。

Ibrahim Yazdi：was instrumental in promoting his cause first within the university Islamic associations in the United States. In Paris he served as a prominent though informal spokesman for Khomeini. He was sidelined in the turbulent years that followed to the point of becoming an outcast and was labeled along with Bazargan as a “compromising liberal” (liberal-e sazeshkar).

Abol-Hasan Banisadr: With Khomeini’s implicit blessing, in February 1980 he was elected as first president of the Islamic Republic, only to be ousted in disgrace sixteen months later and driven out of the country into exile in France.

Sadeq Qotbzadeh: had an idealized view of political Islam that was dismissive of the conservative clergy. As a longtime advocate of Khomeini, and his fashionable facade for the Western media, he gained prominence after the revolution as the head of the NRTI broadcasting services and later as minister of foreign affairs; but he, too, soon witnessed his downfall. He was sent to the gallows in September 1982 on charges of conspiracy to stage a coup.

和毛拉们不同，Bazargan型的伊斯兰反对派相信渐进改变。远没毛拉们团结，在这点上吃大亏。对伊斯兰共和国早期的过渡不可或缺：软化了霍梅尼的形象。运行过渡政府，给没有经验的教士及其盟友时间大开政治胃口/学治国。但自始至终是局外人，利用完就被踢掉。

更年轻一代的lay activists忠于霍梅尼：Mohammad Ali Raja’i，Mir Hosein Musavi，Mostafa Chamran

Whereas Bazargan and his cohorts were shaped by the National Movement of the 1940s and 1950s, the younger activists mostly remembered and idealized the revolt of the 1960s led by Khomeini and were motivated by the 1960s guerilla warfare and radical trends in the Arab world.

霍梅尼在下中产和穷人中很有吸引力。The “disinherited” (mostaz‘afin) of the land, 视其为大救星。It was these multitudes and their strength in numbers that kept him in power despite all odds.

把the “disinherited of the earth”和 the “arrogant”、the taghut（偶像崇拜者，指巴列维政权）对立起来。正邪大战叙事。By underscoring this dichotomy, Khomeini and his supporters consciously aimed to dismantle the Marxist-inspired vocabulary of dissent, which the left perceived as an inevitable outcome of the revolution. In contrast to the left’s vision of a class struggle, Khomeinists advocated a moral struggle along the path of God, a struggle that shaped history of humanity, a sacred movement driven by faith and by “commitment” (ta’ahhod).

精明狡猾，善于抓住机遇。Assertive and intimidating, he was a quick study, adjusting to new realities, negotiating when the situation called for it, and persuading others by means of coercion, intrigue, and charm. Seemingly distant but seductive, in his advanced age he was resolute, confident, and mostly uncompromising. Discreet, emotionally detached, and ruthless when need be, he mesmerized his audiences and won them over with seeming effortlessness.

To most Iranian people, who for decades had not seen a turbaned man in a position of power, Khomeini appeared unique. Often unsmiling, his piercing eyes underneath frowning eyebrows, his monotonous but solemn voice—which betrayed a central Persian countryside accent with an Arabicized mullah intonation—spawned an image of an ascetic from bygone times. To many of his countrymen, such unconventionality was awe inspiring, even terrifying, and yet appealing. The ayatollah’s coterie was smart enough to capitalize on this image, and Khomeini cleverly allowed them to do so.

The Shi‘i messianic motifs behind Khomeini’s image as “imam of the community” were unmistakable—motifs that inspired millions to call on him to save the country and the world.

霍梅尼适应力极强，采纳各家概念，采取多种策略和政治手段，吸收各种思潮和语汇：激进左派的，异议知识分子的，激进伊斯兰人士的，媒体的，甚至军事术语，用到他自己的ideology里。

从霍梅尼的声明和行为猜测，1977年初的时候他还希望政治空间开放，兑现constitutional order。到1978年初，已经开始考虑在革命中扮演更重要的角色：the prime mover behind a revolution mandated by the Iranian people and governed by Islamic principles.

That Khomeini became the Imam of the Islamic Revolution and its “guardian” (wali) was particularly remarkable, given the connotations of both terms in the Shi‘i messianic context. 什叶历史上从来没有其它mojtahed/主流人物采用过Imam的title，或者被信徒这么称呼。理论上霍梅尼的title是 “deputy of the Imam” (na’eb-e Imam), 但平时都直接用Imam称呼, and that was what mattered in a revolutionary environment.

In effect, it may be argued, the revolution finally brought the messianic process within Shi‘ism to a head. The Mahdi paradigm was employed not by a charismatic prince-warrior like Islam‘il I, the founder of the Safavid Shi‘i state. Nor did an antinomian Noqtavi Qalandar claim it or Sayyed ‘Ali Mohammad Shirazi, the Bab. Rather, here a representative of the jurist orthodox establishment, a mojtahed and a marja‘, crossed the longprotected boundaries of normative and messianic Shi‘ism to appropriate the mantel of the prophet and become the savior of an Islamic revolution.

15 CONSOLIDATION OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC (1979–1984)

In less than a year after victory of the revolution in February 1979, the new regime managed to consolidate its base, build new institutions, and eliminate its contenders for power.

温和派和激进派分裂，各种辞职、冲突、逮捕、叛变。伊斯兰共和国成立七个月，霍梅尼就开掉了过渡政府首相Mahdi Bazargan。不到两年，霍梅尼的强硬支持者就把相对温和的第一任总统Abol-Hasan Banisadr及其盟友赶走，基本把所有左翼力量肃清。禁掉，或者边缘化所有温和教士/世俗声音，清洗、关押、处决旧政权支持者。成千上万的中产阶级被迫自我流放。清洗教育系统，重新定义文教。

巴列维同情者和左翼知识分子都以为霍梅尼政权不会长久。和他们的预测相反，新政权 managed to frame a new order, put it in place, and sustain it against all odds.

The powerful Shi‘i paradigm of sacred leadership no doubt was at work. Yet contrary to its basic premises, Khomeini was neither martyred nor persecuted. On the contrary, his proved a story of unparalleled success. Perhaps no other prophetic figure in the course of Iran’s religious history, not even Isma‘il I, the founder of the Safavid dynasty, was as triumphant.

The hostage crisis gave the new regime a much-needed propaganda tool to claim triumph over a superpower; The Iraqi invasion, in contrast, rallied the Iranian public behind the regime and enabled it to wage a patriotic war; The assassinations of prominent figures such as Motahhari and Beheshti offered the regime a chance to appear victimized while giving it license to act more vehemently.

最早面对革命暴力的：“collaborators” of the Pahlavi regime. 任何人，只要有钱+世俗化，都是潜在的怀疑对象。

纷纷设立革命委员会、革命法庭。四处抄家。实际是简单粗暴的革命正义，或者更粗暴的，财富再分配。有的革命委员会成员是真诚的，有的是趁机混入的流氓恶棍，各种敲诈勒索。革命领导层放任之。Some mullahs were behind komitehs’ egregious conduct, and others partook in their spoils.

1979年5月，成立Revolutionary Guards Corps。The Revolutionary Corps was organized not only to purge membership of the komitehs of the undesirable elements of the lefts but also, more important, to act as a counterweight to the regular Iranian armed forces, or what was left of them. 担心军队政变，成立忠于自己的武装力量，抗衡保皇派和左派。

The new Revolutionary Guards Corps组织粗，没经验。Yet by late 1981, 成功镇压首都Mojahedin反对力量。By 1983, hundreds of young Mojahedin, male and female, were killed and thousands more were arrested, tortured, and executed in the prisons of the Islamic Republic. 两伊战争中和常规部队并肩作战。

大量“国有化”工业、没收来的土地和财产都受Revolutionary Guards控制。政权生存的最重要保障力量。

革命法庭：1979年2月革命胜利后立即成立。打击所谓的反革命力量。霍梅尼任命的教士担任法官。既当法官又当检察官。没什么程序正义可言。

巴列维时代的刑法和民法被彻底抛弃，replaced by “pristine justice”. 革命法庭的判决合法化政权暴力。前首相Hovayda还为自己辩护，法官Sadeq Khalkhali毫无反应。 After several days of hearings, unusual for Khalkhali’s courts, the court delivered a verdict of execution but out of public sight.

Sadeq Khalkhali是革命倒向系统暴力的象征。受害者除了前巴列维官员，军官，还有世俗nationalist，少数民族nationalist，巴哈伊教徒，毒贩，妓女，同性恋，不守规矩者。

Khalkhali was no less active in the realm of cultural hatemongering. 和伊朗前伊斯兰时代的统治者有仇，谴责Cyrus the Great，试图推平Persepolis和其它古代遗迹。His campaign was stopped, miraculously, because of local resistance. 摧毁Reza Shah的陵墓。

By the summer of 1979, four interrelated themes began to emerge that helped shape revolutionary Iran: 霍梅尼支持者在深度伊斯兰化的宪法的撑腰下占领权力金字塔顶端；更加好斗（无路是伊斯兰政权还是激进左派），温和人士出局，解体新闻出版业和政治党派；反西方情绪爆发，高潮是人质危机，美国成为much-needed hostile Other；通过没收和国有化，建立强大的国有经济，革命政权的力量大增。

Two influential advisers(Banisadr, Beheshti) to the Imam preferred a plebiscite for acquiring a popular mandate. The idea met resistance from the Bazargan government and its allies who, honoring their earlier promises, insisted on convening a constituent assembly. Demanding an elected constituent assembly, they entertained the naive hope that through a popular vote they would control the assembly and refashion the draft constitution to their own liking.

Despite initial uncertainties, the Assembly of Experts (Majles Khebrehgan) was nevertheless elected in August 11, 1979, to draft a new constitution. A number of candidates from among the left and the liberals were virtually barred from campaigning, and some twenty parties and groups boycotted the election altogether.

宪法第一稿：承认霍梅尼革命领导的地位，但是没提设置the gurdian jurist职位，也没有把教士升格为神权统治精英的意思。最终权威落在大众选出的总统身上，行政权力则由总理行使。Assembly of Experts（dominated by candidates of the newly founded Islamic Republican Party）斟酌商议后：a document much more authoritarian in substance than the first draft, Islamicized in language, and patriarchal in orientation.

新草案的核心：确立the guardian jurist（an office above the president and above the Islamic Consultative Assembly）的最高权威。Though he was to be designated by the clergy dominated Assembly of Experts, he was not accountable to any other elected body—a free agent with almost a divine mandate.

The preamble to the constitution left no doubt about its theocratic grounding.

Despite the full theocratic grounding of the constitution, affirmed by the clerically dominated Assembly of Experts, ample contradictions pervaded the text. 宪法里的神权成分和民主成分对比鲜明，无法调和。

Of some consequent gravity for Iran’s future were articles concerning the perceived Islamic economic model for the Islamic Republic. Most palpable was an unresolved tension between a centralized and bureaucratized state-dominated economy with quasi-socialist characteristics, on the one hand, and a free market economy supposedly adherent to principals of Islamic law, on the other. 东欧国家和中国的计划经济模式影响了伊斯兰宪法的制定者。

On the whole, the constitution of the Islamic Republic proved ideologically too burdened, conceptually too inconsistent, and practically too nonfunctional to guide, oversee, and regulate the emerging institutions of the state.

It was a sad irony that less than a year after the collapse of the Pahlavi regime, dubbed in revolutionary lingo as “idol-worshipping tyranny,” Iranians were to be subjected to a theocracy with far broader constitutional powers compared to what assigned to the monarch in the old constitution even after the 1948 amendment.

Responding to the radical mood of the time, persistent demands of the radical left, and backed by a constitution that essentially called for a state-run economy, in July 1979, on the spur of the moment, the provisional government “nationalized” (or more appropriately, confiscated) fifty-one of Iran’s largest private industries, businesses, and agricultural conglomerates. All banks and insurance companies were also declared nationalized.

1979年3月，霍梅尼下令成立Mostaz’afan Foundation。后来成为控制各行各业各种公私财产的巨无霸。以低效浪费裙带风盛行著称。

新精英：主要是ayatollahs的孩子和亲属，高官的亲属，和政权关系密切的bazaar活动家，两伊战争老兵，men with a convincing-enough Islamic lineage.

革命法官无视并违反几百年来传统什叶律法非常重视的财产权法律。Revolutionary fervor and ideological turpitude quickly overcame any concern for restraint, a principle often emphasized in Islamic law, especially with reference to people’s lives and properties.

国家控制所有基建、服务业（能源，水，通信，交通），类似于社会主义centralized经济，国家控制运行各类产业，包括钢铁、石化、食品、分销、零售。

承诺为穷人提供免费住房，引起穷人和下中产大量涌向更大的城市。申请者过多，远超实际接纳能力，免费住房计划大失败。

国家干预商业比巴列维时代更甚。

把有利可图的资产分给忠于新政权者（作为奖励），以及被视为“insiders”的个人与家庭。

转折点：1979年11月初过渡政府辞职. It illustrated the failure of the liberal Islamist narrative, a legacy of the National Movement of the earlier decades, in harnessing the revolution’s contentious forces.

The combination of the hostage crisis, the ongoing power struggle in the regime, and the Iraqi invasion posed a severe ordeal to an infant regime already suffering from international isolation. In retrospect, these crises helped further solidify the hard-liners’ hold over the revolution and its emerging organs of coercion and control.

Though Banisadr was a longtime supporter of Khomeini, in his own right he was an advocate of a peculiarly utopian outlook that fell between Islamic activism and liberal nationalism with a socialist coloring. Once Banisadr failed to take advantage of the momentum of the first month or two of his presidency, when he still had a chance to turn the popular tide against the stifling political space, he became a target of many justified and unjustified attacks. Soon he appeared more like the leader of a rowdy and dissatisfied opposition party than the president of the republic.

1980年3月15日第一届Islamic Consultative Assembly选举（with the majority of deputies unfavorable toward the president），加深了Banisadr和强硬人士之间的裂隙。主要就总理提名任命问题争执。In the months that followed, the tug-of-war between the two sides revealed an ideological chasm that degenerated into a full-blown constitutional crisis.

为了抗衡Islamic Revolutionary Party，Banisadr逐渐倒向Mojahedin阵营，采取其anticlerical立场, a move that proved fatal to his presidency and his political career.

1981年3月5日（Mosaddeq忌日），Banisadr在德黑兰大学的集会上演讲，more clearly revealed the irreconcilable rift with the Khomeinist camp。集会受到手持大棒的暴徒的干扰，和在场的Mojahedin-e Khalq、National Front人士发生冲突。演讲中批评了革命法庭和绑架人质者，谴责了干扰集会的暴徒。亲霍梅尼媒体负面报道集会及冲突。缺乏大众支持，Banisadr迅速失势。媒体攻击他再无顾忌。

1981年6月，议会弹劾Banisadr，on charges of incompetence, ill intentions, and defiance toward the guardian jurist, all charges carrying a subtext of treason. Banisadr被解职。Banisadr躲到Mojahedin领导Mas‘ud Rajavi家里，后来和后者一起逃到巴黎（驾驶飞机的是Shah以前的私人飞行员…）。

Mojahedin-e Khalq、Marxist Fada’iyan、Maoist Paykar、National Front、Freedom Movement、Tudeh Party均被清洗。

The ten-month-long coup de grace of 1981–1982 can thus justifiably be seen as the third stage of the revolution. While February 1979 brought down the Pahlavi ancien régime and the hostage crisis wiped out the “step-by-step” Bazargan model, the fall of Banisadr and the purging of the opposition—coinciding with mass mobilization for the war with Iraq—brought the greatest concentration of power into the hands of the hard-liner Khomeinists.

反Banisadr阵营的主力：Mohammad Beheshti，Rafsanjani，Khalkhali

从一开始霍梅尼及其亲信就不待见Mojahedin。Mojahedin早期和Taleqani走得近也没用。Mojahedin是反对派里最强的力量。

Mojahedin’s amalgam of idealized but selective Islamic teachings, romantic readings of early Shi‘i history drenched in martyr worship, via ‘Ali Shari‘ati, and a watered-down Marxist-Leninist theory of class struggle with a veneer of a socialist political economy was appealing.

Despite being cultish and hierarchical, to the point of a resembling a fascist party, the Mojahedins’ appeal to young women and men lay in their seemingly liberating message, which contrasted starkly with the male-dominated, paternalistic Islam of the Khomeinists. In reality, the Mojahedin had become an Islamicized answer to the demands of a younger generation for agency. Breaking gender barriers and allowing a greater mix of the sexes under an Islamic canopy and a collectivized morality code was the key.

清洗反对派，Mojahedins选择武装反抗。Mojahedins和真主党以及革命卫队发生暴力冲突。大量成员在街头战斗中死亡。Hundreds of Mojahedin, along with Fada’iyan and Paykar, and their sympathizers, were summarily tried and sent before firing squads or hanged inside the Evin prison and other detention centers.

革命法官Mohammad Mohammadi Gilani臭名昭著，对自己儿子也不手软。Asadollah Lajevardi赢得“Evin屠夫”美誉。

By mid-1982, the tail end of the Mojahedin insurgency, the regime’s draconian measures had successfully created an environment of terror detrimental to any show of sympathy toward any popular cause.

1981年6月28日，炸弹袭击Islamic Republican Party总部。炸死Mohammad Beheshti。两个月后炸死总统Mohammad ‘Ali Raja’i和总理Mohammad Javad Bahonar。

炸弹袭击（可能是Mojahedin agents干的），反而让公众更加同情Khomeinists。激发对反对派前所未有的严厉镇压。

1981年6月，霍梅尼谴责National Front领导人为叛教者，因其号召集会反对议会通过law of Islamic retribution。On a broader scheme, the National Front was being punished for holding Khomeini accountable for the climate of intimidation and terror. 到1982年夏，大部分National Front前领导要么被抓要么流亡。

The Freedom Movement had been saved only barely by renouncing its old comrades in the National Front.

革命早期，liberal nationalists曾以为霍梅尼一派支持民主，后来后悔不迭。

National Democratic Front(a competing political coalition loyal to Mosaddeq’s memory)被贴上异端标签。

Tudeh像其它左翼，还有自由主义知识分子一样，以为毛拉们不会长久。1982年，KGB间谍Vladimir Kuzichkin叛逃英国，供出Tudeh领导层及渗透情况。1983年CIA为了示好伊朗，一起反苏，把信息提供给了伊朗。大逮捕，领导层电视认罪。

1982年4月：逮捕霍梅尼阵营资深成员、前外交部长Sadeq Qotbzadeh。被捕受审，电视认罪。被指控搞政变，处死。

The Muslim People’s Republican Party, a once-powerful rival to the ruling Islamic Republican Party, was another victim. 逮捕支持者Ayatollah Mohammad-Kazem Shari‘atmadari，电视认罪。This was the first time in the history of clerical Shi‘ism that an institutional hierarchy was set with punitive repercussions for violating it.

Hojjatiyeh Society也遭清洗（力度相对较轻）。

到1983年，基本所有的独立报纸期刊都被关闭。（1980年时十分繁荣，有超过一百种刊物）

控制文教系统：Purging all “uncommitted” faculty, staff, and students from institutes of higher education and Islamization of education at all levels soon became a major preoccupation of the Islamic Republic. At the core of what came to be known as the Cultural Revolution (Enqelab-e Farhangi) stood a deep resentment of the secular educational system that had emerged since the turn of the twentieth century.

可能受中国文化大革命启发影响— the Iranian version was far tamer, less bloody, and largely concerned with control of educational levers at all levels.

By mid-1981, in actions parallel to ousting Banisadr and crushing Mojahedin, mobs in Tehran and other provinces randomly attacked university campuses, beating up and injuring students, driving out the left from their offices and paramilitary bases, and in turn occupying campuses. 1980年6月4日，council下令关闭全国大学。关了三年，给清洗undesirable elements以充足时间。

人文社科教授受清洗最厉害： 被指控协助西方文化入侵，或者生活方式“不伊斯兰”。

The regime’s grip over the educational system, and especially over higher education, steadily grew and became further institutionalized over the coming decades.

Even more drastic was the Islamification of the curricula, the other urgent task of the Cultural Revolution.

歪曲伊朗现代史：把Reza Shah时代说得一无是处，rather, it had caused Iran’s educated middle classes to deviate from the path of Islam. Ironically, the authors of these textbooks and a whole host of the radical Khomeinists were the ungrateful by-products of this same middle class.

A succession of encounters between clerical activism and secular modernity, always corrupt and deviant, offered a modern version of a Shi‘i passion play (ta‘ziyeh) with a providential touch, one that was destined to bring Ayatollah Khomeini to the stage as the ultimate savior of centuries of clerical service and sacrifice

By late 1983 the regime had succeeded in silencing virtually all voices of political opposition that had helped bring it to power only four years earlier. All autonomy-seeking ethnic voices in the country including Kurdish, Azari, Turkmen, and Sunni Arab natives of Khuzestan, were efficiently extinguished. Compared to the experiences of earlier revolutionary regimes in Europe and elsewhere, the Islamic Republic’s success was impressive.

新政权如此成功的因素：The key to this remarkable sustenance may be attributed to the crucial presence of Khomeini as a revolutionary prophet. He brought to bear, above all, a high degree of group cohesion.

Group cohesion was complemented by organization and leadership of a strong state. Though revolutionary institutions were chaotic and clerical leadership decentralized, and even flawed, there was enough organization and financial resources, thanks to income from soaring oil prices in the early 1980s, to allow the new regime to consolidate.

This was a Qom-based style of rule because it was grounded in centuries of madrasa solidarity and decades of isolation from sources of political power.

In resilience or shrewdness this clerical community had no rivals, not even the Mojahedin who nurtured unquestioned organizational loyalties and doctrinal certitude.

Solidarity and manipulation aside, the new regime benefited tremendously from public support and patriotic sympathies generated by the war against Iraq. Most Iranians saw Khomeini as the only legitimate leader who could steer their country through the treacherous waters to victory over a menacing Iraqi invader and its real or imagined Western backers.

16 FACING THE FOE: THE HOSTAGE CRISIS, THE IRAQ-IRAN WAR, AND THE AFTERMATH (1979–1989)

人质危机和两伊战争：前者offered the Islamic regime a chance to symbolically engage a superpower；后者a calamity that adversely affected lives of Iranians and Iraqis alike。Yet both events boosted Khomeini’s uncompromising stance and helped consolidate his Islamic order at the expense of his contenders.

Khomeinists exploited the hostage crisis, and the assumed threat of “world-devouring” America, to steal the show from the left, the first to “expose” the great powers’ “sinister imperialist plots.” The war, in contrast, helped silence any contestation of clerical supremacy by labeling it “traitorous.” The experience of defending the “Islamic homeland,” moreover, gave new legitimacy to the regime, which basked in its patriotic glow, and helped raise a generation of veterans tied to the Islamic Republic through sacrifice and blood.

444天的人质危机，一面大损伊朗的国际形象地位，另一面让霍梅尼阵营受益匪浅。

劫持使馆的学生满脑子阴谋论：指责大使馆是间谍窝，搞政变，要复辟Shah。Bazargan和美国大使的会面、 Ibrahim Yazdi和美国国务卿的会面、Bazargan和布热津斯基的会面 在学生眼里都十分可疑。后来被用来攻击临时政府。

革命期间激进左翼曾两次试图占领美大使馆均不成功。主要是为了吸引眼球增加曝光度。很快被激进伊斯兰人士学到。

人质危机的语汇：part of the widespread neology of the early revolutionary days, was a joint product of the left and the Khomeinists.

Occupying the US embassy was a bold move by the Students of the Imam Line to outmaneuver competing trends on the fast-changing revolutionary stage.

To the surprise of many, Bazargan included, Khomeini unabashedly backed the takeover of the embassy not only as a valiant move by the committed Islamic youth but also a preemptive measure to “expose” the American “satanic” plots in the hand of “spies” masked as diplomats. 霍梅尼借此削弱过渡政府。

The first victim of the hostage crisis, predictably, was the provisional government. 人质危机发生次日辞职。其实十月底就已经在komitehs的骚扰、Revolutionary Council的竞争、马克思主义者和伊斯兰左翼的攻击下瘫痪。

学生千方百计从大使馆文件里寻找阴谋证据。What eventually did emerge out of this frantic exercise in exposing “malicious imperialist intrigues” were many published volumes of Asnad-e Laneh-ye Jasusi (Documents from the Den of Spies), demonstrating years of close US monitoring of Iran’s domestic affairs and regional developments. 常规情报采集，在学生眼里是间谍活动铁证。

大使馆文件：美国人不太关注革命政权人事和伊斯兰激进分子动态，更关注新政权的国内国外影响: the potential Soviet benefits from the fall of the shah, security of the Persian Gulf, and consequences of the reactivation of the Tudeh Party and various other brands of Marxism in Iran. 主要视霍梅尼为煽动暴民者而不是潜在死敌，视Bazargan为外交关系正常化的可能合作伙伴。没多少对过去错误的承认，没提啥对失去Shah的弥补措施。

For the students and the captivated Iranian public, the hostage episode first appeared as a triumph, a preemptive move to avert another 1953 coup. But from the start the crisis decidedly tilted the political discourse toward greater militancy as the students successfully adopted the rhetoric and techniques of the left.

Now the frequently uttered slogan in the rallies, “Death to America” (marg bar Amrika), a relic of the Tudeh slogans of the 1950s, was matched by Khomeini’s fiery denunciation of America as the “Great Satan” (shaytan-e bozorg).

Great Satan的指控：may have been rooted more in Cold War propaganda than in an Islamic notion of Satan.

类似于Safavid时期的anti-Sunni宣传：The cursing of the Caliphs and other desecrations of Sunni symbols were rooted in the vulnerability of the new Shi‘i state versus the military might of the Ottoman Empire in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Anti-Sunni propaganda not only reflected anxiety about Ottoman hegemony but also generated legitimacy for the new Safavid state. It consolidated its social base and allowed it to eliminate its real and potential rivals.

To define its identity in moments of crisis, Shi‘ism has relied on an element of social cohesion, charismatic leadership, a persecution narrative, and an external Other, real or imagined. Here in the Islamic revolution, the alien Other reappeared as a demonized United States so as to allow for the political legitimacy of the Shi‘i clerical body and secure its ascendency.

美国大使馆门口的地摊卖各种小册子：an iconic representation of a revolutionary culture in the making, with its diverse origins and curious readership in search of a political identity.

1980年4月24日Operation Eagle Claw失败。This was a huge discredit to President Carter and the Carter administration even though in retrospect it displayed his sound judgment to abort the operation. The perception of divine intervention projected a sense of invincibility onto Khomeini’s image and vastly boosted his revolutionary resolve.

The Iraqi regime’s aggression, however, added an ideological facet to the ancient border tension along the Zagros range.

Saddam’s Tikrit clique, in particular, was brimming with racial and cultural hatred for “Persians” (‘Ajam). They were viewed as historical enemies of the “Arabs,” who, despite defeat and humiliation in the early days of the Islamic era, according to the Ba‘athist narrative, persisted over the centuries and encroached on Iraq’s Arab supremacy. 萨达姆把进攻伊朗的行动命名为Qadisiya，当年击败萨珊波斯的关键战役的名字。

Iran’s historical claims over the Shi‘i holy sites and the Shi‘i community of Iraq added to the Ba‘athist resentment. That by the 1960s and 1970s tens of thousands of Shi‘is with dual Iranian-Iraqi identities were residing in the pilgrimage cities of southern Iraq further injured Ba‘athist sensibilities.

Shatt al-Arab争议：In July 1980, a week after the shah’s death in a Cairo hospital, Saddam appeared on Baghdad television denouncing the earlier settlement with Iran and shredding the Algiers Declaration. Shatt al-Arab, he claimed, was in Iraqi territory in its entirety. Sole access to the two-hundred-mile waterway not only offered Iraq strategically secure access to the Persian Gulf but also exacted a major blow on Iran’s commercial shipping and access to the Persian Gulf along its southeastern province of Khuzestan.

萨达姆还想吞并有40%说阿拉伯语人群的Khuzestan省：Although a leftist-inspired and Iraqisponsored secessionist movement known as Jibhat al-Tahrir (liberation front) flickered briefly in the early months of the revolution, there was virtually no support inside Khuzestan for Saddam or Ba‘athism, even among Sunnis of the province.

萨达姆害怕伊朗输出革命：1979年初，萨达姆曾祝贺霍梅尼革命成功，还邀请Bazargan访问巴格达，但在霍梅尼号召输出革命后，很快转为敌对态度。 伊拉克境内存在愿意和伊朗人合作的Da‘wa Party。

Baghdad’s extreme measures had the reverse effect, for it heightened anti-Ba‘athist sentiments in revolutionary Iran and further blackened Saddam’s image as a brutal tyrant.

尽管同情伊斯兰革命，大批什叶派伊拉克人加入伊拉克军队抗击伊朗并失去生命。

反对伊朗新政权的流亡人士，如General Gholam-‘Ali Oveysi，Shapur Bakhtiar，视萨达姆为潜在合作伙伴。希望伊拉克入侵能帮助巴列维复辟。

革命中途，外国入侵，让多数伊朗人团结起来支持新政权。As it turned out, the “sacred defense” (defa‘-e moqaddas), as it soon was labeled, became a blessing to a regime.

除了People’s Mojahedin受到萨达姆支持，整个两伊战争期间没有通敌叛逃的现象。就算寄希望于萨达姆的Shah时期高级军官也很快放弃。

战争初期：军事行动受到常规部队和Revolutionary Guards之间的竞争，以及国内权斗的影响。

宣传机器优先报道Revolutionary Guards。Soon emerging as a powerful arm of the Islamic state, the Revolutionary Guard Corps relied on its militia spirit and organizational spontaneity, extensive indoctrination, and generous state funding to compensate for the lack of experience and training of its new recruits.

1981年9月：伊朗军队解围Abadan。12月，伊朗常规部队推回西线和西北线的伊拉克军队。

1982年5月：Revolutionary Guards和Basij志愿者夺回已经被毁的港口Khorramshahr。It was a drama of blood and martyrdom that boosted Iranian morale rather than having huge strategic value.

收复失地并占上风，此时伊朗可以胜利结束战争。Yet the war continued for reasons beyond defense of the “Islamic motherland”.

大量缺乏训练的年轻志愿者死亡。The “human waves”—or “cannon fodder” as cynics called it— mostly consisted of young volunteers spearheading counterattacks, or, more accurately, sent off on suicidal missions by Revolutionary Guard commanders and low-ranking clergy.

Tehran’s Behesht-e Zahra cemetery, where the largest number of war victims was laid to rest, displayed the state’s appropriation of the cult of martyrdom.

Hundreds of bridal canopies, known as hejleh, were set up wherever a young unmarried war victim lived, often in low-income neighborhoods. These canopies were meant to celebrate the figurative wedding of a fallen warrior, a moving reference to Shi‘i lore visualizing the unconsumed wedding of Qasim, the young son of Hasan ibn ‘Ali, the Second Imam, who fell in the Battle of Karbala in 680. A whole mournful funerary cult enveloped war martyrdom reflected in posters, films, and propaganda literature.

对战争的视觉表现强调当代的牺牲和早期什叶受难史的联系。大型壁画随处可见Karbala场景。Painted in dramatic settings and bright colors, they evoked a cross between popular narrative paintings (carried by dervish storytellers) and the publicity murals made for low-priced movies of the prerevolutionary cinema.

Beyond murals, war propaganda elevated martyrdom to a new eschatological plane. To further dramatize the messianic connotation of the “battle of good versus evil,” 宣传报道重大反击战役后战士看见马赫迪(Imam of the Age)穿白衣骑白马显灵。Even if this was a mere wartime myth, its wide reportage by word of mouth implied an implicit desire to elevate the war to a messianic cause.

A common venue for such sentiments was in martyrs’ last testaments (vasiyat-namehs), which appeared in newspapers and propaganda publications of the Islamic Republic. 成为一种genre，有明显的模式。Mostly written by the Basij recruits in their late teens and early twenties, they imbued innocence but also fascination with the battlefield. Invariably, they affirmed faith in Hosain, the Third Imam, as lord of the martyrs. The cult of Hosain was omnipresent.

1982年6月，战争第一阶段结束，伊朗占上风，有政治和战略优势。但是拒绝萨达姆派来的讲和者的停火协议。转守为攻，开始战争第二阶段。The momentum, driven by general euphoria after pushing back the Iraqis, served as a vehicle for Khomeini to project his revolutionary vision beyond his own country.

The Ba‘athist regime enjoyed the general blessing of countries of the Western bloc throughout the war and in contrast to a spirit of belligerence aimed at Iran.

1984年初，伊朗占上风：不光派兵多/军事策略更高一筹，士气高和大量牺牲也是因素。Deceived by its momentary successes, however, soon the Iranian leadership, and above all Khomeini, had to face the harsh reality as the Iraqis’ revived spirit of resistance countered Iran’s repeated offensives inside Iraq.

1984年，萨达姆使用化学武器（里根和撒切尔政府都为伊拉克制造化学武器提供方便）。西方国家不怎么谴责萨达姆，倒是谴责伊朗是co-offender of the chemical ban。

当伊朗在伊拉克境内攻势加强时，西方国家加强对萨达姆的支持，以对抗伊朗输出革命。The warming up in relations with Iraq came at the time when the Ba‘athist regime’s genocidal campaigns in the operation code name al-Anfal had begun. 1988年萨达姆对库尔德人使用化学武器，西方政客和媒体怀疑是伊朗干的。

1984-1985: 双方都没什么进展。消耗战又打了四年，陷入僵局。伊拉克1984年4月再次试图进行停火谈判，霍梅尼拒绝和萨达姆见面。

1984年底以后，战略上，政治上，道德上，伊朗都没有理由继续战争，但是霍梅尼想要除掉萨达姆，彻底推翻其Ba‘athist政权。His messianic vision perhaps called for advancing to the lands beyond in the hopes of liberating the Quds（耶路撒冷） from Zionist occupation. Numerous war murals, posters, and signposts along the front read “Through Karbala to Quds.”

伊朗政府拒绝谈判，尽管萨达姆的阿拉伯支持者（科威特，沙特，阿联酋）提出愿意给伊朗巨额战争赔款，which in effect was an admission of Iraqi guilt.

In Khomeini’s eyes, the odds were greatly in favor of his revolutionary crusade, and the prospect of victory for his “dear Islam” was high. 希望以攻占伊拉克的什叶圣城作为革命的sacred drama的终局，不能接受和敌人讲和。

Despite Khomeini’s lofty wishes, the fate of the war shifted once more in favor of Iraq. In the third and final stage of the war, between 1985 and 1988, Saddam began for the first time since 1982 a new offensive in which he was not alone. 除了西方国家和海湾富国，苏联也重新支持萨达姆。

In what came to be known as the “War of the Cities,” thousands were killed on both sides, and tens of thousands turned into internally displaced refugees. 双方用导弹轰炸平民。

伊朗偷偷从以色列和美国购买武器（里根和CIA同意）酿成丑闻。

Fearing the collapse of the Iraqi regime, late in 1983 and again in March 1984, two delegations headed by then US special envoy to the Middle East, Donald Rumsfeld, visited Baghdad to normalize relations and offer help in Iraq’s war efforts.

Most controversial was the US role in facilitating Iraq’s chemical and biological weapon programs. In March 1984 the US delegation to the United Nations even went so far as to collude with Iraq in defeating an Iranian resolution in the Security Council that condemned Iraq’s use of chemical weapons on the battlefield.

By April 1988 US support for Saddam had effectively changed the fortune of the war in favor of Iraq and brought it closer to an end. Had it not been for the United States and its European allies, it may be argued, the war probably would have ended in 1984 or 1985 with a serious weakening, or possibly collapse, of the Ba‘athist regime.

到1988年初，据估算伊朗死亡总数已达到30万（伊拉克25万）。士气低落，精疲力尽，国际孤立，伊朗逐渐意识到已无法在不引起国内不满的情况下继续撑下去（高伤亡+巨额经济消耗）。

1988年7月3日发生击落伊朗客机事件。

1988年7月20日，接受呼吁各方结束敌对和撤军的安理会598号协议。

此时伊朗处在下风，国际上孤立，失去战略优势，是从不利位置接受停火的（without any explicit UN recognition of Iraq’s belligerence）。

In a rare admission of remorse, Khomeini declared that he had succumbed to the cease-fire as if drinking a “chalice of poison” (jam-e zahr), a tantalizing reference perhaps to Socrates’s death when condemned by the Athenian court.

The Iran-Iraq War can be seen as a clash of two ideologies, both manifestations of an evolving modern Middle East.

Ethnic loyalties and collective memories played their parts in the Iraq-Iran conflict, but what really fueled the war and enabled both sides to fight long and hard was the availability of economic resources generated in the main by oil revenues, despite the damages to both countries’ oil installations. Both regimes were able to quell the opposition and tighten their monopoly of power.

西方干预是为了确保波斯湾产油不受影响，也是为了在该地区取得对苏联的上风。

两伊战争没解决伊朗和伊拉克间的领土纠纷。Sovereignty over Shatt al-Arab remained unresolved at least officially.

War, in effect, vastly helped the Islamic Republic consolidate its military, propaganda and policing apparatuses, close constitutional loopholes, and increase ideological and economic control over society.

战争屈辱结束，必须再来一轮清洗了。1988年整个下半年，秘密处决至少4500名政治犯：manifestation of the regime’s insecurity and its unexhausted reservoirs of violence. In Khavaran cemetery, the mass graves of the 1988 victims were shared with graves of the Baha’is, the other “infidels” of the Islamic Republic.大量处决基本没引起内部反对，除了Ayatollah Hosain-‘Ali Montazeri.

1988年7月26日：萨达姆支持下的Mojahedin Khalq突袭Kermanshahan省。国际压力下萨达姆撤去空军掩护，exposing the Mojahedin to Iranian fighter jets and soon to the Revolutionary Guards’ airborne units landing behind their lines. Mojahedin不受伊朗平民欢迎，没人把他们当解放者。

革命胜利后很快开始对付非穆斯林社群：Jews, Armenians, and Zoroastrians, as well as Sunni Muslims, Sufis, the Ahl-e Haqq, and Shaykhis—did not remain untouched by the new regime’s rigorous segregationist policies.

伊斯兰共和国最初十年里处决了200名巴哈伊教徒，被逮捕拷打的就更多了。成千上万的人被骚扰，被抢劫，丢掉政府职位，不准上大学，财产被革命法庭没收，威胁下被迫抛弃信仰，失去养老金，被赶出村镇。

伊斯兰革命是对伊朗巴哈伊的重大打击。有钱的教徒革命后很快移民欧美，没钱的只能留在国内，接受越来越严的限制，和越来越多的羞辱。

巴哈伊教徒并不构成对伊斯兰共和国的政治威胁。但是在其它政治势力被镇压后，被视为强力内部敌人。以前指控主要以异端和叛教为主，从二十世纪中期起，指控越来越有政治色彩和阴谋论色彩。

早些年还指控巴哈伊教徒sexual transgressions。这是古代以来迫害宗教少数的常用手段。 Popularized relics of such smears found a new lease on life in the fertile imagination of the anti-Baha’i polemicists. 后来，道德指控渐渐减少，变成不忠/间谍/卖国指控。

巴哈伊教徒三十年代被指控是俄国走狗，五六十年代被指控是英国走狗，后来被指控为是美国走狗，以色列走狗。

巴哈伊world center和圣地位于现以色列境内，是其反对者眼里和英国-美国-锡安主义者勾结的铁证。

后宪政革命时期到巴列维时期早期，巴哈伊受歧视相对较轻，一部分城市巴哈伊取得较高社会经济地位。支持现代化，是巴列维时代的中产阶级的一部分。教育程度高，有资本，比较成功，和社会多数人拉开距离。Both the clergy and anti-Baha’i activists, such as the Hojjatiyeh Society, bemoaned the Baha’is’ acquired （limited）freedoms to preach their message. In effect, their enemies viewed Baha’is as a new challenge to Islamic superiority.

巴哈伊教徒不问政治，因此被怀疑和巴列维政权合作。被各种指控是幕后黑手：如操作Savak虐待其受害者，通过和当权者的紧密联系垄断财富和特权，和英美以情报部门合作

Deeper than doctrinal differences or conspiratorial obsessions, however, antagonism toward the Baha’i was representative of a shared heritage not only among Islamists but also among many intellectuals on the left, academics, and the public at large. The search for an enemy within, on whose shoulder could be placed all the faults of the past and fears for the future, was an exercise in self-indulgence familiar to cultures of victimization.

Iran-Contra Affair：What was remarkable about the whole affair was the degree of naïveté displayed by the White House in assessing the complexity of the Iranian situation and its predicament.

What was also remarkable was how shrewdly the leadership of the Islamic Republic managed to wave the scandalous aftereffects of Iran-Contra.

Concerned with the damage that exposure of the arms deal can cause, 逮捕处决因为反对秘密军购，把秘密军购泄露给黎巴嫩媒体的Mehdi Hashemi（Montazeri的亲信）。

Silencing Hashemi, and in turn Montazeri, only partially diverted the bewildered Iranian public. Other pretexts were needed to distract attention to another direction.

Rushdie affair：继续损害伊朗的国际形象，但拯救了霍梅尼在国内的不妥协伊斯兰圣斗士形象。

发布fatwa时霍梅尼已经确诊末期癌症，发布fatwa的可能动机：to leave behind a legacy of unbending militancy.

By calling on the “brave Muslims of the world” it was as if Khomeini instantaneously expanded the “abode of Islam” globally, a trend that was soon to be emulated by Muslim militants everywhere.

霍梅尼的fatwa违反什叶jurist处理亵渎的常规：there is near consensus that no opinion can be issued by an Islamic court before the accused is cross-examined in person, admitting or denying a charge of blasphemy brought against him or her; The text by itself, according to most jurists, does not carry sufficient weight for the issuance of a fatwa of blasphemy, let alone a death sentence; an overwhelming majority of Muslim jurists admit that repentance for first-time offenders is adequate grounds for recalling a death sentence, even in grave blasphemy cases.

只有Montazeri敢批评霍梅尼的fatwa：Montazeri dared to say that the people of the world thought of Iran as just in the business of killing people.

霍梅尼接班人Montazeri：gurdianship of the jurist最早的支持者之一。革命早期曾批评强硬派回避Bazargan。1981年曾试图与Mojahedin讲和。逐渐被排除出决策圈。

批评1988年大处决，谨慎向霍梅尼提出，处决既不符合sharia，也侵犯人权。

By early 1989 Montazeri had gone so far as to implicitly criticize Khomeini in public for denying people their rights and disregarding the revolution’s true values. 1989年3月28日辞职。回到Qom教书，后被软禁。从公众视野消失，被从革命叙事中抹去。2008年曾发布fatwa支持巴哈伊。

Montazeri’s fall was the last of the purges of Khomeini’s era and emblematic of the Islamic Republic’s relentless quest for regimented uniformity. That the clerical establishment, with few exceptions, rallied behind Khomeini on this issue, was not merely due to a climate of coercion and a demand for total loyalty. 教士统治集团为了特权放弃独立自主性。

1989年6月3日，霍梅尼病死。It was as if the public were not only mourning the loss of the Imam but also burying with Khomeini’s remains the revolutionary passions that had motivated a generation, brought people into the streets, and forever transformed Iranian society.

Khomeini’s most tangible and enduring contribution was his success in putting into practice the long-speculated-on idea of political Islam. The Islamic republic that he helped found was the first to emerge out of an ideological revolution, something that perhaps could emerge only in Shi‘i Iran.

At least three characteristics qualify the Islamic Revolution as a major revolutionary movement in modern times: it was based on mass mobilization and large-scale popular participation; in a remarkably short time, the Islamic Revolution managed to establish a new political order, nurture a new sociopolitical elite, and institutionalize its hierocracy despite serious domestic and external challenges; the Islamic Revolution offered a cultural program that included a curious mix of hard-line conservatism, anti-imperialist rhetoric, selective modernity, and conscious antisecularism.

Despite many signs of anachronism, the Islamic Republic put into practice a program of social engineering with enduring results.

17 SOCIETY AND CULTURE UNDER THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC

By the end of the first decade of the revolution, the privileged upper and middle classes of the Pahlavi era had been forced out of the political process and gradually replaced in the economic sector as well.

In place of the old elite, the new regime relied primarily on “traditional” middle and lower-middle classes loyal to the revolution.

They were mostly from families of religious orientation (mazhabi) with clerical or bazaar backgrounds, especially small retailers, and first- and second-generation rural migrants in Tehran and the provincial centers. Gradually, more were recruited or rose in the ranks from smaller towns and villages or from urban working classes or low-income government families.

The new state elite in the main belonged to a network that Khomeini and his associates had managed to foster in the 1960s and 1970s while he was in exile.

At the pinnacle of the new hierarchy were the Khomeinist clergy and the laymen close to them. Though a relatively tiny and often quarrelling group, they were conscious of their power and determined to preserve it.

A privileged group in the new elite included the children and close relatives of the ayatollahs, who, as ultimate “insiders,” stood to reap vast political and economic benefits. Referred to, somewhat sarcastically, as aqazadehs (offspring of [clerical] masters), these were characteristically laymen with modicum of education who came to overseeing the “house” of their fathers or fathers-in-law.

Competing with the aqazadeh elite for privilege and power were the newcomers who earned their insider status through revolutionary credentials. Mostly from urban working classes and rural origins, they were veterans of the Iraq-Iran War who often served as commanders of Revolutionary Guard and basij units, or revolutionaries in the formative years of the revolution who proved their radical merits and their loyalty to the regime.

Yet despite the regime’s success in building a new elite with an exclusionary mind-set, it was not as successful in creating a totalitarian state on the classical model.

The inner complexity of the regime, and its drive toward hegemony, required more time beyond Khomeini’s era. Decades after his demise the regime witnessed tension, primarily within its own ranks, between the hard-liners, steadfast in their support for the Supreme Leader, ‘Ali Khamenei, and the “reformists,” hopeful to introduce a more inclusive outlook.

Contrary to the promises of the revolution, political leadership by most standards remained oligarchic; a relatively coherent structure that vetted admission to the system by such institutional means as the Guardian Council. Even though ideological and factional tensions within the ruling elite at times have brought about surprising results, by and large the insider versus outsider divide has remained intact.

Population growth and urbanization were vital forces in the shaping of the Islamic Revolution and how it evolved in its first decade of consolidation. The multitudes that rallied against the shah and later for the Islamic Republic were mostly younger than twenty-five years of age. Most of the army conscripts, the Revolutionary Guards, and the Basij volunteers who fought during the Iraq-Iran War, too, were predominantly from the same undertwenty-five age group.

On a broader scope, it is important to note that at no time in Iran’s past half millennium had there been more favorable demographics for a revolutionary change: a reservoir of a vigorous urban population ready to rise for a cause. Neither in sixteenth-century Tabriz of Isma‘il’s era, nor in Tehran and Tabriz of the Constitutional era or in Tehran and other provincial centers during the National Movement of the early 1950s did such a demographic concentration with a thirst for political participation exist.

In June 1979 creation of the Jihad-e Sazandegi (or the Construction Crusade), a revolutionary organization that intended to utilize engineering and technological expertise among the university faculty and students, engaged in an ambitious number of developmental and public construction projects in remote, often impoverished, towns and villages of Iran. As it turned out, the Construction Crusade, by building roads and enhancing communications, virtually paved the way for the faster movement of population from countryside to cities.

The state’s near monopoly on resources, and revenues from oil and natural gas in particular, combined with its centralized economy, heavily bureaucratized government structure, and poor policy making, were all reminiscent of planned economies of the 1950s and 1960s.

The Islamic Republic in effect augmented manifold the malaise of the Pahlavi state and its economy. Despite industrialization, the Iranian economy became even more dependent on oil income, which further increased the concentration of capital and decision making in the hands of the state and its agencies.

The election of Mohammad Khatami (b. 1943) to the presidency in June 1997 and his promises of civil society, rule of law, tolerance, and sociocultural openness was in effect a response to the wishes of younger Iranians who were disillusioned with the rhetoric and realities of the Islamic leadership.

Enjoying the momentum, these “religious reformers,” as they generally defined themselves, were revisionists who believed that the Islamic Republic could be a more tolerant and pluralistic space answerable to law, social freedoms, and sounder governance. A surprise by-product of the revolution, they were symptoms of a crisis within the revolutionary ranks. Often from religious backgrounds and themselves active in the revolution, they developed new interests and engaged in intellectual and cultural trends beyond the barren ideological confines. In Khatami they searched for a bridge connecting the ideals of the Islamic Revolution, as they experienced it, and the realities of a more pluralistic modernity.

Yet Khatami’s victory proved a mirage. Alarmed by the contagious spirit of openness, the hard-liners, turbaned and unturbaned, rallied behind the Supreme Leader and archconservatives such as Ayatollah Mohammad-Taqi Mesbah-Yazdi(b. 1935). Soon winds of reaction were blowing full force. In a systematic move to restrain the restive public and quell its democratic demands, the Majles, under the control of the hardliners, impeached Khatami’s minister of the interior, ‘Abdollah Nuri(b. 1950) and soon thereafter indicted him on charges of anti-Islamic offenses, sentencing him to five years in jail.

Despite Khatami’s political integrity and intellectual sophistication, the end result of his presidency can be defined only as a setback of his initial objectives—a déjà vu, perhaps, of Banisadr’s presidency sixteen years earlier. This may be attributed to Khatami’s tactical hesitancy or lack of political acumen, which from the outset kept him from leveraging his huge popular mandate to check his hard-liner opponents. 但根本原因是inherent superior powers of his opponents.

For most Iranians, and the middle classes in particular, the failure of the Khatami experiment, insofar as it could be assessed, was a major setback but not a crushing end.

Ahmadinejad：His messianic yearning for the imminent advent of the Imam of the Age pointed at a demagogic mind-set. Coupled with a fiery rhetoric, his desire for a secure power base among lower-class youth paid off at least for a while. Ahmadinejad and his cohorts squandered tens of billions of dollars of oil revenue, perhaps the largest amount ever in modern Iranian history, only to bring the economy to the brink of insolvency.

Along the same path, he reinstituted the largely inactive Basij militia as a paramilitary force. The indoctrinated youth, enthralled by weapons and a common hatred of domestic and foreign enemies, posed a new menace. Nearly three decades after the Islamic Revolution, the appeal of Islamic activism had not entirely ceased. At least until the 2009 presidential election, when obvious vote rigging reinstated Ahmadinejad to office, the Basij option continued to appeal to youth if not out of sheer conviction, at least for access to economic privilege.

In pursuit of his hard-line course, Khamenei had to secure the loyalty of the Revolutionary Guard Corps, the state-controlled media, the Guardian Council and the clerical establishment, and an assortment of hard-liners in the Islamic parliament. Through patronage and moral support he was able to acquire, at least temporarily, the allegiance of the madrasas in Qom and elsewhere, the Islamic propaganda organizations that mushroomed around the county, and editors of the hard-line press.

The excesses and adventurism of Ahmadinejad era were serious enough to bring even Khamenei to his senses. His implicit consent with the Guardian Council to hold a relatively fair presidential election in 2013 that brought Hasan Rouhani (b. 1948), a middle-of-the-road insider, to power was one manifestation of Khamenei’s a conciliatory course, one motivated by expediency rather than radical ideology.

Yet to its credit, the Islamic Republic for nearly four decades since its inception, and despite all its domestic and international challenges, was able to provide Iran with security at its borders and a remarkable degree of internal stability.

With the slow demise of Iran’s basic rural social fabric, the idyllic village setting, with its distinctive architecture, also began to vanish gradually, giving way to mundane Western-inspired buildings with somewhat better construction and sanitation but often devoid of ecological or climatic rationales. Also vanishing were the qanats, the irrigation ponds, and the walled gardens indigenous to the Iranian landscape, the beasts of burden and cattle, species of plants and shrubs, even flocks of sheep and goats.

Even more rapidly forgotten were village crafts and skills, regional dialects, folktales, ceremonies and rituals, and the diversity of clothing worn by people from different regions. With maddening speed Iran forged its path to uniformity, a path paved with fervor, damaging on its way much of the country’s natural resources, wildlife and diverse habitats, and idyllic beauty.

At the edge of Iranian deserts, as remote villages were depopulated and their cultivation declined, soil erosion brought greater desertification. With the loss of their ancient function, many oases disappeared. They paid the price for the demise of the caravan trade and the end to the subsistence village economy, a process that had started decades earlier. Changes in old irrigation techniques, too, accelerated the villages’ demise.

Ineffective environmental control, substantial loss of green spaces in and around cities, and above all an unbridled cult of the car contributed to the degradation of urban life.

A pattern of social ills, rampant from the early 1990s, complemented the failure of the state’s social policies. Widespread drug addiction, prostitution networks, abused and abandoned children, teenagers escaping home, battered women and murdered spouses—all weakened society’s moral fabric. These were compounded by huge discrepancies in wealth, high unemployment, and health and environmental problems

Addiction in Iran had deep historical roots, though perhaps not any more prevalent than in other societies exposed to rapid urban change. Yet addiction was emblematic of the failure of the revolutionary regime to fulfill its declared mission to eradicate “moral turpitude” through Islamic chastity and changes in the decadent lifestyles of the Pahlavi era.

大批人移民。brain drain。

All through the first two decades of the Republic, the morality police, the dreaded “Patrol of God’s Vengeance” (Gasht-e Sar-Allah), terrorized women in the capital and larger cities.

The never-ending chastity-enforcement campaigns not only revealed a fetishistic obsession with the female body but also an element of class warfare, for they set up poorer people with religious proclivities to inspect and correct the “vices” of a secularized middle class.

Beyond enforcing a shari‘a-prescribed bodily code, the essentially misogynistic clerical culture of Qom embarked on a systematic rewriting of women’s civil and legal rights in the Islamic Republic. It reversed much of the achievements of the late Pahlavi era. Marriage and family laws were drastically rewritten along old patriarchal lines.

More visible and more confident, younger women of postrevolutionary generations constituted a voiceless but palpable source of social discontent, at odds with the male-dominated elite of the Islamic Republic and their desire to keep women on the margins of, if not entirely outside, the public space.

Whether modern or classic, however, it seemed as if a millennium-old tradition of Persian poetry were about to give way to a new medium of images. A verbal revolution of sorts had gradually dried up poetic creativity, even though appreciation of select modernist and classics such as Ferdowsi and Hafez remained strong.

By far neorealism ruled supreme among Iranian filmmakers of the 1980s and 1990s, even though they were mostly obliged to work within the genre of children’s films to secure funding and pass the censors. The film department of the Organization for the Intellectual Development of Children and Young Adults, one of the more successful institutions established in 1965 with the patronage of Queen Farah, had a lasting impact on filmmakers of the next generation.

The popular appeal of most of these movies beyond highbrow viewers and international festivals, points to the public’s desire to see their reality unmasked and their agonies surface even if the censorship does not permit its full exposure. Such a collective wish elevated the role of cinema in Iran beyond entertainment and leisure into a powerful instrument of dissent, unmatched in its scope and impact by literary or other modes of cultural expression. The potency of this message of dissent played a major part in elevating Iranian cinema—as early as the 1960s but more poignantly since the Islamic Revolution—to internationally acknowledged standards.

As much as cinema appealed to younger Iranians, classical Persian music and its remarkable revival in the postrevolutionary era projected the other side of the quest for cultural autonomy. Reclaiming the Persian musical tradition in the face of the Islamic state’s initial rejection was not only an act of defiance but also a window onto a fascinating world where the confluence of music and poetry brought back to the present centuries of collective memory.

The tangible absence of female performers and vocalists, however, because of the Islamic Republic’s ban on women performing in public, exposed a major lacuna. Yet the ban did not deter women from excelling in Persian music in private.

Perhaps the most distinguished figure of Persian musical revival since the 1970s, however, is Mohammad Reza Shajarian, a master vocalist of remarkable quality and range. His popularity over the years has given him an iconic position, free of state patronage and immune to its infringement.

Green Movement: Both challenging candidates were among the regime’s insiders, they were hailed by the public and welcomed as realistic alternatives to Ahmadinejad’s presidency. What motivated the campaign rallies to transform into a mass protest movement, more than the relative credibility of the opposition candidates, was Ahmadinejad’s disastrous presidency, Khamenei’s flawed judgment, and the Islamic Republic’s fearful elite.

It revealed to the Islamic regime, to the international community, and to the hundreds of thousands who gathered in Maydan Azadi in Tehran, in Maydan Naqsh-e Jahan in Isfahan, and elsewhere in Iran the existence of popular dissent among the predominantly young middle classes.